


AFGHANISTAN IN 2009

A Survey of the Afghan People



The Asia Foundation

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About The Asia Foundation

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With offices throughout Asia, an office in Washington, D.C., and its headquarters in San Francisco, the Foundation addresses these issues on both a country and regional level. In 2008, the Foundation provided more than \$87 million in program support and distributed over one million books and educational materials valued at \$41 million throughout Asia.

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This survey was made possible by support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (Award No. 306-A-00-09-00514-00). The opinions expressed herein do not reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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Preface

2009 has been a formative year for the people of Afghanistan. In the 12 months since The Asia Foundation conducted its last survey of Afghan public opinion in 2008, the domestic and international landscape has shifted considerably, heralding renewed emphasis on this nation determined to find its path forward in the post-Taliban era. Defined by presidential and provincial council elections and an uptick in insurgent activity, these shifts have delivered both noted accomplishment and tragedy in 2009. Despite modest improvements in basic infrastructure, public services, education, and health, civilian and military casualties have reached unsettling levels. Add natural disasters, inclement weather conditions, and a renewed anti-insurgency campaign in Pakistan to the dynamic and conditions are considerably difficult for the average Afghan. These challenging surroundings notwithstanding, The Asia Foundation successfully conducted its fifth nationwide assessment of Afghan public opinion. This report, outlining findings and methodology, is the material result of that effort.

Aiming to provide policy makers and influential actors in government, civil society, the international community, and the broader Afghan citizenry with useful, actionable information, the 2009 Survey of the Afghan People is a comprehensive assessment of national perception in several key policy areas including security, economy, governance, democratic values, and women and society. Expanding from its limited scope in 2004 and building upon previous surveys conducted in 2006, 2007, and 2008, the 2009 survey continues to track core appraisal areas while revising its nuances and methodology to meet contemporary constraints and demands. The survey's value can be found in its reliable consistency to measure public perception systematically in each passing year, making it an important public policy tool and "snapshot" barometer of public opinion in Afghanistan.



On The Cover: Field researcher walking between survey points in the mountains of Badakhshan province.

The 2009 survey, like previous surveys, employed a standard questionnaire designed to solicit actionable responses from typical Afghans which would prove useful to policy makers, social researchers, and donor organizations and their interventions. In addition to core tracking questions included in the questionnaire since the survey's initial inception in 2004, the Foundation consulted with select experts, stakeholders, and donors for review and suggestions for new assessment elements in 2009. This is reflected in the survey by a greater emphasis placed in the areas of sub-national governance, economy and development, women and society, and democratic values at the request of stakeholders. The conduct of presidential elections in 2009 also played a palpable and influential role throughout.

Operationally, 648 field surveyors throughout all 34 provinces of Afghanistan interviewed 6,406 adult Afghans between June 17 and July 6, 2009 to construct the 2009 report data sets. Sample points were randomly distributed proportional to geographical and residential characteristics with “Kish” grids to select the individual respondents. Instability, the presence of active fighting, logistical constraints, and natural impediments such as flooding in some provinces caused a number of sampling points to be tactically adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of harms way and able to conduct their collection of data. Full details on the methodology of the survey are available in Appendix 2 of this report. The survey questionnaire, with percentage of responses by question, can be found in Appendix 3.

Not only providing a peek into Afghan perceptions at a specific point in time or tool to measure shifts in public opinion, the survey represents the most visible product of a comprehensive approach by The Asia Foundation to build Afghan research capacity. Although the survey was commissioned, developed, and managed by The Asia Foundation's Afghanistan Office, several Afghan organizations benefited from the symbiotic partnerships forged by the program. Fieldwork was conducted by the Kabul-based Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) which has received support from The Asia Foundation since 2006. An internship program to build capacity for students and serve the broader Afghan research community was continued from 2008 in partnership with the National Centre for Policy Research (NCPR) at Kabul University. In addition to specialized trainings, selected students completed projects and received practical hands-on work experience through placements with various research organizations. The Asia Foundation also offered specialized training on statistical tools for personnel from the Afghan Government's Central Statistic Organization (CSO). Further internships and trainings are planned for later this year.

In terms of program implementation, the initial analysis and write-up of the 2009 survey report was provided by Mr. Sudhindra Sharma and Mr. Pawan Sen from Inter-Disciplinary Analysts (IDA), a partner of The Asia Foundation located in Kathmandu, Nepal. Ms. Ruth Rennie, consultant to the Foundation, completed the analysis and constructed the final version of the survey report. In Afghanistan, Mr. Sunil Pillai, Mr. Fazel Rabi Wardak, and Mr. Michael Haines managed the overall day-to-day activities of the survey project.

Finally, the generous support and confidence of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its team of professionals made this important research and capacity building tool possible.

The Asia Foundation
Kabul, Afghanistan
October 2009

1 Executive Summary

1.1 Key Findings

- In 2009, 42 percent of respondents say that the country is moving in the right direction. This figure is higher than in 2008 (38%). Similarly, 29 percent feel that the country is moving in the wrong direction compared to 32 percent in 2008, signaling a check on the trend of declining optimism that had been evident since 2006.
- The main reason for optimism continues to be good security which has been mentioned by an increasing proportion of respondents each year, from 31 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2009. More respondents in 2009 also mention reconstruction and rebuilding (36%) and opening of schools for girls (21%) as reasons for optimism than in previous years.
- Insecurity also remains the most important reason for pessimism, cited by 42 percent of respondents. However, the proportion of respondents that highlight insecurity in 2009 has fallen since 2008 when half of respondents (50%) emphasized this factor.
- Insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism) is identified as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by over a third of respondents (36%), particularly in the South East (48%), West (44%) and South West (41%). However, concern about other issues such as unemployment (35%), poor economy (20%), corruption (17%), poverty (11%) and education (11%) has increased in 2009 compared to 2008.
- A slightly higher proportion of respondents give a positive assessment of the security situation in their local area in 2009 (64%) than in 2008 (62%). Although improvements were reported in almost all regions of the country, it is to be considered that there were greater restrictions on the movement of survey researchers due to security concerns and other reasons in 2009 compared to previous years (refer to Appendix 2: Methodology for details).
- Just over half of respondents (51%) say they fear for their personal safety in their local area. However, much higher proportions of respondents report at least sometimes having fears for their safety in the South East (65%), South West (62%) and West (62%), than in other parts of the country. There has also been a significant rise in the incidence of crime and violence experienced by respondents in these regions since 2008.

- Seventeen percent of respondents report that they or someone in their family have been victims of violence or crime in the past year. Nearly one in ten victims of violence report that this was due to the actions of militias and insurgents (9%) or foreign forces (9%). The incidence of victimization from military type actions has been rising steadily since 2007. Violence resulting from militant/insurgent actions is mentioned most often in the Central/Hazarajat (24%), East (17%), Central/Kabul (11%), South East (9%) and South West (8%). Whereas violence due to the actions of foreign forces is most commonly reported in the South West (22%), South East (11%) and East (10%).
- The proportion of respondents who express fear to vote in a national election rose significantly between 2008 and 2009 (from 45% to 51%). This is now true for the majority of respondents in the South West (79%), South East (68%), West (61%) and East (56%) of the country.
- In 2009, Afghans give a more positive assessment of their economic situation than in previous years, although this prosperity is not evenly shared. Considerably more urban respondents (63%) than rural residents (52%) say they are more prosperous today than they were under the Taliban.
- Unemployment continues to feature amongst the most important problems at both national (35%) and local (26%) levels. Other major problems at the local level concern basic infrastructure and services such as electricity (26%), roads (24%), water (22%) and lack of health care/clinics/hospitals (20%), as in previous years.
- In terms of local amenities and services, respondents continue to report the greatest satisfaction with the availability of education for children (67%), water for drinking (63%) and irrigation (53%) and clinics and hospitals (49%).
- Around two-thirds of respondents (65%) say that the supply of electricity in their local areas is bad and a third of respondents (33%) report having no access to any kind of electricity. This is significantly lower than in previous years.
- Assessments of the performance of the national government have risen slightly from 67 percent in 2008 to 71 percent in 2009. The most commonly mentioned achievements of the current government are reconstruction (32%), establishing peace and security (27%) and a better education system (26%). The most commonly mentioned government failings are insecurity (31%), administrative corruption (29%), lack of job opportunities (20%), weak economy (15%) and weak government (13%).
- The majority of respondents (71%) support the government's attempts to address the security situation through negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-gov-

ernment elements. The high level of support for this approach is likely to be influenced by the fact that a majority of respondents (56%) say they have some level of sympathy with the motivations of armed opposition groups.

- Confidence in representative bodies and their responsiveness to addressing issues of local concern remains relatively high. Sixty-eight percent of respondents say parliament is addressing the major problems of people in Afghanistan and 58 percent say that their MP is addressing the major problems of their constituency in the Parliament. Satisfaction with the performance of MPs in this regards shows a small improvement in 2009 compared to 2008.
- At the local level respondents give the most positive assessment of the performance of Provincial Councils (75%), followed by district authorities (69%) and municipalities (58%). However, in 2009 satisfaction with the performance of municipal authorities has increased while satisfaction with Provincial Councils and district authorities has remained stable.
- In 2009, a significantly higher proportion of respondents than in previous years mention freedom (50%) and peace (41%) as the greatest personal benefits they expect from democracy. This year respondents give greater importance to core democratic values such as rights and law (24%), women's right (21%), government of the people (19%) and Islamic democracy (23%). However, they show less confidence in the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits such as less corruption (17%) or prosperity (15%).
- The proportion of respondents who say that democracy is the best form of government available continues to fall, from 84 percent in 2006 to 78 percent in 2009. However, since 2008 there has been no change in the level of satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Afghanistan (68%).
- Agreement with the principle of equal rights continues to fall over time, from 90 percent in 2006 and 2007 to 84 percent in 2008 and to 80 percent in 2009. The same is true of support for the principle of peaceful political opposition which has fallen from 84 percent in 2006 to 77 percent in 2009. There is also a decline in the acceptance of differences in political allegiances between individuals, from 54 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2009. However, support for allowing opposition parties to hold local meetings rose significantly from 44 percent in 2008 to 54 percent in 2009.
- 2009 sees a certain renewed confidence in the electoral process. Seventy percent of respondents say they believe that voting can lead to improvement, reversing the trend of the last two years. This is accompanied by a steady rise in the proportion

of respondents who say they can have some degree of influence over government decisions from 36 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2009.

- 2009 also sees a significant rise in public confidence in a number of election-related institutions including the Independent Election Commission (from 58% in 2008 to 67% in 2009) and political parties (47%, which is the highest recorded figure since 2006).
- The survey was conducted in June 2009 with the Presidential and Provincial Council elections scheduled for August. Two months before the elections 82 percent of respondents were aware of the elections and 77 percent had registered to vote. Voter registration was significantly higher amongst men (85%) than women (69%). Around three quarters (73%) of those who had not registered said they did not know where to do this.
- Seventy-three percent of registered voters said they were likely to vote including 48 percent who said this was very likely. However, significant proportions in the South West (35%), South East (29%), Central/Kabul (27%) and West (25%) said they were unlikely to vote. The proportion of respondents who report having no interest in participating in the elections rose sharply in 2009, and has more than doubled since 2004 (from 12% to 16% in 2005, 18% in 2008 and 26% in 2009). Security concerns were also prevalent (18%), particularly in the South East (25%) and South West (30%).
- Sixty-four percent of respondents said that the upcoming elections would be free and fair. Those who thought otherwise identified a range of potential problems including cheating in the vote count (39%) and buying of votes (33%). Only a small proportion mentioned intimidation against voters or party activists (8%). Doubts about the elections being free and fair were highest in the South West (37%), South East (29%), Central/Kabul (25%) and West (23%) regions.
- Views on freedom of expression continue to be divided. Forty percent of respondents say that most people feel free to express their opinions but an almost equal proportion (39%) say they do not. The proportion of respondents who say it is unacceptable to talk negatively about the government continues to fall, from 69% in 2007 to 61 percent in 2009. The proportion who mention poor local security conditions as a barrier to freedom of expression is also lower in 2009 (29%) than in any previous year (40% in 2006, 36% in 2007, 38% in 2008), although there is a small increase in those who explicitly mention a threat from the Taliban (21%) compared to 2008 (18%).
- Support for consultation with religious leaders in government decision-making and to resolve local problems continues to rise, with the highest levels of support in the East (82%), and South West (72%) of the country.

- As in previous years, education and illiteracy (49%) remain the major problems facing women in Afghanistan. However, over the same period there has been a consistent rise in the proportion of respondents who identify the lack of employment opportunities for women as a significant issue, from two percent in 2006 to 19 percent in 2007, 24 percent in 2008 and 28 percent in 2009.
- Stated support for gender equality remains high, including equal educational opportunities (87%) and women's right to vote (83%). The proportion who say that women should be allowed to work outside the home has decreased marginally each year from 71 percent in 2006 to its lowest level in 2009 (67%).
- Results in 2009 also show a significant decline in support for female representation in governance bodies at all levels compared to previous years.
- Radio remains the most accessible media for Afghan household, particularly in rural areas. However there has been a steady decline in radio ownership and radio listenership since 2007. The proportion of respondents who get their information from Television continues to rise but is still largely confined to urban areas.
- 2009 saw a dramatic rise in mobile telephone ownership compared to previous years. This has meant that for the first time the majority of respondents (52%) now have access to this technology.

1.2 Summary

In 2009, more respondents say that the country is moving in the right direction and fewer say it is going in the wrong direction than in 2008, signaling a check on the trend of declining optimism that had been evident since 2006.

Security continues to remain a key concern for Afghans and a critical factor by which they judge the progress and direction of their country's development. The survey data in 2009 suggests that there have been some improvements in this area and that respondents have a more positive view of the security situation than has been the case in the past two years¹. Good security is mentioned by an increasing proportion of respondents each year as the main reason for optimism. Insecurity remains the most important reason for pessimism; however, fewer respondents cited this reason in 2009 than in 2008. A slightly higher proportion of respondents

¹ It should be considered that in 2009 survey researchers faced much greater restrictions on their movements due to security concerns than in previous years. For the 2009 survey, more than 100 randomly selected sampling points across the country were inaccessible due to security reasons (*see Appendix 2: Methodology*).

also give a positive assessment of the security situation in their local area than in 2008 in almost all regions.

Nonetheless, insecurity still emerges as the biggest problem in Afghanistan, with particular impact in the South East, South West and West of the country. Much higher proportions of respondents in these regions report at least sometimes having fears for their safety and the proportion of respondents who say they often fear for their safety has been rising steadily over the last four years. There has also been a significant rise in the incidence of crime and violence experienced by respondents in these regions since 2008.

Although experienced by a small minority of respondents (9%), the incidence of victimization from the actions of militias and insurgents or foreign forces has been rising steadily since 2007, indicating that the ongoing hostilities continue to have a perceptible impact on the lives of the Afghan people. This kind of conflict-related violence is a particular concern again in the South West, South East, East and also in the Central/Hazarajat and Central/Kabul regions where high levels of violence related to militias and insurgents are reported.

The majority of respondents support the government's attempts to address the security situation through negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-government elements. The high level of support for this approach is likely to be influenced by the fact that a small majority of respondents say they have some level of sympathy with the motivations of armed opposition groups. There is little variation between ethnic groups, but there are significant regional differences. Around two thirds of respondents have some level of sympathy with such groups in the South East and East, but this is true for less than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul and Central/Hazarajat regions.

Yet a sense of optimism remains. The majority of respondents expect the security situation in their local area to improve in the next year, although, in regions where insecurity is a major problem, respondents are much less optimistic about future improvements.

Levels of insecurity continue to have an impact on respondent's willingness to participate in a range of public activities. Between 2008 and 2009 the proportion of respondents who say they would be afraid to vote in a national election rose significantly. This was the case for the majority of respondents in the South West, South East, East and West of the country reflecting the significant impact of insecurity on democratic participation in this election year.

Afghans continue to express high levels of confidence in state security services. Perceptions of the operational capacity of both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) have been improving since 2007. However, this does not necessarily translate into greater satisfaction with their performance. Fewer respondents in 2009 say the ANP helps to improve security or is honest and fair than in previous years, although assessments of the ANA's performance remain stable.

In 2009, Afghans also give a more positive assessment of their economic situation than in previous years, although this prosperity is not evenly shared. Considerably more urban than rural residents report that they are more prosperous now than under the Taliban regime. Only a minority of respondents say this is the case in the South East and South West.

Again in 2009, in terms of local services and amenities, respondents report the highest levels of satisfaction with the availability of education for children, especially girls. This is also the area in which they report having seen the greatest improvements in the last year. Satisfaction with the availability of water for drinking and irrigation and clinics and hospitals also remains relatively high.

Survey responses in 2009 suggest there have been some improvements in electricity supply in the last year. Although a third of respondents report that they have no access to any kind of electricity, this figure is significantly lower than in previous years. While there has been no substantial increase in coverage of the state electricity supply since 2006, there has been a rise in the use of public or shared generators. A small proportion of respondents also use solar power generation (4%) particularly in rural areas which appears to provide a cost effective solution to rural energy provision, particularly if the quantity of electricity supplied can be increased.

Unemployment continues to be a major issue of concern at both the national and local levels. Respondents are least satisfied with the availability of jobs in their local area and report having seen the least improvement in the last year in employment opportunities.

Despite the progress identified in a number of areas, overall assessments of the availability of basic amenities and services have not improved substantially over time. In fact, levels of satisfaction have been falling since 2007 regarding the availability of core services such as health and education, suggesting that expectations for improvement continue to remain ahead of the implementation of improvements themselves.

As in previous years, the majority of respondents say that they are aware of development projects in their local area relating to education and reconstruction of roads and bridges. Significant proportions of respondents also mention projects related to drinking water supply and health care. The Afghan Government is viewed as the primary agency responsible for most development initiatives although foreign donors are seen to play a key role in programs in the education sector, reconstruction in industry and electricity supply. The United States is identified as the major donor in all regions followed by Germany, Japan and India. However, a number of other donors are mentioned by a significant proportion of respondents in regions where they are particularly active.

In 2009, assessments of the performance of the national government have risen slightly since 2008. As in previous years, the government's performance is judged most positively with regard to the provision of education, the healthcare system and security, but least positively in terms of creating jobs, reviving/developing the economy and fighting corruption. This year respondents were asked for the first time to identify the greatest achievements and failings of the current government. The results closely mirror assessments of the overall direction and progress of the country suggesting that perceptions of government performance are largely indistinguishable from perceptions of the state of the country as a whole. The most commonly mentioned achievements of the current government include reconstruction, establishing peace and security and a better education system, whereas the most commonly mentioned failings include insecurity, administrative corruption, lack of job opportunities, weak economy and weak government. Weak government appears most strongly correlated with poor security, but also, with assessments of government performance in the provision of basic public services.

The majority of respondents continue to say that corruption is a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government. The proportion of respondents that identify corruption as a major problem in their provincial government has fallen since 2006. There has also been a consistent fall in the proportion who report an annual increase in corruption at this level. However, those who identify corruption as a major problem in their daily life and in their neighborhood has been rising steadily over the same period.

Overall confidence in representative bodies and their responsiveness to addressing issues of local concerns remains relatively high. The majority of respondents say that both the Parliament and their own MPs are addressing the issues of concern, and satisfaction with the performance of MPs in this regards show a small improvement in 2009 compared to 2008.

At the local level, respondents give the most positive assessment of the performance of Provincial Councils followed by district authorities and municipalities. Provincial Councils continue to enjoy a higher level of public confidence than national level representative institutions. However, confidence in Provincial Councils has been falling consistently since 2007. In 2009, satisfaction with the performance of municipal authorities increased while satisfaction with Provincial Councils and District authorities has remained stable.

In 2009, awareness of Community Development Councils (CDC) as representative bodies at the village level has continued to rise. In addition, more than three quarters of respondents are satisfied with the performance of their local CDC and these bodies continue to enjoy the highest levels of public confidence of any formal local governance body. However, in 2009 respondents make a much clearer distinction about the representative role of CDCs at different levels of government than they have in the past. CDCs are judged significantly more capable to represent local interests at the provincial level than at the national level.

Local shura or jirga also remain important informal governance structures at the local level. Respondents continue to prefer shura and jirga to state courts for delivering justice and resolving disputes, particularly in rural areas. Both mechanisms are judged most positively in terms of accessibility although State courts are clearly more accessible to respondents in urban areas and those with higher levels of education. Since 2007, the proportion of respondents who have taken cases to shura and jirga has risen whereas those taking cases to state courts has fallen. However, satisfaction with shura/jirga continues to drop. In 2009, the difference in levels of satisfaction between the outcomes of cases taken to formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms is much smaller than in previous years. Similarly, although public confidence in shura and jirga is higher than for all formal local governance bodies this has also been falling steadily since 2007.

In 2009, a significantly higher proportion of respondents mention freedom and peace as the greatest personal benefits they expect from democracy than in previous years. Indeed, in 2009 people appear to give greater importance to core democratic values such as rights and law, women's rights, government of the people and Islamic democracy, reversing the trend of the last few years. However, they show less confidence in the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits such as less corruption or prosperity.

However, since 2006, there has been a steady fall in the proportion of respondents who say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in Afghanistan. This

has been accompanied by a drop in the proportion of respondents who agree that democracy is the best form of government available. This disenchantment with democracy seems to be related to the perceived inability of the democratic system to fulfill the expectations of Afghan citizens in delivering the desired benefits.

In 2009, stated support for core democratic values such as equal rights before the law and equality of representation from all major regions and ethnic groups remains high. However, agreement with the principle of equal rights continues to fall over time. Support for the principle of peaceful opposition is also high, although this too has been falling steadily. Similarly, acceptance of differences in political allegiances between individuals reached its lowest level to date in 2009. On the other hand, support for allowing opposition parties, including unpopular parties, to hold local meetings rose significantly. This may be due to the elections scheduled for 2009 which gave greater salience to the activities of political parties.

As an election year, 2009 saw a certain renewed confidence in the electoral process. More respondents say they believe that voting can lead to improvement, reversing the declining trend of the last two years. This is accompanied by a steady rise in the proportion of respondents who say they can have some degree of influence over government decisions, although the proportion who say they can have a lot of influence was much higher in 2008. Confidence in personal efficacy rises with level of education and remains higher amongst urban residents although there is no significant difference between men and women in their perceptions of their ability to influence government decisions.

The survey was conducted in June 2009 with the Presidential and Provincial Council elections scheduled for August. Two months before the elections more than four-fifths of respondents were aware of the elections and over three quarters had registered to vote. Voter registration was significantly higher amongst men than women. Around three-quarters of those who had not registered said they did not know where to do this, suggesting that a lack of information about electoral procedures may still constitute a significant reason why Afghans may have failed to register to vote.

Around three-quarters of registered voters said they intended to vote, although there were some significant differences between regions and population groups. More men than women said they were likely to vote. While more than four-fifths of registered voters intended to vote in the Central/Hazarajat, East, North East and North West, between a third and a quarter said they were unlikely to vote in the South West, South East, West and Central/Kabul regions. Security concerns were prevalent in the South East and South West. Social restrictions that limit the electoral participa-

tion of women were significant in the Central/Kabul and North East regions. The proportion of respondents who report having no interest in participating in the elections rose sharply in 2009, and has more than doubled since 2004. Voting intention is strongly correlated with the sense of personal efficacy, suggesting that people are more likely to use their voting rights if they believe that voting can lead to improvement. Voting intention is also strongly correlated with confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.

The majority of respondents said that the upcoming elections would be free and fair. Those who thought otherwise identified a range of potential problems including cheating in the vote count and buying of votes. Only a small proportion mentioned intimidation against voters or party activists. Doubts about the elections being free and fair were highest in the South West, South East, West and Central/Kabul regions. However, despite some doubts about the electoral process, 2009 saw a significant rise in public confidence in a number of election-related institutions including the Independent Election Commission and political parties, which achieved the highest level of public confidence since 2006.

Views on freedom of expression continue to be divided. Physical security conditions, as well as the legal guarantee of freedoms, again emerge as the key elements in ensuring freedom of expression for citizens. The proportion of respondents who say it is unacceptable to talk negatively about the government continues to fall, demonstrating that the major obstacles to freedom of expression in Afghanistan do not come from the government but from other factors in the environment and society.

Support for consultation with religious leaders in government decision-making and to resolve local problems continues to rise, with highest levels of support in the East (82%) and South West (72%) of the country

As in previous years, education and illiteracy (49%) remain the major problems facing women in Afghanistan. However, over the same period there has been a consistent rise in the proportion of respondents who identify the lack of employment opportunities for women as a significant issue.

Stated support for gender equality, such as equal educational opportunities and women's right to vote, remains high. However, the proportion of respondents who say that women should be allowed to work outside the home has decreased marginally each year to its lowest level in 2009. Despite the high level of support for women's electoral participation only a small majority think that women should decide for themselves how to vote. In the South West and South East significant proportions of respondents say it is acceptable for men to vote in the place of women. As in previ-

ous years, support for the principles of gender equality is higher amongst women, younger age groups and urban residents. Support also rises with level of education.

Results in 2009 show a significant decline in support for female representation in governance institutions at all levels compared to previous years. Respondents record the least opposition to being represented by a woman in their District Development Assembly (DDA). Women continue to have a much stronger belief in equality of representation than men.

Radio remains the most accessible media for Afghan households particularly in rural areas. However, there has been a steady decline in radio ownership and radio listenership since 2007. Television ownership continues to rise although it remains much more common in urban areas. In addition, 2009 saw a significant rise in mobile telephone ownership compared to previous years, meaning that for the first time the majority of respondents now have access to this technology.

However, the use of informal networks as a source of news and information remains high. Nearly half of respondent use meetings in the community or sermons in mosques for this purpose. Recourse to informal networks such as friends, family and neighbors as the principle source of information also remains high, particularly in rural areas and for women and respondents with lower levels of education. However, the proportion of respondents who say they prefer to receive information on local events from personal acquaintances has been falling steadily in recent years. On the other hand, 2009 records the highest proportion of respondents who say they prefer to get information from influential people such as village chiefs, community leaders or mullahs, demonstrating that traditional channels of information dissemination continue to remain important in Afghanistan.

2 The National Mood

2.1 Direction of the country

For the fourth year running the survey sought to gauge how the men and women of Afghanistan assess their country's overall situation. Respondents were first asked whether they think the country is moving in the right direction or the wrong direction. The most common view, held by 42 percent of respondents, is that the country is moving in the right direction. However, a sizeable proportion (29%) say it is moving in the wrong direction. About one in five respondents (21%) has mixed views on the overall direction of the country.

Interestingly, households with lower incomes are more likely to say that the country is moving in the right direction than those with high incomes. Over half (51%) of households in the lowest income category say this compared to 38 percent in the highest earning bracket. Similarly, around a third (34%) of those in the high income categories say that the country is moving in the wrong direction compared with a quarter (25%) in the lowest group.

There are also significant differences in opinion between regions. The majority of people living in the East (58%), North East (54%) and North West (55%) are optimistic about the overall direction of the country. In contrast, a significant proportion of the population in the South West (42%), South East (40%) and Central/Kabul (35%) regions feel that the country is moving in the wrong direction.

The proportion of respondents saying that the country is moving in the right direction in 2009 (42%) is higher than the figure recorded in 2008 (38%), signaling a check on the trend of declining optimism that had been evident since 2006. Similarly, in 2009 only 29 percent feel that the country is moving in the wrong direction compared to 32 percent who felt so in 2008. This figure is still higher than in 2007 (24%) and 2006 (21%). The proportion of those with mixed views continues to fall (from 29% in 2006 to 21% in 2009).

Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? (Q-9) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 2.1

2.2 Reasons for optimism

Respondents who say that things are moving in the right direction (42% of all respondents) were then asked to give the two most important reasons why they think this is so. The most commonly mentioned reasons include good security (44%), reconstruction/rebuilding (36%) and opening of schools for girls (21%). Around one in ten respondents mention good government (12%) and democracy and elections (10%) as factors for optimism. Improvements in security are more often mentioned by respondents in urban (49%) than rural (42%) areas. Households in the lowest income bracket most often mention improvements in security (51%), but least often mention reconstruction and rebuilding (29%). The opening of schools for girls is emphasized more by women (23%) than men (19%).

Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-10a&b combined, Base 2712)




Fig 2.2

Across the country good security is the most frequently cited reason why the country is moving in the right direction in the North East (63%), North West (60%), Central/Hazarajat (53%) and East (39%) regions².

Reconstruction/rebuilding is given as the main reason in the Central/Kabul (45%), South East (41%) and South West (35%). In the West respondents give equal importance to security (31%) and reconstruction (30%).

Table 2.1: Reasons given by those saying things are moving in the right direction (Q-10a&b combined, Base 2712) BY REGION

Base: Those saying right direction	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
Reconstruction / rebuilding	45	41	27	40	34	30	35	16
Good security	41	16	39	63	60	31	18	53
Schools for girls have opened	17	28	24	19	13	24	31	22
Good government	12	17	12	9	15	14	11	8
Peace / end of the war	10	8	4	8	15	8	7	16
Economic revival	9	9	2	5	6	3	10	5
Democracy / elections	9	17	12	5	5	21	13	14
Freedom / free speech	6	6	3	5	5	7	7	8

Between 2006 and 2009, good security has almost consistently been identified as the most important reason why respondents say that the country is heading in the right direction. Only in 2007 did most respondents identify reconstruction as the primary reason for optimism. In addition, the proportion of people mentioning good security has been rising, steadily from 31 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2009. The proportion mentioning reconstruction/rebuilding and the opening of school for girls has also generally been rising although the impact of rebuilding and reconstruction was most strongly marked between 2006 and 2007. The proportion of respondents mentioning economic revival or democracy and elections has been relatively stable over this period. On the other hand, factors such as the end of the war which were salient in 2006 when they were mentioned by 29 percent of respondents are much less relevant in 2009 (9%).

² It should be considered that in 2009 survey researchers faced much greater restrictions on their movements due to security concerns than in previous years. For the 2009 survey, more than 100 randomly selected sampling points across the country were inaccessible due to security reasons (see Appendix 2: Methodology).

Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-10a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 2.3

2.3 Reasons for pessimism

Respondents who say that things are moving in the wrong direction (i.e. 29% of all respondents) were also asked to give the two main reasons for their view. Insecurity is cited by 42 percent of respondents, making it by far the most important reason for pessimism. One-fourth (25%) of respondents identify bad government as the reason for pessimism, followed by corruption (17%) and unemployment (15%).

Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-11a&b combined, Base 1885)




Fig 2.4

There is also some variation between regions in the reasons cited for believing that the country is moving in the wrong direction. Insecurity remains the most common reason given in almost all regions with more than 40 percent of respondents mentioning this in the South West (49%), East (47%), Central Kabul (44%), South East (42%) and

West (42%). Suicide attacks are particularly singled out by almost one in five respondents in the East (19%) and one in ten in the North West (9%), which is much higher than in other parts of the country. Bad government is the most commonly cited reason in the Central Hazarajat (31%) and ranks in second place in all the other regions. The absence of reconstruction is mentioned by nearly twice as many respondents in the North East (13%) and Central Hazarajat (10%) as in other parts of the country.

Table 2.2: Reasons given by those saying things are moving in the wrong direction (Q-11a&b combined, Base 1885) BY REGION

Base: Those saying wrong direction	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
Insecurity	44	42	47	36	28	42	49	25
Bad government	27	29	16	25	19	24	24	31
There is unemployment	23	7	12	16	22	8	13	5
Corruption	15	21	10	16	19	16	17	18
Bad economy	14	10	6	12	14	13	5	13
Administrative corruption	10	6	9	16	17	7	10	10
No reconstruction has happened	5	4	5	13	5	7	5	10
Suicide Attacks	5	4	19	4	9	5	5	3

2009 is the third consecutive year that insecurity has emerged as the major reason respondents say the country is moving in the wrong direction. This indicates that security continues to remain a key concern for Afghans and a critical factor by which they judge the progress and direction of their country's development. However, the proportion of respondents highlighting insecurity in 2009 (42%) has fallen since 2008 when half of respondents (50%) emphasized this factor. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents mentioning bad government (25%) has more than doubled since 2008 (12%) and remains higher than in 2006 (22%) when it rated amongst the top concerns.

Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-11a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 2.5

2.4 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: National level

The survey attempted to measure public opinion regarding the biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole. Insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism) is identified as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by over a third of respondents (36%), particularly in the South East (48%), West (44%), East (31%), and South West (41%) regions. Unemployment is mentioned by 35 percent of respondents and is identified as the biggest problem in the Central/Kabul (41%), North East (42%) and North West (47%) regions. Other major problems identified include the poor economy (20%), corruption (17%), poverty (11%) and lack of education, schools and literacy (11%).

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-12a&b combined, Base 6406)




Fig. 2.6

Since 2006, insecurity and unemployment have consistently been identified as the most important problems, followed by the poor economy and corruption. The proportion of respondents identifying insecurity as the biggest problem in Afghanistan in 2009 is the same as in 2008 (36%). However, the figures for those mentioning other major issues have all risen, including unemployment (from 31% in 2008 to 35% in 2009), poor economy (from 17% to 20%), corruption (from 14% to 17%), poverty (from 8% to 11%) and education (from 9% to 11%). In contrast however, the proportion of respondents mentioning the presence of the Taliban continues to fall (from 18% in 2006 to 13% in 2007 and 2008 to just 8% in 2009).

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-12a&b combined)
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 2.7

2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level

The most important problems identified by respondents at the local level are quite different from those mentioned at the national level. The survey asked respondents about the biggest problem in their local area and invited them to mention two. As in previous years, across the country as a whole it is development issues, rather than security or governance issues, that dominate priorities at the local level. The problems most often mentioned by respondents are unemployment (26%) and electricity (26%), followed by lack of roads (24%), water (22%) and lack of health care/clinics/hospitals (20%).

Unemployment is identified as a significant problem at both national and local levels. More than a third (35%) of respondents identify unemployment among the top two problems at the national level and around a quarter (26%) say the same at the local level.

What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-13a&b combined, Base 6406)




Fig. 2.8

Lack of electricity is most frequently identified as the main local problem in the East (36%), North East (35%) and North West (33%) regions, while over a quarter of respondents in every region, except the North West, mention unemployment as the local biggest problem. Insecurity, attacks and violence are much more frequently mentioned in the South East (28%), South West (25%) and West (20%) than in other parts of the country (between 5% and 9%). Lack of roads is mentioned by around a third of respondents in the Central/Kabul (32%), North East (32%) and North West (29%) regions, while water is identified as the main problem in the North West (41%) and Central/Hazarajat (29%).

Table 2.3: What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-13a&b combined, Base 6406)
BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
Roads	32	14	14	32	29	23	11	19
Health care/clin- ics/ hospitals	26	14	21	23	22	15	13	22
Unemployment	25	28	26	28	18	29	28	25
Electricity	24	14	36	35	33	25	17	17
Water	21	10	18	25	41	19	8	29
Education / schools / literacy	13	21	16	11	16	18	17	16
Insecurity / attacks / violence	8	28	9	6	6	20	25	5

Twice as many respondents in rural areas (17%) mention education as one of the biggest local problems as compared to those in urban areas (8%). The same is true for insecurity, attacks and violence which are mentioned by 15 percent of respondents in villages compared to 8 percent of those in urban areas. Electricity is also slightly more often mentioned by rural (27%) than urban (23%) respondents. On the other hand, roads are more often cited by respondents in urban areas (30%) than in villages (22%), and the same is true for health care (25% of urban compared to 19% of rural respondents).

Despite occasional fluctuations, the identification of major local problems has remained relatively stable since 2006. However, the priority of roads appears to be rising (24% in 2009 compared to 18% in 2008, 19% in 2007 and 14% in 2006), and the same is true for healthcare, although to a more limited extent (from 15% in 2006 and 2008 to 20% in 2009).

What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-13a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 2.9

2.6 Confidence in specific institutions and organizations

Confidence in public institutions and organizations represents an important indicator of public trust in government and other social institutions. Respondents were asked about the confidence they have in a range of public institutions and organizations. A list was read out and respondents were asked to state how much confidence

they have in each body to perform its job. Responses indicate that the highest levels of public confidence are still enjoyed by the Afghan National Army (ANA) (91%) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (84%). Since 2006 these two institutions have consistently enjoyed the highest levels of public confidence. Confidence in the ANA, in particular, has even risen slightly over this period.

Representative bodies enjoy the confidence of around two thirds of respondents including community shura and jirga (68%), Community Development Councils (CDC) (63%) and Provincial Councils (62%). While confidence in CDCs has remained stable since 2007, confidence in Provincial Councils has fallen (from 69% in 2007 to 65% in 2008 and 62% in 2009). The same trend is evident regarding confidence in community shura and jirga which has fallen from 71 percent in 2007 to 69 percent in 2008 and 68 percent in 2009.

Confidence in the media is also high. Seventy percent of respondents say they have confidence in electronic media such as radio and television. However, here too confidence levels have been falling since 2006 when the figure was 84 percent. Sixty-two percent say they have confidence in newspapers and print media. Considerable public confidence is also expressed in non-governmental organizations, both international (66%) and national (62%) as has been the case since 2007.

Respondents show greater ambivalence towards government institutions. Only 57 percent express confidence in the public administration. This falls to 46 percent for the government justice system and 46 percent for municipalities. A little more than half of respondents (53%) say they have confidence in government ministers. However, two-thirds (67%) of respondents say they have confidence in the Independent Election Commission. This is a significant increase since 2008 (57%) which may be due to the higher public profile of the Commission in the run up to the 2009 presidential and provincial elections.

Although public confidence in political parties remains low (47%), the figure recorded in 2009 is the highest since 2006. This may also be related to the increased activity of political parties in an election year. Public confidence is again lowest for local militias, with just over one-third of respondents (37%) expressing confidence in them. However, this figure has been steadily rising since 2006 (from 31% to 33% in 2007 and 36% in 2008).

Table 2.4: Percentage of people who have a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in specific institutions and organizations (Q-51a-p) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Institution/Organization	Confidence (%) (Great deal + Fair amount)			
	2006	2007	2008	2009
Afghan National Army	87	88	89	91
Afghan National Police	86	83	82	84
Electronic media such as radio, TV	84	74	76	70
Independent Election commission	-	-	57	67
Community Shura/ Jirga	-	71	69	67
International NGOs	-	65	64	66
Community Development Councils	-	64	65	64
Provincial Councils	-	69	65	62
Newspapers, print media	77	62	63	62
National NGOs	-	59	62	61
Public administration	-	61	55	57
Government Ministers	-	58	51	53
Political parties	44	39	43	47
The Government Justice system	38	48	46	46
The Municipality	-	48	42	46
Local militias	31	33	36	37

3 Security

3.1 Security Situation

Although respondents identify insecurity as the biggest problem facing the country (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level*), in most places it is not identified as the biggest problem at the local level (*see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level*). When asked about the security situation in the village/neighborhood where they live, a majority of respondents (64%) say that it is quite good or very good in their area³.

Bearing this caveat in mind, the situation still appears to vary significantly between regions. The majority of respondents have a positive perception of the security situation in their local area in the North West (86%), Central/Kabul (78%), Central/Hazarajat (77%), North East (76%) and East (70%). On the other hand, more than half of respondents say that security in their local area is quite bad or very bad in the West (55%), South East (62%), and South West (65%) regions.

Would you rate the security situation as very good, quite good, quite bad, very bad in your area?
(Q-16e, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig.3.1

Trends show that since 2006 the large majority of respondents in the North West, North East, Central/Kabul and Central/Hazarajat regions continue to say their local security situation is good, whereas in the South East the majority continue to say

³ It should be considered that in 2009 survey researchers faced much greater restrictions on their movements due to security concerns than in previous years. For the 2009 survey, more than 100 randomly selected sampling points across the country were inaccessible due to security reasons (*see Appendix 2: Methodology*).

that it is bad. However, while there has been an overall improvement in the security situation since 2006 in the East and North West, the situation has deteriorated significantly in the South West and West.

Table 3.1: Would you rate the security situation as very good, quite good, quite bad, very bad in your area? (Q-16e – combined responses of Very Good and Quite Good), REGIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Central/Kabul	80	80	74	78
South East	42	38	35	38
East	54	64	67	70
North East	74	88	80	76
North West	78	89	82	86
West	57	40	44	44
South West	47	35	26	32
Central/Hazarajat	75	74	80	77

Respondents from rural and urban areas have significantly different perceptions of local security. A higher proportion of urban residents (79%) say the security situation in their local area is either quite good or very good compared to their rural counterparts (60%). On the other hand, more than a third of respondents in rural areas (39%) say security in their local area is quite bad or very bad compared to only one-fifth of urban residents (20%). This is consistent with the finding that nearly twice as many rural residents identify insecurity as one of the biggest local problems compared to those in urban areas (see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level).

Would you rate the security situation as very good, quite good, quite bad, very bad in your area? (Q-16e, Base 6406) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT




Fig. 3.2

3.2 Personal and family safety and security

The survey sought to gauge the perception of safety and security for individuals and their families. About a third of respondents (32%) report that they never fear for their personal safety or for that of their families. However, another third (35%) say that they sometimes fear for their safety and 16 percent say they often do.

The proportion of respondents who say they often fear for their safety has been rising steadily over the last four years (from 9% in 2006 to 11% in 2007, 15% in 2008 and 16% in 2009).

How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days?
(Q-18) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 3.3

The proportion of respondents who report never having any fear is highest in the Central/Kabul, North East, North West and Central/Hazarajat regions. These findings show how the people living in regions where the local security situation is good are generally less fearful for their own personal safety, or for that of their families. Conversely, the degree of fear is more pronounced in the regions where insecurity is identified as an important local problem such as the South East (65%), West (62%) and South West (62%), where around two-thirds of respondents say they sometimes or often fear for their safety (*see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level*).

*How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days?
(Q-18, Base 6406) BY REGION*




Fig 3.4

The survey also attempted to examine people’s actual experience of violence and crime by asking whether they, or anyone in their family, have been a victim of violence or some criminal act in their home or community in the past year. Compared to the relatively high proportion of people who report that they sometimes or often fear for their safety (51%), the proportion of those who have actually experienced violence or crime in the past year is relatively low, although it is still significant. Nearly one in six respondents (17%) report that they or someone in their family have been victims of violence or crime in the past year.

The experience of violence or crime is almost twice as high in rural (19%) as in urban (10%) areas. This is consistent with the greater concern about insecurity reported by rural respondents (see Fig.3.2). Income also seems to have some bearing on victimization from violence or crime. The proportion of respondents who report having been victims of violence or crime rises consistently with monthly household income, from 12 percent of those earning less than 2000Afs a month to 20 percent amongst those earning more than 10,000Afs.

There is also variation between regions. The highest incidence of crime or violence is reported by respondents in the South East (26%), followed by the West (25%), South West (25%) and East (22%). In addition, the experience of violence or crime has increased significantly in most of these regions since 2008, (In the South East from 21% to 26%, in the East from 19% to 22%, and in the West from 17% to 25%). This is again consistent with the higher perceptions of insecurity and the identification of insecurity as a major local problem in these regions (see Fig.3.1). There has also been an increase in victimization in the Central/Hazarajat region since 2008 (from 4% to 10%), although the level still remains relatively low.

Table 3.2: Have you or has anyone in your family been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in your home or community in the past year? (Q-19) BY REGION, COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008 AND 2009

	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Central/Kabul	13	12
South East	21	26
East	19	22
North East	15	12
North West	11	6
West	17	25
South West	22	25
Central /Hazarajat	4	10

When respondents who report having been a victim of violence or crime in the past year (17% of all respondents) were asked about the kinds of violence and crime they had experienced, the most commonly mentioned include physical attack or beating (30%), racketeering/extortion (15%) and property-related crime such as burglary/looting (15%) and theft of livestock (10%). Nearly one in ten victims of violence report that these were due to military style actions with equal proportions identifying the actions of militias and insurgents (9%) and those of foreign forces (9%). The incidence of victimization from military type actions has been rising steadily both for militia/insurgent activity (from 3% in 2007 to 8% in 2008 and 9% in 2009) and the actions of foreign forces (from 5% in 2007 to 6% in 2008 and 9% in 2009), indicating that the ongoing hostilities continue to have a perceptible impact on the lives of the Afghan people. Indeed, violence resulting from militant/insurgent actions is mentioned by a relatively high number of people in the Central/Kabul (11%), and East (17%) and in the Central/Hazarajat (24%) where it is one of the types of violence most often mentioned by respondents. Violence resulting from the actions of foreign forces is mentioned by one in five victims (22%) in the South West region, and by one in ten in the South East (11%) and the East (10%). Analysis of responses in individual provinces gives an even starker picture. At least one in four victims report having experienced militia or insurgent related violence in Kapisa (27%), Paktika (26%), Daikundi (26%) and Kunar (25%) provinces. One in five victims (20%) in Kunar also report having experienced violence from the actions of foreign forces. This is also true of more than a third of victims of violence in Uruzgan (38%) and half the victims (50%) in Zabul province.

What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-20, Base 1070) (Percentage based on multiple responses)




Fig 3.5

Just under a third (31%) of crime victims in rural areas report having been victims of physical attack or beating compared to around one in five respondents in urban areas (21%). On the other hand, burglary/looting and pick-pocketing are more prevalent in urban areas.

What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-20, Base 1070) (Percentage based on multiple responses) BY SETTLEMENT




Fig 3.6

3.3 Attitude towards reporting crime

Those respondents who have been a victim or violence or crime (17% of all respondents) were then asked whether they reported the crime to any authority. Just under two-thirds (61%) say they reported the crime, while another third say they did not. Reporting levels have not changed since 2007. Rural dwellers are more likely to re-

port crime to an authority (62%) than their urban counterparts (56%). The survey also found that respondents with higher educational levels are more likely to report crime than those who never went to school (58% of crime victims who never went to school reported the crime compared to 71% of those with secondary or higher education).

Reporting of crime is highest in the North East (70%), followed by the Central/Hazarajat (67%), East (64%) and West (63%). Reporting of crime is lowest in the South West (54%).

Respondents who say they reported violence or crime (10% of all respondents) were also asked to which agency or institution they reported the crime. Multiple responses were possible. The majority of respondents say they reported the crime to government authorities such as the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) (41%) or the district governor/woleswal (23%). Around one in five (18%) reported the incident to the Afghan National Army (ANA). A significant proportion say they reported the crime to informal or traditional institutions such as tribal leaders or maliks (18%), shura/elders (12%) or mullahs (6%).

There is a significant distinction in the choice of authority to which crime is reported between rural and urban areas. Respondents in urban areas are more likely to report a crime to formal institutions such as the ANP (64%) than those in rural areas (38%). On the other hand, rural respondents are more likely to report a crime to traditional institutions such as shura/elders (14%) than those in urban areas (4%). The district governor's office is also a popular place for rural residents to report crimes.

To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Q-22, Base 658) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT




Fig. 3.7

Respondents, who have been victims of crime or violence, but who did not report this to any authority (i.e., 6% of all respondents), were asked to give the reasons for not reporting the crime. Again, multiple responses were possible. Around a quarter (23%) say they did not report because it makes no difference. A similar proportion (22%) say they were afraid of retaliation. Women are particularly deterred from reporting crime by danger or fear of retaliation (24% compared to 20% of men). This is also a more significant factor for respondents in urban areas (32%) as compared to those in rural areas (20%). Danger or fear of retaliation is particularly pronounced in the North East (34%), West (28%), Central/Hazarajat (28%) and Central/Kabul (24%) regions.

One in five (20%) say the incident was not serious enough to warrant reporting. A significant proportion (14%) mention lack of trust in government officials as the reason for not reporting crime. However, this is much more commonly cited as a reason in rural (15%) than urban (5%) areas. Around one in ten (11%) respondents say they did not report the crime because they didn't know where to report it. This figure was slightly higher in urban (13%) than rural (11%) areas. Those saying they did not know where to report crime was particularly high in the North West (19%), Central/Kabul (17%), East (13%) and North East (13%) regions.

Why didn't you report the crime? (Q-23, Base 355) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT




Fig 3.8

All respondents, regardless of whether they have had personal experience of crime or not, were asked the hypothetical question: “If you were a witness to a crime, to whom would you report it?” Again, multiple responses were possible. Almost half of respondents (48%) say they would report a crime to ANP. Other government

institutions such as the ANA (16%) and district governor/woleswal (15%) are also identified frequently. However, as with the actual reporting of crime, a significant number of people say that they would report to informal or traditional institutions such as tribal leaders or maliks (23%), shura or elders (13%) and mullahs (10%). Again, informal institutions are more often mentioned in rural than in urban areas. This finding closely mirrors those of previous years

Responses to the hypothetical question about reporting of crime largely correspond to the actual reporting of crime. However, there is a tendency to overestimate the importance of the ANP as the authority to which crime is reported. About half of respondents (48%) say they would report a crime they witnessed to the ANP, but only 41 percent of victims actually reported the crime to the ANP. The same holds true in the case of tribal leaders or maliks (23% say they would report to them but 18% actually did so) and mullah sahibs (10% say they would report to them, 6% actually did). On the other hand, 15 percent say that they would report a crime they witnessed to a district governor or woleswal, but in fact, 23 percent of victims actually reported the crime to a District Governor.

Table 3.3: Proportions of those who have reported the crime to various agencies or institutions (actual) (Q-22, Base 658) and who they would report to if they were a witness to a crime (hypothetical) (Q-24, Base 6406)

	Who they have reported to (Actual) (%)	Who they would report to (Hypothetical) (%)
Afghan National Police	41	48
District Governor/Woleswal	23	15
Tribal leaders/Maliks	18	23
Afghan National Army	18	16
Shura/Elders	12	13
Mullahs	6	10

3.4 Causes of crime

The survey also attempted to identify what people think are the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan. Respondents were requested to mention up to two causes. The most common cause of crime respondents mention is unemployment (37%). Sizeable numbers of respondents also identify corruption (22%), poverty (22%), insecurity (21%), illiteracy (16%) and weak government (12%) as amongst the biggest cause of crime.

In addition to these main causes, a number of other issues were highlighted in specific regions where they have a particular impact. These include drugs (10%), particularly mentioned in the North East (15%) and West (13%), and the presence of the Taliban (8%), which is most often mentioned in the East (15%), South West (12%) and Central/Hazarajat (12%). Interference from Pakistan (3%) is particularly mentioned in the South West (7%), whereas the presence of international forces (2%) is most often mentioned in the East (7%) and the South West (5%).

Table 3.4: What is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Q-26a&b, Base 6406) BY REGION (Percentages based on multiple responses)

	ALL (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
Unemployment	37	44	28	34	43	43	28	32	28
Corruption	22	23	19	17	28	23	20	19	14
Poverty	22	25	23	22	19	26	23	11	15
Insecurity	21	23	20	23	19	17	21	25	14
Illiteracy	16	14	22	22	16	15	13	17	11
Lack of govt. attention /weak government	12	14	19	6	9	9	15	9	17
Drugs	10	8	8	8	15	8	13	9	6
Taliban	8	4	7	15	7	5	8	12	12
Lack of law implementation	6	8	6	1	7	5	10	5	7
Discriminations	5	4	6	7	7	4	3	6	7
Terrorism	4	3	3	6	4	4	3	8	6
Existence of irresponsible armed groups	4	3	6	3	5	2	6	6	1
Pakistan's interference	3	2	3	4	3	1	3	7	2
Having a weak/ low-paid police	2	2	1	0	1	1	4	3	4
Presence of international forces	2	2	2	7	1	1	2	5	1
Lack of recon- struction	1	1	4	4	1	2	1	4	1
Don't know	6	4	6	4	2	11	6	4	19

3.5 Safety to participate in various activities

The survey also examined perceptions of security by ascertaining whether people feel safe to participate in a range of public activities. A series of activities was read-out to respondents and they were asked to say whether they would participate in these activities with some degree of fear or without fear. The majority of respondents (57%) say they would have no fear participating in resolving problems at the community level. However, this is not the case with other forms of public activity. Just over half (51%) of respondents said they would be afraid to vote in a national election, including 16 percent who say they would have a lot of fear doing this. In contrast, a significant majority say they would have some degree of fear engaging in public political actions such as participating in a peaceful demonstration (61%) or running for public office (58%). More than two-thirds of respondents (69%) also say they would be afraid when traveling from one part of the country to another. Half (50%) of respondents say that they would have some fear encountering officers of the Afghan National Police (ANP). These figures closely match those recorded in 2008.

Table 3.5: Public's level of fear to participate in various activities (Q-30a-f, Base 6406)

	No fear (%)	Some fear (%)	A lot of fear (%)
a) Participating in resolving problems in your community	57	33	7
b) Voting in a national election	47	35	16
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration	32	39	22
d) Running for a public office	31	37	21
e) Encountering ANP officers	46	36	14
f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	28	42	27

There are important variations between regions. The highest levels of fear to participate in any kind of public activity are recorded in the South West region, followed by the West, South East and East which are also the regions where respondents most frequently say they fear for their safety and that of their families (*see Fig.3.4*) and where insecurity is identified as one of the biggest problems at the local level (*see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level*). More than half of respondents say they would have some fear participating in resolving problems in their local communities in the South West (62%) and West (54%) regions. The majority say the same about voting in a national election in the South West (79%), South East (68%), West (61%) and East (56%). This clearly reflects the impact of insecurity on democratic participation in these regions.

Table 3.6: Public's level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in various activities (Q-30a-f, Base 6406) BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
a) Participating in resolving problems in your community	32	44	44	34	22	54	62	30
b) Voting in a national election	40	68	56	46	31	61	79	30
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration	53	61	68	56	54	73	75	53
d) Running for public office	51	65	58	54	46	70	79	41
e) Encountering ANP officers	45	50	41	49	41	57	73	35
f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	67	71	62	65	56	87	78	59

More women report fear participating in public activities than men. Just under half (46%) of women say they would have some fear participating in resolving problems in the community, compared to around a third (34%) of men. Women also express more fear voting in a national election (55% compared to 48% of men) and participating in a peaceful demonstration (64% compared to 58% of men). However, there is no significant difference in the proportions of men and women who say they would have fear running for public office or traveling around the country.

Since 2006, the proportion of respondents who say they would have some fear participating in resolving problems in their community has risen. The same is true for voting in a national election or running for public office.

Table 3.7: Public's level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in various activities (Q-30a-f, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) When participating in resolving problems in your community	32	38	39	40
b) Voting in a national election	41	44	45	51
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration	61	61	61	61
d) To run for a public office	50	56	55	58
e) When encountering ANP officers	-	49	49	50
f) When traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	-	-	61	69

The proportion of respondents who express fear to vote rose significantly between 2008 and 2009 (from 45% to 51%). The rise is evident in all regions, but particularly noticeable in the West (from 47% to 61%) and North East (from 39% to 46%).

Table 3.8: Public's level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to vote in a national election (Q-30b, Base 6406) REGIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008 AND 2009

	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Central /Kabul	34	40
South East	65	68
East	51	56
North East	39	46
North West	26	31
West	47	61
South West	74	79
Central/Hazarajat	30	30

3.6 Perceptions of the Afghan National Police

The most important institution in Afghanistan with responsibility for ensuring security and fighting crime and violence is the Afghan National Police (ANP). The survey sought to examine public perceptions of the effectiveness of the ANP in combating crime and improving security. It also sought to assess the levels of trust respondents have in the police in terms of honesty and fairness, professionalism and the capacity to act without the assistance of foreign troops. A series of statements about the ANP was read out to respondents and they were asked to state whether they agree or disagree. The responses to these statements are summarized in the table below.

Table 3.9: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANP (Q-53 a-e, Base 6406)

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	47	36	11	5
b) ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained.	22	36	27	12
c) ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	32	38	20	8
d) ANP helps improve the security	43	39	13	5
e) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	34	37	18	8

Overall, respondents assess the ANP favorably. More than four out of five respondents agree that the ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people (83%) and helps improve security (82%). Nearly three-quarters (71%) believe that the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so they can be brought to justice. However, an equally high proportion (70%) agree that the ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself. Over half (58%) think that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained.

Perceptions of the operational capacity of the ANP have been improving since 2007. Fewer respondents now think that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained (58% in 2009 compared to 65% in 2007) or that it needs the support of foreign troops to operate (70% in 2009 compared to 77% in 2007). However, this does not translate into greater satisfaction with police performance. Slightly fewer respondents in 2009 agree that the ANP helps to improve security (82% in 2009 compared to 86% in 2007), or that it is honest and fair (83% in 2009 compared to 86% in 2007).

Table 3.10: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANP (Q-53 a-e, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Agree (%) (Strongly agree & agree somewhat)		
	2007	2008	2009
a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	86	80	83
b) ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained.	65	60	58
c) ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	77	69	70
d) ANP helps improve the security	86	80	82
e) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	-	73	71

3.7 Perceptions of the Afghan National Army

The survey also attempted to gauge public perceptions of the other most significant national security force, the Afghan National Army (ANA). A similar series of statements about the ANA was read out to respondents and they were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree. The responses to these statements are summarized in the table below.

Table 3.11: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANA (Q-52 a-d, Base 6406)

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	57	34	5	2
b) ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained.	19	33	28	17
c) ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	30	39	18	9
d) ANA helps improve the security	54	33	8	3

Overall, the public has an even more positive perception of the ANA than it does of the ANP. Nine out of ten respondents (91%) agree that the ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people as compared to eight out of ten (83%) who say the same about the ANP. A similarly high proportion agree that the ANA is helping to improve the security situation in the country (87%) as compared to 82 percent for the ANP. These responses are consistent with the finding that the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army enjoy the highest levels of confidence amongst public institutions in Afghanistan (*see Chapter 2, Table 2.3*).

However, respondents also register similar concerns about the capacity of the ANA to operate, as they do for the ANP. More than two thirds (69%) agree that the ANA cannot operate without the support of foreign troops. Around half (52%) agree that the ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained.

As with the ANP, perceptions of the operational capacity of the ANA are also rising over time. Fewer respondents now say that the ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained (52% in 2009 compared to 62% in 2007), or that it needs the support of foreign troops to operate (69% in 2009 compared to 77% in 2007). However, perceptions of the ANA's performance remain stable.

Table 3.12: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANA (Q-52 a-d, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Agree (%) (Strongly agree & agree somewhat)		
	2007	2008	2009
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	90	89	91
b) ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained.	62	55	52
c) ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	77	69	69
d) ANA helps improve the security	89	86	87

3.8 Expectations regarding security

The survey also aimed to examine public expectations regarding the security situation in the future. Respondents were asked how they expect the security situation in their local area to be in a year's time. Overall, the majority of respondents (75%) are optimistic. Nearly half (46%) say they expect it will be much better and just under a third (29%) say that it will be somewhat better. There are, however, significant variations between regions. More than half of respondents in the South West (51%) think that the security situation will be worse in a year from now. This is true for 41 percent in the South East and at least one-fifth of respondents in the East (23%). The results suggest that in these regions where insecurity is a major problem respondents are much less optimistic about future improvements.

What is your expectation for the security situation in your area a year from now – much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse or much worse? (Q-17e, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 3.9

4 Economy and Development

4.1 Economy of Afghan Households: Past and present

The survey sought to ascertain how people perceive their level of economic well being. Respondents were asked to assess their current level of economic prosperity compared to different periods in the past. They were first asked to compare their current economic condition with their circumstances under the Taliban Government (1996-2001). Around half (54%) of respondents report that their families are more prosperous today than they were during the days of the Taliban regime. One-fourth (24%) say that they are now less prosperous. Fourteen percent say their economic circumstances are the same, while the remainder were absent during Taliban rule.

The proportion of respondents who say they are more prosperous is the highest since 2006 (when it was also 54%). The more positive assessment of family economic prosperity in 2009 may be correlated with the increase in the proportion of people who say that things are going in the right direction since 2008 (*see Chapter 2, 2.1 Direction of the country*). It may also be related to the fact that fewer people in 2009 identify high prices as one of the biggest national problems compared to 2008 when this appeared as a major issue (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problem: National level*).

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-38) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 4.1

Urban residents have a more positive view of their family's current economic prosperity than their rural counterparts. Just under two thirds (63%) of urban dwellers think that they are more prosperous today than they were under the Taliban regime, compared to just over half (52%) of rural residents. Compared to other communities, Pashtuns tend to have a more negative assessment of their current level of economic prosperity. A little over a third of Pashtuns (39%) think that they are more prosperous today than under Taliban rule, compared to nearly two thirds for most other groups.

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-38, Base 6406) BY SETTLEMENT AND BY ETHNICITY




Fig 4.2

There are also significant differences in perceptions of current economic prosperity between regions. Fewer than one in five respondents in the South West (18%) and just over one in three of respondents in the South East (36%) feel that they are more prosperous today than they were under the Taliban regime, compared to at least half of respondents in the other regions. These two regions also record the highest proportion of respondents who are pessimistic about the overall direction of the country (see Chapter 2, 2.1 Direction of the country).

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-38, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 4.3

The survey also asked respondents to compare their current level of economic prosperity with a period further back in time during the period of the Soviet occupation (1979-1989). Half (50%) of respondents say that their family is more prosperous now than during the period of the Soviet occupation. Another third (32%) say that they are now less prosperous than during the Soviet period while 10 percent say that their circumstances are about the same.

Now, going even further back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about your family then and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Soviet occupation government? (Q-39, Base 6406)




Fig 4.4

The South West has the lowest proportion of respondents (Fewer than one in five – 19%) who say that they are more prosperous now than during the Soviet period. This is less than half the figure recorded in other regions

4.2 Economic Situation of Afghan Households

The survey also endeavored to examine the economic situation of Afghan households in more detail by comparing the situation of households today with their situation one year ago in terms of financial and physical well-being, as well as access to basic services and amenities. The proportion of respondents who report improvements in their situation during the last one year is summarized in the following table.

Table 4.1: Percentage of people whose situation has improved compared to one year ago in various domains (Q-45a-h, Base 6406)

	Better (%)
Access to schools	40
Health well-being of your family members	32
Financial well-being of your household	31
Quality of your food diet	23
Electricity supply	23
Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	20
Availability of products in the market	19
Employment opportunities	11

The greatest improvement has been in access to schools, mentioned by 40 percent of respondents. More people in urban areas (51%) report such improvements as compared to their rural counterparts (37%). Improvements in access to schools are reported by more than half of respondents in the North West (53%) and East (52%), and by more than a third in the Central/Kabul (44%), North East (44%), Central/Hazarajat (37%) and South East (35%) regions. However relatively few respondents report improvements in the West (29%) and South West (14%) regions.

Around one-third of respondents report improvements in the health (32%) and financial well-being (31%) of their families. Health improvements are reported most often in the East (47%), Central/Kabul (34%), South East (34%) and North West (33%) regions. However, around a quarter of respondents in the North East (24%) and South West (29%) actually say that their health status has worsened during the last year. Improvements in financial well-being are most often reported in the East

(43%), South East (38%), Central/Kabul (34%) and North West (34%) regions. Not surprisingly, low income households are less likely to report improvements in their financial situation than those with higher incomes. Thirty-one percent of households with a monthly income of less than 2000 Afs say their financial wellbeing has improved in the last year compared to 36 percent of those earning over 10,000Afs.

Around a fifth of respondents also mention improvements in the quality of their diet (23%), electricity supply (23%) and the physical conditions of their house/dwelling (20%). Improvements in electricity supply in the past year are most often mentioned in the Central/Kabul region (42%).

Respondents report the least improvement in employment opportunities (11%). The lowest levels of improvement in this regard are recorded in the South West (7%), South East (8%), West (9%) and North East (10%) regions. These responses re-confirm the identification of unemployment as one of the biggest problems facing Afghanistan at both national and local levels (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 - Afghanistan's biggest problem: National level and 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problem: Local level*).

4.3 Availability of basic amenities

The survey also attempted to measure the current condition of basic infrastructure and essential public services. The table below summarizes respondents' views on the availability of a range of basic amenities in the villages and neighborhoods where they live.

Table 4.2: Present condition of basic amenities in localities (Q-16a-d,f-h, Base 6406)

	Very good (%)	Quite good (%)	Quite bad (%)	Very bad (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water	22	41	25	12
b) The availability of water for irrigation	16	37	31	14
c) The availability of jobs	5	19	40	36
d) The supply of electricity	13	21	27	38
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	11	38	35	16
g) The availability of medicine	11	33	39	16
h) The availability of education for children	25	42	22	10

Overall, respondents report the greatest satisfaction regarding the availability of education for children with two-thirds (67%) saying this is quite good or very good in their local area. This is consistent with the finding that access to schools has shown the greatest improvement in the last year (*see Table 4.1*). A similarly high proportion

of respondents (63%) judge the availability of clean drinking water to be good or very good, and around half say the same about water for irrigation (53%) and the availability of clinic and hospitals (49%).

On the other hand, people are least satisfied with the availability of jobs. More than three quarters (76%) of respondents say the availability of jobs in their local area is quite bad or very bad. About two thirds (65%) say the supply of electricity in their local area is bad. These findings are entirely consistent with the identification of local problems discussed in Chapter 2 (*see Chapter 2, 2.5 - Afghanistan's biggest problem: Local level*).

The present condition of basic amenities varies widely between regions. The availability of education for children is judged to be good or very good by a clear majority in all regions except the South West where only a third (34%) of respondents think this. The availability of jobs is judged to be bad by more than three quarters of respondents in the South West (79%), West (78%), and North East (78%), which is much higher than in other regions.

Despite the progress identified by respondents in a number of areas, overall assessments of the availability of basic amenities and services have not improved substantially over time. In fact, although the greatest progress is reported in access to education (*see Table 4.1*), the proportion of respondents who judge this to be good in their local area has been falling since 2007 (from 72% to 70% in 2008 and 67% in 2009). The same is true for the availability of clinics and hospitals (from 56% in 2007 to 51% in 2008 and 49% in 2009). These findings suggest that expectations and desire for improvement continue to remain ahead of the implementation of improvements themselves.

Table 4.3: Present condition of basic amenities in localities (Q-16a-d,f-h) combination of quite good and very good responses, COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water	63	62	63
b) The availability of water for irrigation	59	47	53
c) The availability of jobs	30	21	24
d) The supply of electricity	31	25	34
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	56	51	49
g) The availability of medicine	-	49	44
h) The availability of education for children	72	70	67

4.4 Future expectations for infrastructure and services

Respondents were also asked about their expectations for basic infrastructure and services in the coming year. The majority of respondents expect to see improvements in their local area in all the amenities and services mentioned. More than four fifths of respondents expect to see improvements in the availability of clean drinking water (85%) and the availability of education for children (81%). About three quarters expect improvement in the availability of water for irrigation (78%), the availability of clinics and hospitals (75%) and medicines (74%). Respondents are less optimistic about the prospects for improvements in electricity supply (67%) and the availability of jobs (64%), although a clear majority still think that these will get better.

Table 4.4: People's expectations for improvements in basic infrastructures and services in local areas in the next year (Q-17a-i, Base 6406)

	Much better (%)	Somewhat better (%)	Somewhat worse (%)	Much worse (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water	48	37	9	4
b) The availability of water for irrigation	41	37	14	5
c) The availability of jobs	37	27	20	12
d) The supply of electricity	41	26	16	14
e) The security situation	46	29	13	8
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	41	34	17	6
g) The availability of medicine	40	34	17	6
h) The availability of education for children	50	31	12	5
i) Your freedom of movement - the ability to move safely in your area or district	46	32	13	6

Optimism about future improvements in basic infrastructure and services has not changed substantially since 2007 despite some minor fluctuations. However, in 2009 there is an increase in the proportion of respondents who are optimistic about improvements in the electricity supply (67%) as compared to 62 percent in 2008 and 61 percent in 2007. This may be correlated with the higher proportion of respondents in 2009 who say that the electricity supply in their local area is good, even though they are still the minority (*see Table 4.3*).

Table 4.5: People's expectations for improvements in basic infrastructures and services in local areas in the next year (Q-17a-i.) combination of somewhat better and much better responses, COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water	85	83	85
b) The availability of water for irrigation	78	74	78
c) The availability of jobs	64	62	64
d) The supply of electricity	61	62	67
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	79	76	75
g) The availability of medicine	-	76	74
h) The availability of education for children	85	82	81

4.5 Important development issues

The survey also examined how people prioritize development needs, particularly in terms of basic infrastructure such as electricity supply, water, roads, health care and education. Respondents were asked to rank these issues in order of priority; from 1 - most important to 5 - least important.

Survey results show that at the national level, roads and power are ranked equally as the top priorities followed by water supply, health care and education, although the difference in priority accorded to these five issues is not substantial. There has, however, been a shift in the public's priority since last year. In 2008 power was identified as the top priority whereas in 2009 electricity supply is in second place and the top priority is again roads, as it was in 2007.

Table 4.6: Importance of development issues in rank order (Q-14 a-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Development Issue	2007 (Rank)	2008 (Rank)	2009 (Rank)
Importance of roads	1	3	1
Importance of power	3	1	2
Importance of water	2	2	3
Importance of health care	5	4	4
Importance of education	4	5	5

The priorities for development differ between regions. Roads emerge as the top priority for inhabitants of the Central/Kabul, South West, North East and North West regions, while those living in the South East rank power supply as the top priority.

The top priority in the West is water supply and in the East it is health care. Respondents in the Central/Hazarajat give equal weight to power supply and water supply.

Table 4.7: Importance of development issues in rank order (Q-14a-e, Base 6406) BY REGION

Development Issue	Central/ Kabul	South East	East	North East	North West	West	South West	Central/ Hazarajat
	(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)
Importance of roads	1	3	3	1	3	1	4	1
Importance of power	2	5	1	2	2	2	1	2
Importance of water	4	4	2	3	1	3	2	4
Importance of health care	3	1	4	4	4	4	5	3
Importance of education	5	2	5	5	5	5	3	5

4.6 Electricity supply

Electricity is regularly identified as a priority issue for communities. For this reason the survey sought to obtain a more detailed picture of access to electricity across Afghanistan. When asked about their electricity supply at home, one third (33%) of respondents report that they have no access to any kind of electricity whatsoever. However, the proportion with no access to electricity is lower in 2009 than that recorded in previous years (43% in 2008, 41% in 2007 and 42% in 2006). This suggests that there have been some improvements in the supply of electricity to Afghan homes. The highest proportions of respondents with no access to electricity are in the North East (50%), South West (44%) and West (40%) regions.

One fifth of respondents (20%) have access to government electricity with a direct line dedicated to the house and 3 percent have access to government supplied electricity by other means. However, while around nine in ten houses in rural areas have no access to state-supplied electricity, two thirds (67%) of urban households have access to electricity provided by the government.

The remainder rely mostly on generators which are either community owned (16%), privately owned (12%) or owned by neighbors (11%). Across the country, 4 percent of respondents say they have access to electricity generated by solar panels. These are mostly mentioned by rural (5%) rather than urban (1%) respondents, and are particularly prevalent in Central Hazarajat (12%), South East (10%), South West (8%) and East (5%).

Table 4.8: Kinds of electricity supply used at the house (Q-41a-g, Base 6406) BY RURAL-
URBAN SETTLEMENT

	Electricity supply used		
	All (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)
No access to electricity	33	39	10
a) Neighbor's generator that provides electricity to your and other households in the area	11	12	8
b) Privately, self-owned (non-neighbor) generator	12	14	7
c) Community owned generator, which provides electricity to your household	16	17	10
d) Government electricity – direct line dedicated to your house	20	9	60
e) Government electricity – other sources, but not directly connected to your home	3	3	7
f) Large batteries/ invertors (such as for running TV, lights, etc.)	6	7	4
g) Solar panels for producing electricity	4	5	1

The survey then sought to examine the cost effectiveness of the electricity supply to afghan homes. The table below summarizes the various types of electricity people use at home, their daily hours of electricity consumption and their monthly spending on electricity.

Table 4.9: Kinds of electricity supply used at home (%), average consumption of electricity (hours) and average monthly expenses on electricity (Afs) (Q-41a-g; Q-42a-g; Q-43a-g, Base 6406)

	Electricity supply (%)	Consumption of electricity (hours)	Expense on electricity (Afs)
a) Neighbor's generator that provides electricity to your and other households in the area	11	3.6	591
b) Privately, self-owned (non-neighbor) generator	12	3.5	1010
c) Community owned generator, which provides electricity to your household	16	4.4	480
d) Government electricity – direct line dedicated to your house	20	18.8	903
e) Government electricity – other sources, but not directly connected to your home	3	14.7	640
f) Large batteries/ invertors (such as for running TV, lights, etc.)	6	3.2	248
g) Solar panels for producing electricity	4	4.8	194

The table indicates that those receiving government supplied electricity use the most electric power on a daily basis. On average they have access to electricity for between 14 and 19 hours a day. Average monthly spending on government supplied electricity ranges from 640 Afs for those accessing government supply through other sources to 903 Afs for those with a direct supply to their house. However, given the extended periods of supply this is amongst the cheapest forms of electricity available, averaging about 1.5Afs per hour of electricity supplied. Government supplied electricity is more than six times cheaper than electricity from a private generator whose average cost is around 10Afs per hour of supply. The only source of electricity that is cheaper than public supply is solar power. The small proportion of respondents using this form of electricity generation (4%) on average pay 194 Afs a month for up to 5 hours daily supply. This works out at around 1.3 Afs per hour of electricity. These figures suggest that solar power might be a cost effective solution to rural energy provision, particularly if the quantity of electricity supplied can be increased

4.7 Main source of energy for lighting, cooking and heating

Electricity is the most commonly used source of energy for lighting (46%), particularly in urban areas. Four fifths (80%) of urban respondents say they use electricity as the main source of energy for lighting, compared to just over a third (37%) of rural respondents. The other major sources of energy for lighting are kerosene (26%) and bottled gas/LPG (15%).

However, more than half of the respondents (52%) use firewood as their main source of energy for cooking. Other main sources of energy for this purpose include bottled gas/LPG (23%) and animal dung/manure (16%). Use of firewood for cooking is significantly higher in rural (59%) than urban (26%) areas, while the use of bottled gas/LPG is significantly higher in urban (66%) than rural (11%) settings.

Firewood is the main source of energy for heating (39%) in both rural and urban areas. There is also significant use of electricity (28%), particularly in the urban areas, and use of animal dung/manure (17%) and charcoal (14%).

Overall firewood is the most widely used source of energy in Afghan households (70%) and is used for both cooking and heating. Electricity is the next most widely used, although mostly for lighting. Electricity is the main source of energy in urban areas (81%). Bottled gas/LPG (38%) is the next most widely used source of energy and is used for all purposes, although only a small minority use this for heating.

Table 4.10: The main source of energy for lighting, cooking and heating (Q-44a-c; Base 6406)
(Percentages based on multiple responses)

	All (%)	Lighting (%)	Cooking (%)	Heating (%)
Firewood	70	-	52	39
Electricity	47	46	-	8
Bottled gas/LPG	38	15	23	4
Animal dung/ manure	30	-	16	17
Kerosene	27	26	-	1
Charcoal	16	-	2	14
Coal	11	-	2	10
Grass or other biomass	12	-	6	7
Diesel	8	7	-	-
Candles	3	3	-	-
Petrol	2	2	-	-

4.8 Development Programs and Public Awareness of Foreign Aid

The international community and donor agencies are supporting a wide variety of projects and programs in Afghanistan. The survey sought to gauge respondents’ knowledge about the implementation of development programs in their local area. All respondents were asked whether they knew of, or had heard of, any project or program implemented with foreign aid in their area or district in the last 12 months. Respondents were then given a list of the kinds of development programs that might be present in their area.

More than half (54%) of respondents say that they are aware of projects relating to education (reconstruction/opening of schools, training teachers etc.), which is consistent with the general perception that access to education is the service that has shown the greatest improvement over the past three years (see 4.2 - *Development for Afghan Households*).

A similar proportion say that they are aware of reconstruction projects involving the building of roads and bridges (52%). Projects related to water supply for drinking are mentioned by 42 percent of respondents and healthcare programs, such as primary health centers and regular visits of doctors, are mentioned by 40 percent.

Responses in this regard in 2009 are broadly similar to those recorded in previous years. Awareness of education and reconstruction programs has topped the list for four consecutive years. This suggests that the majority of development programs mostly respond to the development issues that are generally prioritized by the people

(see 4.4 – *Important development issues*). However, just over a quarter (28%) of respondents report being aware of development programs targeting the electricity supply which remains one of the most pressing issues for Afghans.

Table 4.11: Percentage of the people who knew of or heard of any development project or program implemented with foreign aids in their localities (Q-34a-m, Base 6406)

Development project	Knew/heard of (%)
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.)	54
Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges	52
Water supply for drinking	42
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	40
De-mining	33
Demilitarization / disarmament	29
Electricity supply	28
Water supply for irrigation	26
Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	26
Building new mosques	23
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture	22
Reconstruction/programs in industry	13

In order to measure public perceptions of who is primarily responsible for providing aid for development projects, respondents were asked whether they thought the Afghan Government, foreign sponsors or both were responsible for these activities in various sectors. The findings reveal that the Afghan Government is seen to be the primary agency responsible for the supply of electricity (55%), supply of water for irrigation (55%) and the in the development of education by reconstruction of schools or opening of new ones (54%). The government is seen to contribute a lot into building new mosques (70%). The Afghan Government is also seen to be leading in the field of reconstruction programs in agriculture (49%), demilitarization and disarmament (47%), reconstruction programs in industry (47%), provision of water for drinking (46%) and healthcare (45%). Almost equal credit is given to the government and to foreign donors for programs dealing with the reconstruction or building of roads and bridges or in humanitarian programs. Foreign donors are seen to have a leading role in de-mining programs.

Table 4.12: Has the Afghan government or foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of the aid for the projects? (Q-35a-l, Base 6406)

Development project	Afghan Govt. (%)	Foreign sponsor (%)	Both (%)
Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges	34	39	27
Water supply for drinking	46	31	22
Water supply for irrigation	55	25	19
Electricity supply	55	22	21
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	45	27	27
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.)	54	20	26
De-mining	33	43	23
Demilitarization / disarmament	47	26	25
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture	49	25	25
Reconstruction/programs in industry	47	27	26
Building new mosques	70	16	12
Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	31	35	33
Other projects	50	31	16

Respondents who identified foreign sponsors, alone or alongside the Afghan Government, as the primary agencies responsible for implementing projects in their area or district (70% of all respondents) were also asked which countries they think have provided this assistance. The country mentioned most often is the USA (41%) followed by Germany (8%) and Japan (7%). This finding largely matches those of 2006, 2007 and 2008. However, the figures in 2009 are slightly lower than in previous years.

Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been implemented in this area, district? (Q-36, Base 4494)




Fig 4.5

The United States is identified as the major donor in all regions (41%), followed by Germany (8%), Japan (7%) and India (5%). Many respondents also mention the local Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (3%) or foreign countries (3%) as the major donor without identifying any specific country providing the assistance.

Respondents were then asked to mention any other countries which they think have provided aid for the projects in their area or district. Overall, the countries seen to provide the most aid to Afghanistan (either as the major donor or alongside other donors) are still the USA (31%), followed by Germany (13%), Japan (12%) and India (10%) which are seen to be active in all regions. However, a number of other donors are mentioned by a significant proportion of respondents in regions where they are particularly active. For example, in the East respondents mention China (10%), Pakistan (7%), Sweden (6%) and Saudi Arabia (5%). In the South East they identify Poland (5%) as well as the PRT (7%). In the South West respondents mention Canada (9%), the UK (5%) and Saudi Arabia (5%) as well as local PRT (7%). In the West, Iran (8%), Italy (8%) and France (5%) are identified as significant donors. France is also mentioned in the North East (10%). In the Central/Kabul region, France (7%), Turkey (7%) and China (5%) are identified most often. However, in the Central/Hazarajat region comparatively few respondents identify donor countries other than the major four.

Table 4.13: Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been implemented in this area, district?, Which other countries have provided aid for the projects in your area, district? (Q-36 and 37, average score), Base 4494)

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
USA	31	32	31	34	30	30	33	29	20
Germany	13	14	14	15	20	7	11	5	14
Japan	12	14	10	22	10	8	12	12	5
India	10	8	9	19	5	5	12	9	11
France	5	7	4	3	10	4	5	4	4
United Kingdom (Britain)	3	4	3	4	2	1	4	5	3
Pakistan	3	2	2	7	2	1	2	2	0
China	3	5	1	10	3	3	2	1	1
Iran	3	3	2	3	2	2	8	3	4
Saudi Arabia	3	3	3	5	3	2	1	5	2
Turkey	3	7	1	1	1	5	2	0	0
Italy	3	2	2	2	1	1	8	1	2
Sweden	3	2	4	6	3	3	0	0	0
PRT team	3	1	7	3	1	2	2	6	2
Canada	2	3	1	3	1	1	2	9	1
Holland	2	1	0	1	2	1	1	5	0
Norway	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	0	0
Australia	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0
Russia	1	1	0	2	2	1	2	0	0
Denmark	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	1
Poland	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0

5 Government

The survey attempted to examine Afghans' experience of interacting with a range of governance institutions at the national and local levels. These include local administrative authorities such as Provincial and District Governors and Municipalities and elected representatives at national and local levels including Members of Parliament (MPs), Provincial Council and Community Development Council representatives. Respondents were asked about the performance of these institutions and their responsiveness to people's needs including whether or not they have been successful in addressing local problems. In addition, the survey collected people's views on the representation of different social groups at the community level and on the role of particular groups in political decision-making processes including consultation with religious leaders.

5.1 Performance of National Government

When asked to assess how well the national government is carrying out its responsibilities, almost three quarters of respondents (71%) give a positive assessment, including one in five (19 %) who say that the government is doing a very good job. In 2008, only two thirds of respondents (67%) gave a positive assessment, which indicates that 2009 has seen a small increase in satisfaction with the national government. However, the assessment of government performance is still less positive than in 2007 when four out of five respondents (80%) said the government was doing a good job, including one in four (25%) who said it was doing a very good job.

Thinking of the National Government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities? (Q-59) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig. 5.1

Women have a more positive view of national government performance than men. Three quarters of women (75%) say the government is doing a good job compared to around two thirds of men (66%). Public perception of the government's performance is most favorable in the East (86%), North West (82%) and North East (75%) regions, but least favorable in the South West (59%), Central/Hazarajat (61%) and South East (63%). However, even in these regions the majority of respondents still judge government performance favorably.

The survey then sought a more in-depth understanding of these responses by investigating respondents' views on the government's performance in specific areas such as education, healthcare, creating job opportunities, maintaining relations with neighboring countries, reviving/developing the economy, fighting corruption and providing security.

The government's performance is judged most positively with regard to the provision of education, healthcare and security which are the basic public services. More than four-fifths of respondents (83%) say the government is doing either a somewhat good job or a very good job providing education. Just under two-thirds (63%) say the same about the provision of healthcare and a similar proportion (61%) have the same view with respect to the provision of security. The majority of respondents also give a positive assessment of government performance in maintaining relations with neighboring countries (58%). On the other hand, a significant majority of respondents say that the government is doing a bad job in creating jobs (71%), fighting corruption (68%) and reviving/developing the economy (62%). These findings are consistent with respondents' views of the situation in their local area where the majority are most satisfied with the availability of education for children, but least satisfied with the availability of jobs (*see Chapter 4, 4.3 Availability of basic amenities*). This correlation clearly indicates that the public's assessment of government performance is closely related to the ability of the national government to provide the basic services and amenities that people need.

Table 5.1: Perceptions of the performance of the National Government in specific areas (Q-60a-g, Base 6406)

	Very good Job (%)	Somewhat good job (%)	Somewhat bad job (%)	Very bad job (%)
a) Education	37	46	12	4
b) Healthcare system	17	46	27	9
c) Creating job opportunities	6	22	38	33
d) Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	16	42	26	10
e) Reviving/Developing the economy	7	29	36	26
f) Fighting corruption	7	23	31	37
g) Security	23	38	22	16

People living in urban areas give a more positive assessment of the performance of the national government in all domains. The largest differences of opinion concern the provision of security (71% of urban respondents say the government is doing a good job in this regard, compared to 58% of respondents in rural areas) and the provision of healthcare (73% of urban respondents give a positive assessment of government performance as compared to 61% in rural areas).

Across the country the most positive assessments of government performance in all domains is recorded in the North West and Eastern regions. Whereas, the lowest levels of satisfaction are consistently recorded in the Central/Hazarajat, South West and West. The lowest level of satisfaction regarding the provision of security is recorded in the South East.

Table 5.2: Perceptions of the performance of the National Government in specific areas (Q-60a-g, Base 6406), 'somewhat good job' and 'very good job' responses, BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
a) Education	87	80	89	85	92	82	63	82
b) Healthcare system	71	60	71	55	72	63	54	47
c) Creating job opportunities	25	29	38	25	33	24	25	26
d) Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	59	59	66	54	66	55	49	38
e) Reviving/Developing the economy	33	46	42	30	35	33	38	23
f) Fighting corruption	26	25	46	29	37	26	28	18
g) Security	68	35	73	75	86	41	38	62

However, in understanding the factors that influence respondents' assessments of the government performance, it is interesting to consider the level of actual contact people have with government institutions and services. A separate set of questions reveal that a substantial proportion of respondents have had no contact with government agencies in the last year. This ranges from a third (33%) who have had no contact with public health services to 38 percent who have had no contact with the Afghan National Police (ANP), to 44 percent who have had no contact with state electricity services or with the courts to around half who have had no contact with the Afghan National Army (ANA) (47%). Moreover, levels of contact vary widely between regions. Notably, in the Central/Hazarajat region, the majority of respon-

dents have had no contact with any of these government services in the past year. These figures indicate that the presence and accessibility of government institutions is likely to be a factor that influences respondents' perceptions of government performance.

Table 5.3: Percentage of the people who have no contacts with government officials in the last year in various facets of life (Q-29c-g, Base 6406)

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
c) Afghan National Police	38	47	19	23	40	47	42	20	61
d) Afghan National Army	47	58	27	30	58	54	50	26	63
e) Judiciary / courts	44	59	28	30	47	49	44	24	59
f) State electricity supply	44	49	35	36	50	49	44	31	63
g) Public healthcare service	33	45	12	23	37	37	32	23	51

The survey also asked respondents to identify what they thought was the most important achievement of the current government in the past few years. Respondents were asked to mention up to two important achievements. The most commonly mentioned achievement of the current government is reconstruction (32%) followed by establishing peace and security (27%) and a better education system (26%). These findings are largely coherent with the reasons for optimism mentioned by respondents who say that the country is moving in the right direction (*see Chapter 2, 2.2: Reasons for optimism*).

What in your opinion is the most important achievement of the current government in the past few years? And what is next? (Q-61a & b, Base 6406) (Percentages based on multiple responses)




Fig. 5.2

Reconstruction is most often mentioned as the most important achievement of the current government in the Central/Kabul (39%), North East (37%), West (33%) and North West (31%) regions, but least often mentioned in the Central/Hazarajat (18%). Similarly, establishing peace and security is mentioned by a little less than half of respondents in the North West (46%) and North East (42%), but only one in ten in the South West (10%) and South East (11%). Again this suggests that there are wide disparities across the country in the impact and perceptions of government performance in these domains. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents who identify a better education system or freedom of speech as the most important government achievements shows little variation between regions.

In the same vein, the survey asked respondents about the most important failing of the current government. The most commonly mentioned government failings are insecurity (31%), administrative corruption (29%), lack of job opportunities (20%), weak economy (15%) and weak government (13%). Eight percent of the respondents are unable or unwilling to identify any failures of the current government. These are the same issues highlighted by those respondents who say that the country is moving in the wrong direction (*see Chapter 2, 2.3: Reasons of pessimism*).

What in your opinion is the most important failing of the current government in the past few years? And what is next? (Q-62a&b, Base 6406) (Percentages based on multiple responses)




Fig. 5.3

Insecurity is most often mentioned in the South West (41%), South East (39%), and West (33%), which are the areas in which the majority of respondents rate the security in their local area as poor or very poor (*see 3, 3.1 Security Situation*). This is also the case in the Central/Kabul region (34%) where insecurity is the top issue mentioned. Respondents in these same areas most often mention weak government as a major fail-

ing, suggesting again that the government’s capacity to ensure security is amongst the most important factors that influence perceptions of government performance. Weak government is also mentioned often in the Central/Hazarajat region where satisfaction with government performance is lowest across all domains (see Table 5.2). The lack of job opportunities and the weak economy are most often mentioned in the North West, North East and Central/Kabul regions. Other major government failings which have particular resonance in certain regions include removing the Taliban mentioned by one in six respondents in the West (15%) and one in ten in the East (11%) and South West (10%), removing drugs mentioned by one in ten respondents in the West (10%) and preventing civilian casualties mentioned by one in seven respondents in the East (14%) and around one in ten in the South West (9%) and South East (8%).

Given the importance of security issues in perceptions of government performance, the survey sought to examine public opinion on certain aspects of the government’s approach to security. In particular, the survey asked respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the current government’s efforts at negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-government elements. Nearly three-quarters of respondents (71%) say they approve of these efforts, although 43 percent express some reservations. A quarter of respondents (25%) say they disapprove of this approach, although only one in ten (10%) strongly disapprove. These findings indicate that Afghans support the government’s efforts to address state security issues through talks with opposition groups, rather than by military means exclusively.

Do you strongly approve, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat or strongly disapprove of the Afghan Government’s reconciliation efforts and negotiations with armed Anti-Government elements? (Q-64a, Base 6406)




Fig. 5.4

Support for efforts to negotiate and achieve reconciliation with armed opposition groups varies little between regions, with the exception of the Central/Hazarajat where just over half (52%) of respondents say they approve of this approach and one in three (33%) say they disapprove.

The survey also asked respondents about their level of sympathy for the reasons why anti-government groups have used violence during the past year. Responses show that a slight majority (56%) say that they have some level of sympathy with the motivations of armed opposition groups, including around one in five (22%) who say they have a lot of sympathy. These results certainly help to explain the high levels of support for a conciliatory approach to addressing anti-government violence.

Thinking about the reasons anti-government groups used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the reasons these anti-government groups choose to use violence? (Q-64b, Base 6406)




Fig. 5.5

Levels of sympathy with anti-government violence are higher in rural areas (57%) than in urban settings (48%). There is relatively little variation between ethnic groups in their sympathy for the motivations of armed opposition groups. The majority of all groups record some level of sympathy with the highest levels recorded by Uzbeks (60%) and Pashtuns (59%) and the lowest by Tajiks (51%). Responses vary more significantly between regions. The highest levels of sympathy are recorded in the South East (66%) and East (65%) where two thirds of respondents say they have some sympathy with the reasons that armed opposition groups use violence, however this is the case for fewer than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul (46%) and Central/Hazarajat (48%) regions.

5.2 Performance of provincial government

Respondents were also asked to assess the performance of the provincial government in their area. Three-quarters of respondents (75%) give a positive assessment and nearly a quarter (24%) say that the provincial government is doing a very good job. These findings are entirely consistent with the findings of previous years.

However, assessment of the performance of provincial government varies between regions. Although the overall assessment of the performance of provincial government is positive in all regions, the highest levels of satisfaction are recorded in the East (85%) and North West (81%) where more than four out of five respondents say that the provincial government is doing a good job. These high levels of satisfaction are recorded in eight individual provinces: Balkh (94%), Laghman (90%), Baghlan (88%), Badakhshan (88%), Badghis (89%), Panjshir (87%), Nangarhar (87%) and Sar-i-pul (83%)

The highest level of dissatisfaction is recorded in the South West where around one in three respondents (36%) say the provincial government is doing a bad job. Around two-thirds of respondents in Zabul (67%) and Uruzgan (63%) say that their provincial Government is doing a bad job, nearly twice the figure recorded in other provinces.

Turning to your Provincial Government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-65a, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 5.6

5.3 Performance of municipal and local authorities

The survey also asked about the performance of municipal and local authorities. People living in urban areas (21% of all respondents) were asked questions pertaining to municipal authorities.

Again the majority of respondents living in urban areas (58%) think that the municipal authority in their local area is doing a good job, including 17 percent who say it is doing a very good job. However, the level of satisfaction with municipal government performance is significantly lower than the proportion of respondents who say the central government (71%) and provincial government (75%) are doing a good job. Forty percent of respondents give a negative assessment of the performance of the municipality in their locality, including around one in six (15%) who say it is doing a very bad job. Yet despite these relatively low levels of satisfaction compared to other levels of government, in 2009, levels of satisfaction with the performance of municipal authorities increased compared to 2008, and the proportion of respondents who say that municipal authorities are doing a very good job is higher than in previous years.

The most positive assessment of the performance of municipal authorities is in the North West where almost nine in ten respondents (88%) say their local municipality is doing a good job. However, significant majorities say the same in the East (71%), South East (71%) and North East (62%). On the other hand, the highest level of dissatisfaction is recorded in the Central/Kabul region where nearly half of respondents (49%) say that their local municipal authorities are doing a bad job.

What do you think about the job done by your municipal authorities? Do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-65b, Base 1377) BY REGION




Fig 5.7

The survey asked a similar question about the performance of local authorities at the district level to people living in rural areas (79% of all respondents). Overall, more than two-thirds of respondents (69%) rate the performance of their district authorities positively, considerably more than those who give a positive assessment of the performance of municipal authorities in urban areas (58%). Around a quarter of rural respondents (23%) say their local district authorities are doing a very good job. However, 28 percent think the district authorities in their localities are doing a bad job. These findings show almost no variation from 2008.

The largest proportions of respondents who say that their local district authority is doing a good job are in the North West (81%), East (77%) and North East (76%) followed by the West (67%). However the highest levels of dissatisfaction are recorded in the South West, where nearly half (48%) of respondents say that their district authorities are doing a bad job. Over one in three respondents say the same in the South East (38%) and Central/Hazarajat (37%) regions.

What do you think about the job done by your Local authorities, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-65c, Base 5029)
BY REGION




Fig 5.8

The overall picture of public perceptions of the performance of different levels of government shows that respondents are most positive about the performance of their provincial government, followed by the national government and rural district authorities. They are least satisfied with the performance of municipalities. However, since 2007 satisfaction with provincial and national level authorities has fallen, whereas satisfaction with municipal authorities is now about the same as it was two years ago.

Table 5.4: Proportions of respondents who say the national government, provincial government, municipality and district authorities are doing a good job (combination of very good job and somewhat good job) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
National government	80	67	71
Provincial government	80	74	75
Municipality	57	50	58
District authorities	-	67	69

5.4 Corruption

One of the major problems facing Afghanistan identified by respondents is the issue of corruption including administrative corruption. (*See 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level*). The level of corruption in public institutions is an important measure of government performance, both in terms of equity and efficiency. The survey therefore sought to measure public perceptions of the prevalence of corruption at different levels of government and in various facets of life. Respondents were asked whether they think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem or no problem at all in their daily life, their neighborhood, their local authorities, their provincial government and in Afghanistan as a whole.

Results show that the majority of Afghans think that corruption is a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government. Moreover, as in previous years, perceptions of the prevalence of corruption rise as the level of the institution rises. While just over half of respondents (53%) say that corruption is a major problem in their local authorities, just under two thirds (61%) say the same about their provincial governments, and around three quarters (76%) say this with regard to Afghanistan as a whole. Conversely, while only one in twenty respondents say that corruption is not a problem for the country as a whole (5%), three times as many say that it is not a problem in their daily life (15%).

Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in Afghanistan as a whole, your provincial government, your local authorities, your neighborhood, your daily life (Q27a-e, Base 6406)




Fig 5.9

This pattern is consistent with previous years. However, while the perception of corruption in Afghanistan as a whole has remained stable, the proportion of respondents who identify this as a major problem in their daily life and in their neighbourhood has been rising steadily since 2006. Encouragingly, the proportion that identify corruption as a major problem in their provincial government has fallen (from 66% in 2006 to 61% in 2009). However, the reverse is true for local authorities. Under half (48%) of respondents said that corruption was a major problem at this level of government in 2007, but more than half had this opinion in 2008 (53%) and 2009 (53%).

Table 5.5: Percentage of the people who think corruption is a major problem in various facets of life and levels of government (Q-27a-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
In Afghanistan as a whole	77	74	76	76
In your provincial government	66	60	63	61
In your daily life	42	47	51	53
In your local authorities	-	48	53	53
In your neighborhood	40	43	48	50

To further explore trends in public perceptions of corruption, respondents were also asked to compare the level of corruption now with one year ago. Over half (54%) of respondents think that the amount of corruption has increased in Afghanistan as a whole, while 41 percent think that it has done so at provincial government level. A third (32%) of respondents think that corruption has increased in their local authorities and around a quarter believe this is true in their neighborhood (24%) and in their daily lives (23%). The findings suggest that respondents are more likely to identify an increase in corruption in domains where they perceive corruption to be generally high. However, since 2006 there has been a consistent fall in the proportion of respondents who say there has been an annual increase in corruption in Afghanistan as a whole (from 60% in 2006 to 54% in 2009) and in their provincial government (from 50% in 2006 to 41% in 2009).

Table 5.6: Percentage of the people who think the amount of corruption has increased in various facets of life and levels of government (Q-28a-e)

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
In Afghanistan as a whole	60	57	57	54
In your provincial government	50	45	45	41
In your local authorities	-	31	33	32
In your neighborhood	28	21	25	24
In your daily life	24	21	24	23

The survey also attempted to measure respondents' personal experience of corruption in various facets of public life by asking how often in the past year they had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for a government official. Responses show that the majority of contacts with government institutions do not involve corruption. This suggests that people's overall perception of the prevalence of corruption is higher than their personal experience of it. The situations in which respondents have most frequently encountered corruption (either in all cases when they had contact or in most cases) are in receiving official documents (30%), applying for jobs (27%), and dealing with the judiciary/courts (26%). However, around one in five respondents report encountering corruption in receiving public healthcare services (21%), dealing with officials in the municipality (21%), getting admissions to schools or universities (20%), dealing with the ANP (19%) and dealing with state electricity supply (19%) or the customs office (19%). The lowest incidence of corruption is recorded in dealings with the ANA, although corrupt practices are still reported by one in ten respondents (11%).

Table 5.7: *Percentage of the people who have corruption-related experience (based on respondents who had contacts with the organization/area) (Q-29a-j, Base 6406)*

	In all cases (%)	Most cases (%)	Total cases (%)
To receive official documents	11	18	30
When applying for a job	8	19	27
Judiciary/courts	9	17	26
Officials in the Municipality	8	15	23
Public healthcare service	5	16	21
Admissions to schools/university	7	13	20
Afghan National Police	6	13	19
State electricity supply	5	13	19
Customs office	6	13	19
Afghan National Army	3	8	11

Respondents' experience of corruption in various institutions is broadly correlated with the low levels of public confidence expressed in these same institutions. Institutions in which respondents frequently report corrupt practices also register particularly low levels of public confidence including municipalities (46% confidence), the government justice system (46%), government ministries (53% confidence) and the public administration as a whole (57% confidence) (*see Chapter 2, 2.6: Confidence in specific institutions and organizations*).

5.5 Contact with local government to solve local problems

Respondents were asked whether, at any time in the past five years, they had asked for the help of a government official or a government agency to resolve an issue that concerned everybody in their area but which they could not resolve on their own. The majority of respondents (71%) say that they have not had such a problem. However, just under a quarter (23%) report that they have sought assistance from a government agency to resolve a problem of this kind.

Among those who have sought assistance (23% of all respondents), most people have done this to resolve problems related to a lack of water and electricity (21%) or disputes over land (17%). Respondents have also sought help from government agencies in relation to other problems with basic infrastructure such as reconstruction of roads and bridges (10%). Security issues have prompted requests for assistance from 10 percent while a small proportion has asked for help to resolve tribal disputes (6%).

Sometimes people and communities have problems, related to an issue that concerns everybody in their area, that they can't resolve on their own and so they have to ask for the help of a government official or a government agency. In the past 5 years, has your community had such a problem in your area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve it? (YES responses) - What kind of problem was/is that? (Q-47, Base 1486)




Fig 5.10

When asked who they approached to solve the problem, one-third of respondents (34%) mention elders of local shura or jirga, demonstrating the continuing importance of informal community governance structures in resolving problems at the community level. A significant proportion report taking their problem to the local administration, with a higher proportion seeking help from district authorities (20%) than from authorities at the provincial level (17%). Twelve percent have sought the help of the Afghan National Police which has a clear responsibility for law enforcement at the local level. Ten percent say they approached a semi-formal malik or khan at the village level to help solve their problem. A similar proportion say they asked for assistance from government agencies (9%) or from elected representatives including community development councils (9%) and MPs (7%).

Who did you approach/ask to solve the problem? (Q-48, Base 1486) (Percentages are based on multiple responses)




Fig 5.11

When asked whether the problem for which they sought help has been resolved, respondents' experience was divided. Around half (47%) report that the problem has been resolved while a slightly smaller proportion (44%) say the problem is still pending resolution.

A high proportion of those who approached the state security services have had their problem resolved. This is the case for over half of those who took their problem to the ANA (58%) and ANP (57%). The majority of people who approached traditional institutions at the community level such as mullah (55%), malik/khan (50%) and shura/jirga (49%) had their problems solved. The efficacy of these institutions in resolving local issues may help explain why levels of public confidence in them is relatively high (see Chapter 2, 2.6 - *Confidence in specific institutions and organizations*). Bodies close to the local level also resolved just under half of the problems presented to them, including District Authorities (48%) and Community Development Councils (43%)

By contrast, only around a third (35%) of respondents, who approached government authorities at the provincial level and a quarter (24%) who sought help from national government offices, have had their problems resolved. This may also offer a partial explanation for the relatively low levels of public confidence recorded in the public administration (see Chapter 2, 2.6 - *Confidence in institutions and organizations*).

Table 5.8: *Proportion of those who mentioned that the problem has been resolved BY AGENCY*

	Problem resolved (%)
Afghan National Army	58
Afghan National Police	57
Mullah	55
A Member of Parliament	52
Malik / Khan	50
Elders of the local shura/jirga	49
District authorities	48
Community Development Council	43
NGO	37
Human Rights Commission	37
PRT	36
Provincial governor/ authorities	35
Government agency/office	24
Foreign forces	24

5.6 Role of elected representative bodies

The survey sought to examine people's perceptions of elected representative bodies including parliament and members of parliament (MPs) at the national level, Provincial Councils (PC) at the provincial level and Community Development Councils (CDC) that operate at villages and community level in rural areas.

To assess perceptions of the responsiveness of national level representatives to meeting the needs of the people, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "The Parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country." Overall, more than two-thirds of respondents (68%) agree with this statement including around a quarter (24%) who strongly agree. However, just under a third of respondents (30%) disagree, including one in ten (10%) who disagree strongly. These findings are broadly similar to those recorded in 2008.

Levels of agreement are particularly high in the North West (77%), Central/Hazara-jat (73%), Central/Kabul (70%) and East (70%), while disagreement is highest in the South East (38%), West (36%) and South West (34%) regions.

"Do you agree or disagree with the statement: "The Parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country"?" (Q-90a, Base 6406)




Fig. 5.12

The majority of respondents (58%) also agree with the statement: "My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in the Parliament", including one in five (20%) who strongly agree. However, more than a third of respondents (39%) disagree with this statement.

The highest levels of agreement are in the North West (72%), Central/Hazarajat (64%) and East (61%), which are also the regions that report the highest levels of satisfaction with the responsiveness of Parliament to the needs of the country as a whole. On the other hand, nearly half of respondents disagree with this statement in the South East (49%) and South West (49%).

“Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in the Parliament?” (Q-90b, Base 6406)




Fig. 5.13

Overall, levels of satisfaction with the performance of MPs in addressing the major problems of their constituencies in the Parliament has fallen steadily since 2006, suggesting increasing disenchantment with the ability of MPs to address local problems through the parliamentary channel. However, results in 2009 show a small improvement compared to 2008.

“Do you agree or disagree with the statement “My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in the Parliament”?” (Q-90b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig. 5.14

5.7 Contacts with Members of Parliament (MPs)

The survey also sought to examine in greater detail people's perceptions of the responsiveness of MPs in addressing problems in their constituencies by looking at their involvement in resolving local problems experienced by individuals and communities. Respondents were asked: “Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems?” Only around one in eight respondents (12%) report ever having contacted their MP for help of this kind. Men (16%) are twice as likely as women (8%) to have done so. Respondents living in villages (14%) are also twice as likely to have done so as those living in urban areas (7%). Contact with MPs for this purpose is most frequently reported by respondents in the South East (19%) and East (17%) of the country.

Those respondents who had contacted their MP for help in solving local problems (12% of all respondents) were then asked what kind of problem was involved. Problems relating to basic infrastructure and services are the most common reasons why respondents have contacted their MPs, including lack of water and electricity (19%), lack of roads and bridges (12%), lack of security (8%) and lack of teachers in schools (8%). One in ten respondents (10%) mention land disputes and one in fifteen (6%) mention tribal problems. More urban (26%) than rural residents (18%) have contacted their MP about water and electricity problems, whereas problems related to land dispute are more frequently raised by rural residents (11%) than those living in urban areas (1%).

Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (YES responses) - For what kind of problem did you contact the MP? (Q-83, Base 772)




Fig 5.15

Respondents were then asked whether their MPs tried to help to resolve the problem. A small majority (53%) say the MP tried to help, while 43 percent say they did not. This finding seems consistent with the proportion of respondents who agree that their MP is addressing the major problems of their constituency in the parliament (58%) (see 5.6 - *Role of elected representatives*).

Finally, respondents were asked whether the problem had been resolved, regardless of who helped. Slightly more than half (53%) say that the problem has not been solved, whereas 43 percent report that it has.

5.8 Contacts with Provincial Council representatives

Respondents were asked the same question about contacting a representative of the Provincial Council (PC) for help in solving any personal or local problems. Again, an overwhelming majority (82%) has not done this, however almost one in six (15%) say they have contacted a PC representative for assistance. This figure has remained broadly the same since 2006.

Respondents who had contacted a PC representative for help (15% of all respondents) were further asked for what kind of problem they had sought help. The results show that people contact PC members about the same kinds of issues that they take to MPs. These include problems related to basic infrastructure and services such as electricity and water (23%), roads and bridges (11%), building schools (6%), and building clinics (5%). Likewise, disputes over land (10%) and tribal problems (7%) are also a common reason for contacting PC representatives.

Have you ever contacted a representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (YES responses) - What kind of problem was it? (Q-87, Base 970)




Fig 5.16

Problems related to electricity and water account for the greatest number of requests for help from PC representatives in almost every region, although they are almost as common as issues relating to roads and bridges in the Central/Kabul region (22%) and land disputes in the East (17%) and South West (21%). The exception is the Central/Hazarajat region where problems related to teachers and schools are the main reasons why respondents had contacted their Provincial Council representative. Respondents in the South West, West and South East are twice as likely to have contacted their PC representative about tribal problems as those in other regions, whereas respondents in the Central/Kabul and Central/Hazarajat regions are twice as likely to have approached a PC member about economic problems in contrast to other parts of the country.

Have you ever contacted a representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (YES responses) - What kind of a problem was it? (Q-87, Base 970) BY REGION




Fig 5.17

Respondents were further asked whether, when asked for assistance, the PC representative tried to help resolve the problem. Nearly two-thirds of respondents (62%) say their PC representative tried to help which is a significantly higher proportion than those who said the same about their MP (53%). The remaining third (35%) said the PC representative did not try to assist.

Finally, respondents were again asked whether the problem was resolved, regardless of who helped. Just under half (47%) of respondents report that the problem was solved, whereas a similar proportion (49%) say it was not. The proportion of problems taken to PC members which have been resolved is slightly higher than for those taken to MPs (43%).

5.9 Role of Community Development Councils

Community Development Councils (CDCs) have been established as part of the National Solidarity Program as elected community development governance bodies in rural areas. CDCs currently cover 23,180 rural communities, accounting for 72 percent of villages⁴ across Afghanistan, with plans to achieve full national coverage over time. The role of CDCs is defined in a specific bylaw to provide the “social and development foundation at community level, responsible for implementation and supervision of development projects and liaison between the communities and gov-

⁴ Source: Information provided by National Solidarity Program (NSP), Afghanistan (September 2009)

ernment and non-government organizations.” Current government policy indicates that CDCs are likely to play the role of Village Councils provided for in the Afghan Constitution until appropriate legislation is passed and elections are held to formally constitute such bodies.

The survey attempted to measure public awareness and views about CDCs. Respondents received a brief explanation about CDCs and were then asked whether they are aware of such institutions in their neighborhood. Forty-four percent of the respondents say they are aware of a CDC in their area, while just over half (51%) say they are not. As CDCs operate essentially in rural areas, awareness is more than twice as high amongst rural respondents (49%) as amongst urban dwellers (23%). Moreover, across the country as a whole, awareness of CDCs has been steadily rising in recent years. Although only around a third of respondents said they were aware of CDCs in 2006 (37%) and 2007 (32%), the figure is close to half (44%) in 2009.

Are you aware of an institution called a Community Development Council formed in your neighborhood/settlement? (Q-91) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 5.18

The level of public awareness of CDCs varies between regions, which is to be expected as the program has not yet covered the entire country. The majority of respondents say they are aware of a CDC in their local area in the East (57%) and North West (50%), however, this is true for only around a third of respondents in the South West (36%) and Central/Hazarajat (33%) regions.

Are you aware of an institution called a Community Development Council formed in your neighborhood/settlement? (Q-91, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 5.19

Respondents who are aware of a CDC in their neighborhood (44% of all respondents) were also asked to indicate which social groups are members of the CDC. A list of groups was read out and respondents were asked to say whether these groups are represented on the CDC in their area. Traditional local leaders are most often mentioned as members of CDCs. Around three-quarters of respondents say that elders of the local shura/jirga (77%) or a local Malik/Khan (71%) are members. Around half also mention other influential members of the community such as mullahs (56%) and local teachers (48%). A third say local commanders (32%) are members. However, a significant proportion of respondents also indicate that their local CDC includes representation of less powerful social groups such as ordinary farmers (45%), shopkeepers (40%) and landless agricultural workers (36%). Around a quarter (27%) of respondents say that women are represented on their local CDC. Just under a quarter (23%) mention public officials from the municipality or district administration amongst the members of their local CDC. These findings are broadly similar to those in 2007 and 2008.

Table 5.9: Percentage of the people who think that there is a representation of various groups in the Council (Q-92a-k, Base 2796)

Group	Representation (%)
Elders of the local shura/jirga	77
Local Malik/Khan	71
Mullah	56
Local teacher	48
Ordinary farmers	45
Shopkeepers	40
Landless agricultural workers	36
Local commanders	32
Women	27
Officials from municipal/district administration	23
Doctor	19

These same respondents were also asked about their level of satisfaction with the job their local CDC is doing. Overall, more than three quarters of respondents (78%) say they are satisfied with the performance of their local CDC, including a third (32%) who are very satisfied. Only around one in five (19%) respondents express some level of dissatisfaction. This finding is also largely similar to those of 2007 and 2008.

How satisfied are you with the job this Community Development Council is doing? (Q-93, Base 2796)




Fig 5.20

Respondents were asked whether they think the CDC is capable of representing their interests before the provincial authorities and the Government of Afghanistan.

About four-fifths (81%) say that their CDC is capable to represent their interests before the provincial authorities, while just under two thirds (62%) say it is capable to do so before the national government. Confidence in the representative capabilities of CDCs in relation to provincial authorities has not changed since 2008, however, a much smaller proportion judge their CDC capable of representing their interests at the national level in 2009 (62%) than in 2008 (82%) when respondents judged the CDC equally capable to represent them at the provincial and national levels. This may indicate that in 2009, which is an election year at the provincial level, respondents are making a clearer distinction between the different levels of government and their functions than they have done in the past.

Still speaking of the same Community Development Council, to what extent do you think this Council is capable to represent your interests before the Provincial authorities? (Q-94a)

AND ... To what extent do you think this Council is capable to represent your interests before the Government of Afghanistan? (Q-94b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008 AND 2009




Fig 5.21

6 Justice System

6.1 The formal and informal justice system in Afghanistan

In the last few years the Afghan Government, with the help of the international community, has sought to strengthen the formal judicial system and establish the rule of law. However, a significant proportion of the Afghan population continues to rely on informal tribal or traditional systems of justice to address issues of crime or resolve disputes. In 2009, the survey again attempted to examine public perceptions of both formal and informal justice mechanisms and the recourse people have to them for reporting and redressing crime and for dispute resolution.

6.2 Perceptions of state courts

To examine public perceptions of state courts a series of statements related to the qualities and performance of these institutions was read out and respondents were asked to say whether they agree or disagree. Levels of agreement with each of the statements are shown in the table below.

Table 6.1: Public's agreement or disagreement with various statements about state courts (Q-95 a-f, Base 6406)

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Somewhat (%)	Disagree Somewhat (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)
a) State Courts are accessible to me.	20	48	20	9
b) State Courts are fair and trusted.	11	39	33	13
c) State Courts are not corrupt compared to other options of settling a dispute.	11	36	34	14
d) State Courts follow the local norms and values of our people.	12	37	32	14
e) State Courts are effective at delivering justice.	15	36	30	15
f) State Courts resolve cases timely and promptly.	12	28	32	23

The most positive assessment of state courts relates to accessibility. The survey shows that over two-thirds (68%) of respondents feel that state courts are accessible to them, including one fifth (20%) who agree strongly with this statement. However, 29 percent do not feel that they can access state courts easily. More urban dwellers

agree that state courts are accessible to them (76%) than their rural counterparts (66%), and more men (73%) than women (63%) say the same.

Do you agree or disagree with “State courts are accessible to me”? (Q-95a, Base 6406) BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT




Fig 6.1

The proportion of respondents who say that state courts are accessible to them also rises with level of education. Only 65 percent of respondents who never went to school agree with this statement as compared to around 70 percent who attended secondary school and 80 percent who completed secondary or higher education.

Around half of respondents agree that state courts are fair and trusted (50%), follow the local norms and values of the people (49%), and are effective at delivering justice (51%). Respondents in urban areas tend to have a more positive assessment of state courts than those in rural areas.

Opinion is almost equally divided about whether state courts are not corrupt compared to other options for settling disputes. Just under half (47%) of respondents agree with this statement, and almost the same proportion (48%) disagree. This is consistent with the finding that around half (51%) of those who have had contacts with the judiciary and courts in the past year report having encountered some instance of corruption (see Chapter 5, 5.5: Corruption, Table 5.4).

However, only 40 percent of respondents agree that state courts resolve cases timely and promptly. The majority (55%) disagree with this statement, including around a quarter (23%) who strongly disagree. Indeed, respondents show the greatest levels of dissatisfaction with this aspect of the performance of state courts.

Respondents in the North West, East and Central/Kabul regions consistently give a more positive assessment of state courts across all domains, whereas the lowest levels of satisfaction are recorded in the South West.

The high level of ambivalence about the performance of state courts with regard to their fairness, honesty, effectiveness and timeliness is consistent with the relatively low level of trust respondents report in the state justice system compared to other public institutions (*see Chapter 2, 2.6: Confidence in specific institutions and organizations, Table 2.3*).

Satisfaction with the performance of state courts in all these areas has fallen since 2007, however, there have been no substantial shifts in opinion between 2008 and 2009.

Table 6.2: Proportion of those who agree with the following statements about state courts (Q-95a-f)
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Agree		
	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) State Courts are accessible to me	78	68	68
b) State Courts are fair and trusted	58	50	50
c) State Courts are not corrupt compared to other options of settling a dispute	56	47	47
d) State Courts follow the local norms and values of our people	57	50	49
e) State Courts are effective at delivering justice	58	52	51
f) State Courts resolve cases timely and promptly	51	38	40

Respondents were also asked: “If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial system would punish the guilty party?” Over half of respondents (57%) say they would have a significant level of confidence in the formal justice system to do this, while 41 percent say they would have little or no confidence including 18 percent who say they would have no confidence at all. This reveals that a sizeable proportion of the population does not believe that the state’s formal justice system is able to bring the guilty party to justice. This finding mirrors those of 2007 and 2008.

If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party? (Q-25, Base 6406)




Fig 6.2

Confidence in the formal justice system is particularly low in the South East, West and South West where around half of respondents have little or no confidence that state law enforcing organizations and the judicial system would punish the guilty party. These are the regions which report the highest levels of insecurity (see Chapter 3, 3.1 Security Situation) which suggests the poor capacity of the state to enforce the rule of law in these areas.

If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party? (Q-25, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 6.3

6.3 Perceptions of local shura and jirga

To assess the differences between perceptions of formal and informal justice mechanisms, respondents were asked about the quality and performance of local jirga and shura in the same way they had been asked about state courts. Levels of agreement with each of the statements are summarized in the table below.

Table 6.3: Public's agreement or disagreement with various statements about the local shura/jirga (Q-96a-e, Base 6406)

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Somewhat (%)	Disagree Somewhat (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)
a) Local jirga/ shura are accessible to me.	35	44	13	5
b) Local jirga/ shura are fair and trusted.	24	48	20	5
c) Local jirga/ shura follow the local norms and values of our people.	25	45	21	5
d) Local jirga/ shura are effective at delivering justice.	25	44	21	7
e) Local jirga/ shura resolve cases timely and promptly.	24	40	23	9

As with state courts, local jirga and shura are assessed most positively regarding their accessibility. More than three-quarters (79%) of respondents agree that shura/jirga are accessible to them. Also like state courts, more men (84%) than women (74%) say local shura/jirga are accessible to them. However, unlike the courts, more rural respondents (81%) agree with this statement than urban residents (76%).

Do you agree or disagree with "Local jirga/shura are accessible to me"? (Q-96a, Base 6406) BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT




Fig 6.4

Over two-thirds of respondents agree that local shura/jirga are fair and trusted (72%), follow the local norms and values of the people (70%) and are effective at delivering justice (69%). All of these figures are considerably higher than those recorded for state courts, where between 50 and 60 percent of respondents agree with these statements. If urban residents have more positive views toward state courts, rural residents give more positive assessments of local shura/jirga. There are also differences between regions. More than four-fifths (84%) of respondents in the North West say that local shura/jirga are fair and trusted, compared with less than two thirds who say the same in the West (64%) and South West (65%).

Do you agree or disagree with “Local jirga/shura are fair and trusted”? (Q-96b, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 6.5

As with state courts, assessments of local shura/jirga are least positive with regard to their timeliness and promptness. Around two-thirds (64%) of respondents agree that local jirga/shura resolve cases promptly. However, this is significantly higher than the proportion who say the same about state courts (40%).

Since 2007, positive assessments of local jirga/shura have fallen slightly, although responses in 2009 show some improvement in the public’s assessment of the traditional justice system compared to 2008.

Table 6.4: Proportion of those who agree with the following statements about local jirga and shura (Q-96a-e, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Agree		
	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) Local jirga, shura are accessible to me	83	76	79
b) Local jirga, shura are fair and trusted	78	70	72
c) Local jirga, shura follow the local norms and values of our people	76	69	70
d) Local jirga, shura are effective at delivering justice	76	69	69
e) Local jirga, shura resolve cases timely and promptly	72	59	64

The table below compares people's assessments of state courts and shura/jirga. On all five counts the traditional justice system is seen to fare better than the modern state justice system. In addition, although positive assessment of both the formal and informal justice systems have declined since 2007, the drop in satisfaction has been more severe regarding the performance of state courts than it has for shura and jirga.

Table 6.5: Percentage of the people who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree) with respect to various statement related to state courts and jirga/shura (Q-95a-f and Q-96a-e, Base 6406)

	Agree	
	State Court (%)	Shura/Jirga (%)
a) Are accessible to me.	68	79
b) Are fair and trusted.	50	72
c) Follow the local norms and values of our people.	49	70
d) Are effective at delivering justice.	51	69
e) Resolve cases timely and promptly.	40	64

Overall, these results demonstrate that many Afghans continue to view traditional dispute resolution mechanisms such as jirga and shura more positively than the modern formal justice system such as state courts. These findings corroborate the higher levels of public confidence recorded for shura and jirga (67% confidence) than for the state justice system (46% confidence) (see Chapter 2, 2.6: Confidence in specific institutions and organizations, Table 2.3).

However, a poor assessment of state courts does not automatically imply a positive assessment of traditional justice mechanisms. Respondents who give a positive assessment of state courts often give a similarly positive assessment of local jirga/shura in the same domains. For example, the North West region records the most positive assessments of both formal and informal justice mechanisms. This suggests that people do not see formal and informal justice mechanisms as rival institutions but rather take them both as possible options for accessing justice.

6.4 Dispute resolution

In addition to examining perceptions of formal and informal justice mechanisms in dealing with crime, the survey sought to examine public opinion of these same institutions in terms of resolving disputes within communities. Respondents were asked whether, in the past two years, they had a dispute or a formal case that they could not settle with another party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it. Around one in six respondents (16%) report having taken a dispute for resolution to one of these bodies.

A higher proportion of men (20%) than women (10%) report taking a dispute for formal resolution. Likewise, more rural (18%) than urban (7%) residents report doing so. A significantly higher proportion of respondents in the South East (29%), East (22%), West (22%) and South West (21%) say they took a dispute to one of these bodies for resolution than those living in other regions.

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it? (Q-97, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 6.6

Respondents who had taken disputes for resolution (16% of all respondents) were then asked where they had taken their case. Just under half (47%) say they took the case to a shura or jirga, while 38 percent say a state court. One in ten (10%) report taking their case to both institutions. Results in 2009 show that since 2007 the proportion of respondents taking cases to state courts has fallen (from 46% to 38%), whereas those taking cases to shura and jirga has risen (from 43% to 47%).

Table 6.6: Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Q-98, Base 997) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
State Court	46	39	38
Village, neighborhood based Shura/Jirga	43	42	47
Both	10	17	10

Respondents living in urban areas tend to go to state courts (46%), while the largest proportion of those living in rural areas go to local shura or jirga (48%). Recourse to state courts is highest in the Central/Hazarajat region where more than two thirds (69%) of respondents say they used these to resolve disputes. More respondents also took disputes to state courts than to informal dispute resolution mechanisms in the West (48%) and North West (46%). On the other hand, the majority of respondents say they took their disputes to jirga or shura for resolution in the South West (60%), Central/Kabul (56%) and East (52%).

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it? (YES responses).

Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Q-98, Base 997) BY REGION




Fig 6.7

Respondents who have taken their case to a state court (8% of all respondents) were asked a follow-up question regarding their use of professional legal services. More than half (52%) report that they pleaded their case alone or were helped by friends or relatives. Only 39 percent say they used the professional legal services of a lawyer. Even though the proportion of those who used legal services is small, it has grown significantly since 2007 (35%) and 2008 (22%).

When taking a case to a state court or being a party in settling case in a state court, have you used any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or you pleaded your case alone or helped by friends/relatives? (Q-99, Base 483)




Fig 6.8

Wherever they had taken their case, respondents were asked what kind of case or dispute they had taken for resolution. More than half of cases are disputes over land (52%) which is by far the most common cause of contention. Property disputes other than land are the second most common cause (11%), followed by commercial disputes (8%) and physical assault (8%).

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it? (YES responses).

What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-100, Base 997)




Fig 6.9

Since 2007, disputes over land have consistently been the most common kind of dispute taken for resolution. However, there is a slight downward trend in the proportion of respondents approaching dispute resolution mechanisms with matters of an essentially criminal nature that could be dealt with by the police, such as physical assault (from 10% in 2007 to 8% in 2009), robbery/burglary (from 9% in 2007 to 6% in 2009) and pick-pocketing (from 2% in 2007 to 1% in 2009). The exception to this is murder which concerns around 5% of cases taken for dispute resolution.

Table 6.7: What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-100) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Dispute over land	48	47	52
Other property dispute, not land	14	9	11
Commercial dispute	9	7	8
Physical assault	10	12	8
Robbery / burglary	9	8	6
Murder	4	5	5
Don't know	0	4	5
Divorce	4	6	3
Pick-pocketing	2	1	1

The data also reveals is that there is no substantive difference between the kinds of cases taken to state courts and shura/jirga. Slightly more respondents have gone to state courts (56%) than to shura/jirga (54%) to resolve disputes over land, whereas more respondents have gone to state courts (10%) than local shura/jirga (7%) to resolve commercial disputes. Where such problems are taken to a dispute resolution body, informal justice system seems to be preferred for resolving cases of robbery or burglary (7% are taken to shura/jirga compared to 4% to state courts) and physical assault (10% taken to shura/jirga compared to 7% taken to state courts).

Table 6.8: What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-100, Base 997) BY PLACE WHERE CASE OR DISPUTE WAS TAKEN

	State Court (%)	Shura/Jirga (%)
Dispute over land	56	54
Other property dispute, not land	10	10
Commercial dispute	10	7
Divorce	4	3
Pick-pocketing	1	1
Robbery / burglary	4	7
Physical assault	7	10
Murder	5	4

Finally, respondents who have referred a dispute for resolution to either formal or informal institutions (16% of all respondents) were asked whether they are satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings. Half of respondents (50%) say they are satisfied while a third (33%) say they are not. These figures show a fall in satisfaction since 2007 when 59 percent of respondents said they were satisfied with the outcome of their case. There has been no change since 2008.

Levels of satisfaction are slightly higher amongst respondents who have taken cases to local shura/jirga (55%) than those who have taken their case to the state courts (51%).

The highest levels of satisfaction are reported in the East (69%). Also, the majority of respondents say they are satisfied with the outcome of their cases in the Central/ Kabul (55%), South East (50%), West (49%), South West (50%) and Central/Hazarajat (50%). It is interesting to note that in most of these regions more people take their cases to local shura or jirga for resolution than to state courts. Only in the West and the Central/Hazarajat do more people use formal rather than informal dispute resolution mechanisms.

However, results in 2009 show that over time the proportion of respondents who report being satisfied with the outcomes of cases taken to shura/jirga continues to fall (from 67% in 2007 and 65% in 2008, to 55% in 2009), whereas those who say they are not satisfied has almost doubled between 2007 (16%) and 2009 (30%). Indeed, the difference in levels of satisfaction between the outcomes of cases taken to formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms is much smaller now than in previous years.

Table 6.9: Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings? (Q-101) BY PLACE WHERE CASE OR DISPUTE WAS TAKEN (COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009)

Satisfaction with outcomes	2007		2008		2009	
	State Court (%)	Shura/Jirga (%)	State Court (%)	Shura/Jirga (%)	State Court (%)	Shura/Jirga (%)
Yes	56	67	36	65	51	55
No	27	16	42	18	38	30
Not finished yet	17	13	17	9	9	10

7 Democratic Values

7.1 Perceptions of democracy

Afghan political actors and the international community have worked towards restoring democratic government in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. For this reason, since 2004, the survey has sought to examine how Afghans understand and perceive democracy and how these perceptions are changing over time.

In order to ascertain whether Afghans think they will gain any perceptible benefits from the introduction of democracy to the country, respondents were asked to identify the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring them personally. They were allowed to mention more than one response. Half (50%) of respondents mention freedom and 41 percent say peace as the greatest personal benefits they expect from democracy. These responses highlight the expectation of many Afghans that the consolidation of democracy will end war, conflict and insecurity. They also indicate that public perceptions of the success of the democratic system are closely related to its ability to ensure freedom and peace.

Significant numbers of respondents also mention aspects of good governance and the rule of law as benefits they expect to gain from democracy. These include rights and law (24%), women's right (21%), government of the people (19%) and less corruption (17%). Nearly a quarter (23%) specifically mention Islamic democracy, highlighting the importance respondents place on the integration of democratic practices and values with other core values in Afghan society. A small proportion of respondents mention material benefits such as prosperity (15%).

What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you personally? (Percentages based on multiple responses) (Q-54, Base 6406)




Fig 7.1

Although peace and freedom have consistently been the most commonly mentioned benefits of democracy identified by survey respondents, a significantly higher proportion mention these in 2009 than in previous years, indicating that these issues have gained greater importance for Afghans in the last year. Indeed, the proportion of respondents who mention peace as the most important benefit of democracy has increased from 34 percent in 2007, 35 percent in 2008 to 41 percent in 2009. The proportion who have mentioned freedom has moved up from 30 percent in 2007 to 50 percent in 2009. Responses in 2009 also appear to reverse the trend of the last few years with people giving greater importance in this year's survey to core democratic values such as rights and law, women's rights and Islamic democracy, but showing less confidence in the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits such as less corruption or prosperity.

What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you personally? (Percentages based on multiple responses) (Q-54) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 7.2

Respondents were then presented with some general statements about democracy and asked to give their views. The first statement said: “Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government”. Over three-quarters (78%) of respondents say they agree with this statement, including almost a third (31%) who agree strongly, while only around one in seven (16%) disagree. This closely matches the findings in 2008.

More women (81%) agree with this statement than men (76%). Agreement is also slightly higher in the younger age ranges than amongst older peoples (80% amongst

those aged 18-24 compared to 76% amongst those aged over 55). More urban dwellers (83%) than rural residents (77%) agree. There are also significant differences between regions. More than four out of five respondents say that democracy is the best available form of government in the North West (86%), Central/Kabul (83%) and North East (82%) regions. However, almost a quarter say they disagree in the South East (24%), East (22%) and South West (22%).

Respondents were then asked for their reaction to the statement: "Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don't worry about helping people". Three quarters of respondents (75%) also agree with this statement, including 41 percent who strongly agree.

Since 2006, there has been a clear drop in the proportion of respondents who agree that democracy is the best form of government available (from 84% in 2006 to 78% in 2009). The proportion of respondents who say that politicians only serve their own interests has also declined, but to a much smaller degree (from 79% in 2006 to 75% in 2009). Thus, while responses indicate falling confidence in democracy as a system, the decline in confidence seems to be more closely related to the inability of the system to fulfill the expectations of Afghan citizens in delivering the desired benefits.

Table 7.1: Proportion of those who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree) with the following statements about democracy (Q-80a-b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Agree			
	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government.	84	85	76	78
b) Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don't worry about helping people.	79	79	76	75

The growing disenchantment with the democratic system is further demonstrated by respondents' answers to the direct question asking how satisfied or dissatisfied they are with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. More than two-thirds of respondents (68%) say that they are satisfied, including one fifth (20%) who are very satisfied. However, over a quarter (28%) are either somewhat or very dissatisfied.

Again, since 2006 there has been a steady fall in the proportion of respondents who say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (from 76% in 2006, to 73% in 2007 and 68% in 2008 and 2009). This has been accompanied by a corresponding rise in those who say they are dissatisfied (from 21% in 2006 to 25% in 2007 to 27% in 2008 and 28% in 2009).

Table 7.2: On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? (Q-81) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Very satisfied	21	18	15	20
Fairly Satisfied	55	55	53	48
Not very satisfied	15	16	16	17
Not at all satisfied	6	9	11	11

Again, satisfaction is higher amongst women (72%) than men (63%), amongst those aged 18-24 (70%) compared to those over 55 (65%) and amongst urban dwellers (74%) as compared to rural residents (65%). This closely mirrors attitudes related to democracy as the best available form of government. Satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the country is also highest in the North West (80%), followed by the North East (75%) and East (74%). The proportion of respondents reporting dissatisfaction is highest in the South East (43%), South West (43%) and West (32%) of the country. These are also the regions where insecurity is identified as a major local problem (See Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level), and therefore where the expected benefits of democracy such as peace and freedom are least evident.

7.2 Attitudes toward democratic principles, processes and political activities

The survey endeavored to assess public attitudes regarding a number of fundamental principles associated with democratic governance. A series of statements was read out and respondents were asked to say whether they agree or disagree with them. A summary of responses is presented in the table below.

Table 7.3: Public agreement or disagreement with various democratic principles (Q-58a,b&e, Base 6406)

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
a) It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition	38	39	12	6
b) Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion	49	31	13	4
e) The government should include representatives from all major regions and ethnic groups in the country	48	33	13	3

More than four-fifths of respondents (81%) agree with the statement: “The government should include representatives from all major regions and ethnic groups in the country”. However, levels of support for this statement vary significantly between regions. Over four in five respondents agree with this statement in the North West (88%), Central/Kabul (84%) and South East (84%) regions, whereas around a quarter of respondents in the West (23%) and South West (23%) disagree. There is no significant difference in views between different ethnic groups.

A similar proportion (80%) agree with the statement: “Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or religion”. Interestingly, slightly more men (81%) than women (79%) say they agree with this statement. However, there are more significant differences in views between ethnic groups. More than four-fifths of Hazara (87%), Tajik (84%) and Uzbek (81%) respondents agree with this statement, as compared to three-quarters of Pashtuns (75%) and other ethnic groups (75%). On a regional level, more than four-fifths of respondents agree with this statement in all regions except the South West where this is true for just over half (59%). Moreover, 38 percent of respondents in the South West say they disagree, which is more than twice the proportion recorded in other regions. Overall agreement with the principle of equal rights continues to fall over time (from 90% in 2006 and 2007 to 84% in 2008 and to 80% in 2009).

More than three-quarters of respondents (77%) say they agree that: “It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition”. Public support for allowing peaceful opposition is highest in the Central/Kabul region (85%) and over 70 percent agree with this statement in all other regions except the Central/Hazarajat (67%). However, levels of disagreement are highest in the East (28%) and South East (24%), followed by the Central/Hazarajat (23%), West (21%) and South West (21%). Here too, levels of support for allowing peaceful opposition has fallen over the years. In 2006, 84 percent of respondents agreed with this statement. This fell to 81 percent in 2007, 78 percent in 2008 and 77 percent in 2009.

The survey also asked a number of questions related to basic democratic practices. In this regard, respondents were asked whether political parties should be allowed to hold meetings in their area. Just over half (54%) say that political parties should be allowed to hold meetings, while more than a third (37%) say that they should not. However, unlike the previous statements which show falling support for fundamental democratic values, the proportion of respondents who are in favor of allowing key democratic processes such as local meetings of political parties increased significantly between 2008 (44%) and 2009 (54%), almost reaching the level recorded in 2006 (57%) (the year that followed election years in 2004 and 2005). This is accom-

panied by a corresponding fall in opposition to local political party meetings (from 47% in 2007 to 43% in 2008 and 37% in 2009).

Do you think that political parties should be allowed to hold meetings in your area? (Q -55) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 7.3

Respondents were also asked whether they think that all political parties, even the ones most people do not like, should be allowed to hold meetings in their area. Only a third (34%) of respondents say this should be the case, while the majority (57%) disagree. Here too, responses in 2009 reverse the trend that was seen in previous years with more respondents than ever expressing support for this idea. Agreement fell from 32 percent in 2006 to 31 percent in 2007 and 29 percent in 2008, but rose to 34 percent in 2009. Support for allowing the activity of all political parties is highest in the East (42%), but lowest in the North West (28%), North East (27%) and South East (30%).

Responses to this question are also influenced by level of education. While 32 percent of those who never went to school agree with this statement, this rises to 38 percent of respondents who have completed tenth grade or beyond.

Finally, the survey sought to ascertain whether differences in political party affiliation could have an impact on interpersonal relationships. Respondents were asked: “Suppose a friend of yours supported a party you do not like. Would you accept that, or would it end your friendship?” Just under half (48%) of respondents say they would accept the situation while 40 percent say that this would end the friendship.

A clear majority of respondents in the East (66%) and South West (58%) say they would accept such a difference in opinion, whereas the majority in the North East (56%) say that this would end their friendship.

Over time, acceptance of differences in political allegiances between individuals has been declining. Those who say they would accept such a situation has fallen from the majority in 2006 (54%) and 2007 (54%) to 48 percent in 2009, whereas those who say this would end their friendship has risen from 38 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2009.

Suppose a friend of yours supported a party you don't like. Would you accept that, or would it end your friendship? (Q-57) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 7.4

7.3 Personal efficacy: Influence of individuals on government

The survey sought to measure the degree of influence people think they can have over government decisions. More than half (56%) of respondents feel they can have a significant degree of influence over government decisions, while more than a third (38%) say they do not have much influence, including a fifth of respondent (21%) who say they have no influence at all.

The results of the 2009 survey are close to the figures recorded in 2006 and 2007. However, they do show a small but significant trend towards greater confidence in personal efficacy over time. The proportion of respondents who say they can have

“some” influence over government decisions has been rising steadily (from 35% in 2006 to 42% in 2009). Similarly, the proportions who say they have very little or no influence have been falling.

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-63)
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 7.5

Respondents in rural areas are still less likely to say they can influence decision making (54%) than urban residents (60%). Similarly, as has been noted in previous years, confidence in personal efficacy rises with level of education. Just over half (54%) of respondents who have never been to school say they can have some level of influence on government decisions, but this rises to around 60 percent amongst those who have completed some degree of secondary education. However, there is no significant difference between men (56%) and women (55%) in their perceptions of their ability to influence government decisions.

The highest levels of confidence in the ability to influence government decisions are recorded in the East where two thirds of respondents (66%) say they can have some level of influence, whereas only 42 percent of respondents say this in the South East. On the other hand, more than half (55%) of respondents in the South East say they have little or no influence on government decisions, including almost a third (29%) who say they can have no influence at all.

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-63, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 7.6

74 Attitudes toward elections

The survey also attempted to assess people's sense of efficacy to influence public decision-making specifically through the electoral process. Respondents were asked whether they think that voting can lead to improvements in the future or whether they believe no matter how one votes things will never change. More than two-thirds (70%) say that voting can change things, while just over one-fifth (22%) say that things are not going to get better regardless of how they vote.

Although there has been a steady decline in the proportion of people who have confidence in the efficacy of their vote between 2006 and 2008, results in 2009 reveal a certain renewed confidence in the electoral process. While three-quarters (75%) of respondents said they believe that voting can change things in 2006, this had fallen to 72 percent in 2007 and around two-thirds (65%) in 2008. However, in 2009 the figure rose again to 70 percent of respondents who say that voting can lead to improvements in the future. This may be a reflection of the fact that 2009 is an election year. This finding is also consistent with the slight increase in positive assessments of the performance of the central government and the parliament recorded in 2009 (*see Chapter 5, 5.1 Performance of National Government & 5.6 Role of elected representative bodies*).

Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change? (Q-77) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 7.7

Attitudes in this regard vary between regions. The highest levels of confidence on voting are in the North East and North West where around 80 percent of respondents think that voting can change things. This is also true for 75 percent of respondents in the East and 72 percent in the Central/Kabul region. However, just over half (55%) of respondents in the South West believe in the efficacy of voting to bring about improvement.

Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change? (Q-77, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 7.8

It is interesting to note, that across almost all regions, respondents express higher levels of confidence that voting can change things than they do in their own ability to influence government decision-making. Only in the South West do slightly more respondents think they can have influence (57%) than believe that voting can bring about change (55%).

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-63, Base 6406) BY REGION, and

Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change? (Q-77, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 7.9

Some light may be cast on this apparent paradox by the answers to a set of further question related to the ways in which individuals should use their vote. When respondents were asked their opinion about the statement: "A person should vote the way his or her community votes, not how they feel individually", the majority (59%) say they agree. Just over a third (36%) of respondents think that voting should be based on personal preferences. More men (61%) than women (57%) agree with this statement and agreement is also higher amongst rural (61%) than urban (55%) respondents. More respondents over 45 (62%) agree with this statement than those under 24 (58%). The majority of respondents agree with this statement in all regions except the Central/Hazarajat (48%). However, support for voting according to com-

munity preferences fell significantly between 2008 (65%) and 2009 (59%). Similarly, only a small majority (57%) of respondents say that women should decide for themselves who how to vote (*see Chapter 8. 8.3 Women’s political participation*).

75 Electoral participation

The survey also sought to measure public awareness regarding the elections in Afghanistan scheduled in 2009. The survey was conducted in June 2009 and the Presidential and Provincial Councils elections were scheduled for August. Respondents were asked if they are aware of the upcoming elections due to take place in the next few months. An overwhelming majority (82%) said they were aware, but nearly one in six respondents (16%) said they were not. Levels of awareness were higher among men (85%) than women (78%).

Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months? (Q-67, Base 6406) ALL AND BY GENDER




Fig 7.10

When people had been asked about their awareness of the 2009 elections the previous year, just over half (53%) of respondents had said they were aware. The fact that more than four-fifths (82%) of respondents were aware of the upcoming elections in June 2009 suggests that efforts to increase public awareness about the elections have been largely successful.

Respondents were also asked whether they had received any information regarding the elections or regarding their participation in the elections in the previous days or weeks. Half (50%) of respondents said they had received such messages while just under half

(48%) said they had not. More rural residents (51%) than urban dwellers (44%) said they received information. Nearly two-thirds of respondents in the East (63%), and more than half in the North West (59%) and North East (55%) reported having received such messages. However, more than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul (59%), South West (55%) and Central/Hazarajat (53%) regions said they had not.

Respondents who were aware of the elections were then asked to identify their main source of electoral information. The most commonly mentioned source of information was radio (44%) followed by TV (25%), then followed by friends, family and neighbors (16%). Radio was the most common source of information on elections for rural residents (49%), while most urban dwellers (61%) said they get their election information from TV. This is also consistent with national patterns of media usage (see *Chapter 9, 9.4: Sources of information on national and local events*). The Central/Kabul region is the only region where the majority of respondents identified TV as their main source of information. Radio remains the main source of information in the rest of the country.

The survey also asked all respondents whether they had registered to vote in the 2009 elections. Just over three quarters (77%) of respondents said they had done so, while around one in five (21%) said they had not. While more than four-fifths (85%) of men said they had registered, this was true for just over two-thirds (69%) of women. A lower proportion of respondents on higher incomes had registered to vote than those in lower income brackets. While more than four-fifths (83%) of respondents who earn less than 2000 Afs a month had registered, only around three-quarters (76%) of respondents who earn more than 3,000 Afs a month had done so.

Respondents with higher levels of education were also more likely to have registered to vote. Almost nine out of ten (89%) respondents who have completed high school and four-fifths (81%) of those who have some level of secondary education had registered. This fell to under three-quarters (73%) of respondents who never went to school.

Have you registered yourself for the elections? (Q-69, Base 6406)




Fig 7.11

The survey asked those respondents who said they had not registered for the elections (21% of all respondents) whether they knew where to register to vote. Only around one in five (22%) said they did, while about three-quarters (73%) said they did not, suggesting that lack of information about electoral procedures may still constitute a significant reason why Afghans may have failed to register to vote. Only half as many women (17 %) as men (31%) said they knew where to register to vote.

Respondents were then asked how likely they were to vote. Around three-quarters (73%) said they were likely to vote, including almost half (48%) who said this was very likely. However, one in five (20%) said they were unlikely to vote, including one in seven (14%) who said this was very unlikely. Considerably more men (53%) than women (41%) said they were very likely to vote. These results suggest that the disparity in electoral participation between men and women that was seen in the 2004 and 2005 elections was likely to be repeated in the elections in August 2009.

How likely are you to vote in the coming elections? (Q-72, Base 6406)




Fig 7.12

More than four out of five respondents said they were likely to vote in the Central/Hazarajat (87%), East (85%), North East (83%) and North West (82%). However, more than one in three respondents in the South West (35%) and at least one in four in the South East (29%), Central/Kabul (27%) and West (25%) said they were unlikely to vote.

Respondents who said they were unlikely to vote in the upcoming elections (20% of all respondents) were then asked why this was so. A quarter of respondents (26%) said this was because they are not interested. Security concerns (18%) were the second most commonly cited reason.

Lack of interest was the most common reason cited by respondents in the Central/Kabul (35%), East (23%), North East (28%), North West (33%) and West (25%), while insecurity was the main reason identified in the South East (25%) and South West (30%).

The proportion of respondents who report having no interest in participating in the elections has more than doubled since 2004 (from 12% to 16% in 2005, 18% in 2008 and 26% in 2009).

More than a quarter (26%) of women who said they were unlikely to vote said this was because they would not be permitted to vote. No men mentioned this as a reason. More than a third (34%) of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region said that this was the reason they were unlikely to vote making it the most frequently mentioned reason in this region. Given that this region registered the highest level of intentions to vote, it seems likely that it was mostly women in the Central/Hazarajat who were excluded from the electoral process. However, just under a quarter of respondents in the North East (23%) and Central/Kabul (22%) also said this was because they would not be permitted to vote, more than twice as many as in the other regions.

You said it is somewhat or very unlikely that you would vote in the upcoming elections. Why do you say that? (Q-73a, Base 1319)




Fig 7.13

Respondents who said they were likely to vote in the upcoming elections (73% of all respondents) were then asked about their motivation for voting. More than a quarter (28%) of respondents said it was because it is their right to vote. Another 22 percent said they believe voting contributes to peace, while 20 percent expressed the desire to choose their leaders. Motivations for voting did not differ significantly across the country.

What is the most important reason why you want to vote? (Q-73b, Base 4687)




Fig 7.14

Respondents were also asked whether they thought the upcoming elections would be free and fair. Before asking this question, respondents were briefed about what the terms ‘free’ and ‘fair’ mean in this regard. In an electoral context ‘free’ means that all people have the chance to vote as they wish and that they are not forced to vote for a particular party or candidate. ‘Fair’ means that all candidates and parties are given equal access to public channels of communications, that they are not prevented from getting their message across to voters and that votes cast are counted correctly and results are not manipulated. Just under two-thirds (64%) of respondents said that the upcoming elections would be free and fair, while around a fifth (22%) said they would not. Doubts about the elections being free and fair were highest in the South West (37%), South East (29%), Central/Kabul (25%) and West (23%).

Do you think the upcoming elections will be free and fair, or do you think they will not be free and fair? (Q-75, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 7.15

Respondents who said that the coming elections would not be free and fair (22% of all respondents) were also asked for the reason. Well over a third (39%) said there would be cheating in the vote count, while another third (33%) mentioned buying of votes. Just under one in ten (9%) said that husbands will not let their wives vote, and a similar proportion (8%) mentioned intimidation against voters or party activists.

When responses about the likelihood of the elections being free and fair are analyzed alongside voting intentions a clear correlation emerges. Respondents who are likely to vote are also those who believe that the elections will be free and fair. More than

three-quarters (77%) of respondents who are very likely to vote also think the elections will be free and fair. The same is true for around two-thirds (64%) of respondents who are somewhat likely to vote. However, well under half (43%) of those who are somewhat unlikely to vote think that the elections will be free and fair, and this is true for an even smaller proportion (38%) of those who are very unlikely to vote. This indicates that confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has a significant impact on people's willingness to participate in these democratic processes.

Table 7.4: Do you think the upcoming elections will be free and fair, or do you think they will not be free and fair? (Q-75, Base 6406) BY THOSE WHO ARE VERY LIKELY, SOMEWHAT LIKELY, SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY AND VERY UNLIKELY TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS

	Very likely (%)	Somewhat likely (%)	Somewhat unlikely (%)	Very unlikely (%)
It will be free and fair	77	64	43	38
It will not be free and fair	13	22	44	43
Refused	1	1	3	2
Don't know	10	13	10	16

Another factor that influences people's decision to vote is the belief that their votes will bring about change. Those who are likely to vote in the upcoming election are those people who believe in the efficacy of their vote to achieve improvement. A much higher proportion of those who say they are very likely to vote (84%) and somewhat likely to vote (71%) think that voting can change things, compared to those who are somewhat unlikely to vote (46%) and very unlikely to vote (43%). This suggests that people are likely to use their voting rights if they believe that voting can lead to improvement and changes in the future.

Table 7.5: Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change? (Q-77, Base 6406) BY THOSE WHO ARE VERY LIKELY, SOMEWHAT LIKELY, SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY AND VERY UNLIKELY TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS

	Very likely (%)	Somewhat likely (%)	Somewhat unlikely (%)	Very unlikely (%)
Voting can change things	84	71	46	43
Things are not going to get better	11	21	44	49
Refused	0	0	2	1
Don't know	5	7	8	8

7.6 Freedom of expression

The survey also sought to measure public opinion on freedom of expression as another cornerstone of democratic practice. Respondents were asked whether most people feel free to express their political opinions in their local area. Forty percent of respondents say they do but an almost equal proportion (39%) say they do not. Around one in five respondents (18%) is either unable or unwilling to give an opinion. These percentages have not changed significantly since 2007.

However there are significant regional differences. Over half of respondents in the East (53%), and more than forty percent in the North West (48%), Central/Hazarajat (45%), North East (44%) and Central/Kabul (43%) regions say that people feel free to express their political opinion in their local areas. In contrast, over half of respondents in the South West (53%) and South East (52%) and 43 percent in the West say that this is not the case. In addition, at least a quarter of respondents in the West (27%) and Central/Hazarajat (25%) and at least a fifth in the North West (22%) and Central/Kabul (20%) regions, are unable or unwilling to express an opinion in this regard.

Do most people feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live? (Q-31, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 7.16

Respondents who say that most people feel free to express their political opinions in their local area (40% of all respondents) were then asked what changes or reasons have made this possible. Respondents were invited to give two reasons. More than half (55%) of respondents say this is because freedom of speech is guaranteed. Over a third (37%) mention good security conditions in their areas. Around one in seven respondents say the reason is peace and democracy (14%) or the removal of local militias (14%). This suggests that physical security conditions, as well as the legal guarantee of freedoms, are important in ensuring freedom of expression for citizens. A third of respondents (33%) do not identify any particular factor to which they could attribute freedom of expression in their area.

What changes compared with the past, or reasons, do you think have made most people to feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live? (Q-32a&b combined, Base 2544)




Fig 7.17

Respondents who say that most people do not feel free to express their political opinions in their area (39% of all respondents) were also asked why they think this is so. They were invited to mention two reasons. Physical security conditions account for the overwhelming majority of responses including fear for safety (34%), bad security conditions (29%), presence of the Taliban (21%) and presence of warlords (7%). In addition, 40 percent of respondents do not give a definitive answer to this question which also suggests a level of concern about the possible consequences of doing so. The lack of guaranteed rights also features prominently amongst responses including the government not allowing freedom of political opinions (12%), women being under the control of men (9%) and government not taking note of people’s opinions (9%).

Why don’t people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-33a&b combined, Base 2521)




Fig 7.18

The proportion of respondents who identify fear for their safety and bad security conditions as the reason for lack of freedom of expression in their area has fallen in 2009 compared to 2008. Indeed, the proportion mentioning poor local security conditions is lower in 2009 (29%) than in any previous year (40% in 2006, 36% in 2007, 38% in 2008). The proportion of respondents who explicitly mention a threat from the Taliban had fluctuated substantially since 2006, but has risen in 2009 (21%) compared to 2008 (18%), whereas those who mention the presence of warlords continues to fall (from 32% in 2006 to 18% in 2007, 8% in 2008 and 7% in 2009). Twelve percent of the respondents mention government prohibition of freedom of political expression in 2009 as opposed to 15 percent in 2008, 22 percent in 2007 and 17 percent in 2006. On the other hand, more than twice as many respondents have mentioned women being under the control of men as a reason for limited freedom of expression in 2009 (9%) and 2008 (10%) as in 2006 (4%) or 2007 (4%).

Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-33a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009.




Fig 7.19

7.7 Democratic spirit of government

In order to assess how citizens relate to the government, the survey asked all respondents to say whether they agree or disagree with a number of statements related to the application of democratic principles. The first statement was: "I don't think the government cares much about what people like me think". Around three quarters of respondents (74%) agree with this statement including over a quarter (28%) who strongly agree. Just under a quarter (22%) disagree with the statement.

The second statement was: “It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the Government in public”. Sixty-one percent of respondents agree with this statement including 23 percent who strongly agree. Over a third (35%) disagree. A higher proportion of residents in the South West (43%) and South East (41%) say it is acceptable to talk negatively about the government than in other regions. These are also the regions that report the highest levels of dissatisfaction with government performance (*see Chapter 5, 5.1 Performance of National Government*).

Table 7.6: Public agreement and disagreement toward the statements related to the democratic spirit of the government (Q-15a-b, Base 6406)

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Somewhat (%)	Disagree Somewhat (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)
a) I don't think that the government cares much about what people like me think	28	46	16	6
b) It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the Government in public	23	38	25	10

Over time there have been small fluctuations in the proportion of respondents who say that the government does not care about the views of people like them. However, there has been a consistent fall in the proportion of respondents who say it is unacceptable to talk negatively about the government (from 69% in 2007 to 61% in 2009). This is significant given that the proportion of respondents who say that people feel free to express their political opinions in their local area has not changed significantly over this period (*see section 7.6 first paragraph*). These findings confirm that the major obstacles to freedom of expression in Afghanistan do not come from the government but from other factors in the environment and society.

Table 7.7: Proportion of those who agree (combination of strongly agree and agree somewhat) toward the statements related to democratic spirit of the government (Q-15a-b, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) I don't think that the government cares much about what people like me think	77	79	76	74
b) It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the Government in public	-	69	62	61

7.8 Involvement of religious leaders

Finally, the survey sought to assess public opinion regarding the involvement of religious leaders in government decision making. Respondents were offered two alternative viewpoints: “Some people argue that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area while others argue that politics and religion should not mix”, and asked which is closer to their view. About two-thirds of respondents (67%) say that religious leaders should be consulted while around a quarter (27%) say that politics and religion should not mix. The proportion of respondents who say religious leaders should be consulted has been higher in 2008 and 2009 than it was in 2006 and 2007, when only around 60 percent of respondents were in favor of such consultation.

Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view? (Q-66) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 7.20

Public opinion in this regard varies between regions. Although the majority of respondents in all regions are in the favor of consulting with religious leaders, this is true for a much higher proportion of people in the East (82%) and South West (72%) of the country than in other regions. Opposition to the involvement of religious leaders is highest in the West where a third of respondents (32%) say that politics and religion should not mix.

Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view? (Q-66, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 7.21

Despite the relatively low levels of support for the view that politics and religion should not mix, 71 percent of respondents say they agree with the statement: “Religious authorities should lead people in obeying the obligations of their faith while political leaders should make decisions about how the government is run”. However, support for the separation of the roles of religious authorities and political leaders has also fallen over the years. Over four-fifths of respondents (82%) agreed with this statement in 2006. This fell to 80 percent in 2007, 75 percent in 2008 and 71 percent in 2009. This trend is therefore consistent with the increasing support for consultation with religious leaders to help the government to resolve local problems (see Fig. 7.20).

8 Women and Society

8.1 The biggest problems faced by women

The survey sought to understand the particular challenges faced by women in Afghan society. All respondents (men and women) were asked to identify the two biggest problems women face in Afghanistan. Nearly half (49%) of respondents mention lack of education and illiteracy. More than a quarter identify the lack of job opportunities for women (28%) and around a fifth (21%) say lack of women's rights.

Slightly more men (50%) than women (47%) identify lack of education and illiteracy as one of biggest problems faced by women. Men also tend to place greater emphasis on the availability of basic services for women such as access to general healthcare (12% of men compared to 9% of women) and pregnancy related healthcare (10% of men compared to 5% of women). However, more women mention lack of job opportunities (31% compared to 26% of men) and issues related to equality including lack of women's rights (24% of women, 18% of men), domestic violence (14% of women, 9% of men) and that women can't leave their homes (10% of women, 7% of men).

The problem of job opportunities for women is a significantly higher priority for low income households. This is mentioned by 37 percent of households with a monthly income of less than 2000Afs compared to 27 percent for those earning over 3,000 Afs a month, 24 percent for those earning over 5,000 Afs a month and 19 percent for those in the highest income category. Conversely, the lack of women's rights and domestic violence are more frequently identified by higher income households.

Across the country, the lack of education and illiteracy is identified as the biggest problem facing women in all regions. However, the proportion of those who identify the lack of job opportunities for women is particularly high in the North West (42%) and North East (40%). More than a fifth (21%) of respondents identify the lack of women's rights in all regions except North East (12%) and Central/Kabul (16%)⁵.

⁵ In 2009, in three provinces in the South; Paktika, Uruzghan and Zabul, women were not sampled due to the deteriorated security situation in the region that restricted freedom of movement, making it unsafe to employ female interviewers (see *Appendix 2: Methodology*).

What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-102a&b combined, Base 6406)




Fig 8.1

Since 2006, lack of education has consistently been identified as the biggest problem for women in Afghanistan. However, over the same period there has been a consistent rise in the proportion of respondents who identify the lack of employment opportunities for women as a significant issue (from 1% in 2006 to 19% in 2007, 24% in 2008 and 28% in 2009). While concern about the lack of women's rights has remained relatively stable (fluctuating between 24% and 21% in the last four years), the proportion of respondents who identify domestic violence as a major problem for Afghan women has declined (from 23% in 2006 to 15% in 2007, 12% in 2008 and 11% in 2009).

What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-102a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 8.2

8.2 Gender equality

The survey also endeavored to measure public opinion on the issue of gender equality. Respondents were first asked whether they agree with the statement: “Women should have equal opportunities like men in education”. Well over four-fifths (87%) of respondents say they agree with this statement, including more than half (55%) who strongly agree. Only around one in eight (12%) express some level of disagreement. This finding closely matches that of 2008.

Not surprisingly, a higher proportion of women (92%) than men (83%) support equal opportunities in education. Urban residents are also more likely to support equal educational opportunities for women (93%) compared to their rural counterparts (85%).

Across the country at least 85 percent of respondents express support for equal educational opportunities for women in all regions except the South West (73%). In the South West around a quarter (26%) of respondents oppose such equality at least twice the figure recorded in any other region.

Table 8.1: Some people say that women should have equal opportunities like men in education? Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Q-103, Base 6406) BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	/Central Hazarajat (%)
Agree	92	88	86	89	90	86	73	89
Disagree	7	12	13	10	8	12	26	8

These responses are broadly consistent with the high level of stated support for equal rights under the law, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion (80%) (*see Chapter 7, 7.2 Attitudes to democratic principles, processes and political activities*).

Respondents were then asked to give their opinion on whether women should be allowed to work outside the home. Just over two-thirds of respondents (67%) say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while 29 percent say that they should not. Public opinion in this regard has not changed significantly since 2006, although the proportion who say that women should be allowed to work outside the home has decreased marginally each year to its lowest level in 2009 (from 71% in 2006 to 67% in 2009).

Table 8.2: Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-104) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	71	70	69	67
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	27	28	27	29
Refused	1	1	0	1
Don't know	2	2	4	3

There is a considerable difference of opinion between the sexes on whether women should be allowed to work outside the home. Four-fifths of women (80%) think that they should, compared to just over half (55%) of men. Younger respondents also tend to be more favorable to this idea. Seventy-one percent of respondents aged between 18 and 24 are in favor of women working outside the home compared to only 62 percent among those aged over 55. Similarly, more urban (79%) than rural (64%) residents hold this opinion. Respondents with lower incomes are also more favorable to this idea than those in higher income categories. Sixty-nine percent of respondents earning less than 2000 Afs a month are in favor compared to 61 percent of people earning more than 10,000 Afs.

Support for women being allowed to work outside the home is strongest in the Central/Hazarajat (82%), North West (75%), Central/Kabul (73%) and North East (71%) regions. Opposition to this idea is strongest in the South West (49%), South East (38%) and East (37%) of the country.

Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-104, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 8.3

8. Women's political participation

The survey attempted to ascertain whether respondents' views on gender equality in general carry through into support for women's political participation. Respondents were asked whether they think women should be allowed to vote in elections. A large majority of respondents (83%) say that they should, demonstrating that the principle of universal suffrage is broadly accepted in Afghanistan. Only 14 percent of respondents disagree with women being allowed to vote. More women (88%) than men (79%) say women should be allowed to vote, as do more respondents in urban (91%) than rural (81%) areas. Likewise, those with higher levels of education are more likely to support the electoral participation of women. Eighty-eight percent of respondents who have completed secondary school agree with this, compared to around 82 percent of those with lower levels of education.

There is also variation between regions. Support for women voting is highest in the North West (90%), Central/Hazarajat (90%), North East (89%), Central/Kabul (88%) and East (83%). However, at least a third of respondents in the South West (35%) and a quarter in the South East (25%) say women should not be allowed to vote.

Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections? (Q-74, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 8.4

Respondents were then asked whether they thought that, when voting in elections, women should decide for themselves how to vote or whether they should receive advice from men. A small majority (57%) say that women should decide for themselves, while around a third (23%) say men should advise them. Almost one in five respondents (19%) think that women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men. There has been almost no change in public opinion on this issue since 2006.

Table 8.3: *If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice from men? (Q-105) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009*

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Women should decide for themselves	57	56	58	57
Men should advise them	24	25	22	23
Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men	19	19	18	19
Don't know	1	1	2	2

Again more women (62%) than men (51%) say that women should decide for themselves and fewer women (17%) say they should be advised by men, compared to male respondents (27%). However, an equal proportion of both groups say that women should decide in consultation with men (19%).

If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice from men? (Q-105, Base 6406) BY GENDER




Fig 8.5

More than two-thirds of respondents in the North West (69%), North East (67%) and Central/Hazarajat (67%) regions think that women should decide for themselves on how to vote, while almost a third of respondents in the South East (31%), South West (31%) and around a quarter in the East (26%) say that women should be advised by men. An almost equal proportion in these three regions thinks that women should decide in consultation with men (28% in the South East and South West and 25% in the East).

Respondents were also asked whether they agree with the statement: “In the election, everyone must vote for themselves. Men cannot vote in place of women. Women must vote for themselves”. More than four-fifths (86%) of respondents agree with this statement while around one in ten (11%) disagree. Again, more women (91%) agree with the statement than men (83%).

Again the same regional divergence is seen. More than four-fifths of respondents agree with this statement in the North East (94%), Central/Kabul (92%), Central/Hazarajat (90%), North West (88%), East (88%) and Western (86%). However, more than one in four respondents (27%) in the South West and around one in five (19%) in the South East say it is acceptable for men to vote in the place of women.

Respondents’ views on women’s independent participation in electoral processes are clearly correlated with their other views on gender equality.

For example, 70 percent of respondents who think that women should be allowed to work outside the home also say that women should decide for themselves how to vote. On the other hand, 70 percent of those who think that women should not be allowed to work outside the home do not think that women should be allowed to decide for themselves how to vote (44% of them think men should advise and 26% think women should decide in consultation with men). These findings closely match those of 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Table 8.4: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice from men? (Q-105, Base 6406) BY PEOPLE WITH OPINIONS WOMEN SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE HOME - COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Women should be allowed to work outside the home (%)				Women should not be allowed to work outside the home (%)			
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2006	2007	2008	2009
Women should decide for themselves	68	68	70	70	31	27	29	28
Men should advise them	15	16	14	13	47	47	43	44
Women should decide in consultation with men	17	16	15	16	22	25	25	26

Similarly, 61 percent of those who agree that women should have equal opportunities in education also say that women should decide for themselves how to vote. On the other hand, 69 percent of those who think that women should not have equal educational opportunities also do not think that women should decide for themselves how to vote (44% of them think men should advise them and 25% think women should decide in consultation with men). These findings closely match those of 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Table 8.5: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice from men? (Q-105, Base 6406) BY PEOPLE WITH OPINIONS WOMEN SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT HAVE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES LIKE MEN IN EDUCATION - COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	Women should have equal opportunities like men in education (%)				Women should not have equal opportunities like men in education (%)			
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2006	2007	2008	2009
Women should decide for themselves	61	61	63	61	20	15	17	28
Men should advice them	21	20	19	20	53	60	47	44
Women should decide in consultation with men	18	18	17	18	24	23	27	25

8.4 Political leadership

The survey also asked a series of questions pertaining to women playing leadership roles in politics. Respondents were first asked whether they think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women or whether both men and women should have equal representation at leadership level. A little less than half (47%) of respondents say that both men and women should have equal representation, while more than a third (39%) say leadership positions should be mostly for men, and just one in ten (10%) say that leadership positions should be mostly for women.

The survey shows that women have a much stronger belief in equality of representation than do their male counterparts. Almost twice as many women (60%) as men (35%) say there should be equal representation in political leadership. More than half of male respondents (54%) believe that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, while only around one in six (15%) female respondents think that leadership positions should be mostly for women.

Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?
(Q-108, Base 6406) BY GENDER




Fig 8.6

The majority of respondents support equal representation of men and women in the Central/Hazarajat (66%), North West (54%), North East (53%) and West (50%) regions, while nearly half of respondents in the South West (49%), East (48%) and South East (45%) think that political leadership positions should be occupied by men.

Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?
(Q-108, Base 6406) BY REGION




Fig 8.7

In order to investigate public attitudes to women in political leadership roles in more detail, the survey asked respondents whether they are opposed to being represented by a woman on various governance bodies from the local to the national level. Just over half of respondents say they have no objection to being represented by a woman on any of these bodies. The only exception to this is at Provincial Council level where the figure is just below half (49%).

Table 8.6: Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following organizations? (Q109-a-e, Base 6406)

	Yes (%)	No (%)
a) In National Parliament	48	50
b) In your Provincial Council	48	49
c) In your Community Development Councils	45	52
d) In your District Development Assembly	42	54
e) In your local Shura or Jirga	43	53
Average	45	52

Respondents record the least opposition to being represented by a woman in their District Development Assembly (DDA) (54% say they have no objection while 42% say they are opposed). This may reflect the impact of the systematic policy of promoting active female representation incorporated into the approach for the establishment of DDAs. The highest levels of opposition are at the level of the National Parliament (50%) and the Provincial Council (49%). In these institutions a quota system has been the main mechanism for supporting women's representation.

There is a little difference between the responses of men and women on this issue. On average, 50 percent of men and 53 percent of women say they have no objection to being represented by a woman on these bodies. There are significantly lower levels of objection to female representation in the Central/Hazarajat than in other regions.

However, results in 2009 show a significant decline in support for female representation compared to previous years. The greatest fall concerns representation on a Provincial Council (PC). In 2008, 59 percent of respondents had no objection to being represented by a women on the PC, but this has fallen to under half (49%) in 2009. A similar fall in support is evident regarding representation in the national parliament (from 57% to 50%), on a Community Development Council (58% to 52%) and in local shura or jirga (58% to 53%). The smallest drop concerns acceptance of being represented by a woman on the District Development Assembly (57% to 54%) which has shifted from having amongst the highest levels of opposition to female representation to having the lowest level in the space of a single year.

Table 8.7: Proportion of those who are not opposed to a woman representing them in the following organizations (NO responses only) (Q-109a-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) In National Parliament	55	57	50
b) In your Provincial Council	58	59	49
c) In your Community Development Councils	58	58	52
d) In your District Development Assembly	59	57	54
e) In your local Shura or Jirga	56	58	53
Average	57	58	52

The table below further breaks down responses regarding female political representation by region. Support for women taking a representative role is consistently highest in the Central/Hazarajat region regarding national (60%) and provincial (58%) level representation, and in the East in terms of female representation at the community level, including District Development Assemblies (68%) and local shura or jirga (65%). Both regions express equally high levels of support for women's representation on Community Development Councils (60%). Support for female representation on governance bodies in the Central/Hazarajat region are clearly correlated with more general views on women's political participation. Respondents in this region are amongst the most supportive of women being able to vote (90%), to decide for themselves how to vote (67%) and for women being allowed to work outside the home (82%). The Central/Hazarajat also records the highest levels of support in the country for political leadership positions being shared between men and women (66%) (*see Fig.8.7*). The picture is more complex for the East region which records a high proportion of respondents who say they are not opposed to women in leadership position in various bodies, but where nearly half (48%) say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, and more than a third (37%) say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home.

Table 8.8: Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following organizations? (Q109-a-e, Base 6406) NO Responses BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
a) In National Parliament	46	49	54	51	52	51	46	60
b) In your Provincial Council	49	45	53	50	50	52	42	58
c) In your Community Development Councils	50	49	60	51	52	52	51	60
d) In your District Development Assembly	51	53	68	54	53	53	55	56
e) In your local Shura or Jirga	51	53	65	53	49	54	54	55
Average	49	50	60	52	51	52	50	58

8.5 Awareness of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs

In 2002, the Afghan government created the Ministry of Women’s Affairs to provide a focus for policy on gender equality and enhance the participation of women in Afghan society. In 2009, for the second year, the survey attempted to measure public awareness of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs at the national and local levels. Respondents were first asked whether they were aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. More than half (58%) of respondents say that they are aware of the Ministry, while 39 percent say they are not aware of it. There has been no substantive change in the level of awareness in the last year.

More men (66%) than women (48%) are aware of the existence of this Ministry. This is likely to be a reflection of the higher levels of literacy and education amongst men and the greater role taken by men in public life in Afghan society.

Are you aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women's Affairs? (Q-107a, Base 6406) BY GENDER




Fig 8.8

Awareness is also greater amongst respondents with higher levels of education. More than three quarters (78%) of respondents who have completed high school and around two thirds of those who have some secondary education (69%) or completed primary school (64%) are aware of the existence of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, compared to less than half (49%) of respondents who never went to school.

Awareness of the Ministry of Women's Affairs is highest in the South East (72%) and Central/Kabul (71%) regions. Around half of respondents are aware of the Ministry in the North East (53%), North West (50%), West (50%) and South West (57%). On the other hand, over half of respondents living in the East (51%) and Central/Hazarajat (58%) regions have not heard about the ministry.

Table 8.9: Are you aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women's Affairs? (Q-107a, Base 6406) BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
Yes	71	72	48	53	50	50	57	35
No	28	26	51	43	46	44	40	58

Respondents who say they are aware of the Ministry of Women's Affairs (58% of all respondents) were then asked whether there are any local offices of the ministry in the district or province where they live. Around 60 percent of them say they know of local offices of this Ministry while 36 percent say they do not. Awareness of the local offices of the ministry is highest in the North East (73%), Central/Hazarajat (65%) and West (64%). However, half of respondents in the East (50%) and more than 40 percent in the South East (44%) and South West (41%) do not know of any local offices of the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

9 Information Sources and Media Use

Since 2006, the survey has sought to explore how Afghans access and receive information. Once again, this year, the survey examined listenership of radio, viewership of television and the way people use the media. It also assessed how Afghans access communications technology such as radio, television, computers, fixed phone lines and mobile phones and assessed their preferences for receiving information through these and other channels including informal community networks.

9.1 Access to communications technology

Radio is the most accessible media for Afghan households. More than four-fifths (81%) of respondents say they have a functioning radio in their household, and there is only a slight difference in access between urban (81%) and rural (77%) areas. However, other communications technologies are much more accessible to urban residents than to those living in rural areas. More than twice as many urban (80%) as rural (30%) households have access to a television. The same is true for mobile phones. More than four-fifths (81%) of urban residents say they have a mobile phone while only 44 percent of rural residents say so. Although only a small proportion (6%) of Afghan households own a computer, six times more urban (18%) than rural (3%) residents do so. Ownership of functioning fixed phone line is rare in Afghanistan.

Table 9.1: Proportion of respondents who have the following communications technologies in functioning order in their households (Q-1) ALL, RURAL AND URBAN SETTLEMENT (Q-1, Base 6406)

	All (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)
Radio	81	81	77
TV set	41	30	80
Mobile phone	52	44	81
Computer	6	3	18

Ownership of all kinds of communications technology rises steadily with both income and educational level. The disparity is smallest with respect to radio ownership, but it is still significant. More than four-fifths (84%) of all households earning over 3,000Afs a month own a radio, but this is true for just over two thirds (69%) of households earning under 2,000Afs. These disparities underline the challenges that remain in providing information through technological means to the poorer sections of Afghan society.

Radio ownership is highest in the South East (96%), East (89%) and South West (87%). However, it is relatively low in the Central/Hazarajat (59%) and North West (66%) regions. Access to television is highest in the Central/Kabul region (64%) followed by the West (47%) and North West (38%). Mobile telephone penetration is also highest in the Central/Kabul region (78%) followed by the East (68%), South East (57%) and North West (46%). The Central/Kabul region also has a significantly higher proportion of households that own a computer (14%) than any other region.

Table 9.2: Regional comparison of ownership of communications technologies (Q-1, Base 6406)

	Central/ Kabul (%)	South East (%)	East (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)	West (%)	South West (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)
Radio	81	96	89	80	66	78	87	59
TV set	64	35	27	33	38	47	24	18
Mobile phone	78	57	68	38	46	34	34	30
Computer	14	5	5	3	4	5	5	2

Although radio continues to be the most accessible form of communications technology in Afghanistan, the proportion of respondents who own a functioning radio has been declining steadily since 2007 (from 88% to 84% in 2008 and 81% in 2009). On the other hand, the proportion of respondents who own a working television set continues to rise (from 37% in 2007 to 38% in 2008 and 41% in 2009). However, the most dramatic increase has been in mobile telephone ownership which has risen from 42 percent in 2007 to over half (52%) of respondent households in 2009.

Table 9.3: Proportion of respondents who have the following communications technologies in functioning order in their households (Q-1) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Radio	88	84	81
TV set	37	38	41
Mobile phone	42	40	52
Computer	-	5	6

9.2 Radio listenership

The survey also sought to examine the use of different media. Respondents were first asked how many days a week they listen to the radio. Forty four percent say they listen to the radio every day or almost every day and 21 percent say they listen three or four days a week. One-fifth (20%) of respondents say they never listen to the radio.

How many days a week do you listen to the radio, if any? (Q-2, Base 6406)




Fig 9.1

Along with radio ownership, radio listenership has also been falling in recent years. In 2006, more than half (53%) of respondents said they listened to the radio every-day, however, this has fallen to 44 percent in 2008 and 2009. Conversely, those who say they never listen to the radio has risen from one in eight respondents (12%) in 2006 to one in five (20%) in 2009.

How many days a week do you listen to the radio, if any? (Q-2) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 9.2

Respondents who say they listen to the radio (80% of all respondents) were then asked for how many hours they listen on an average day. Around three in five respondents (59%) say they listen for under an hour, including one in five (21%) who listen for less than 30 minutes. A quarter (25%) of radio listeners listen for up to two hours while around one in six (16%) listen for more than two hours a day.

How many hours do you listen to it on an average day every time when you listen to radio? (Q-3, Base 5078)




Fig 9.3

9.3 Television viewership

The survey then asked about television viewership. Respondents were asked how many days a week they watch TV, if any. More than half (56%) say they never watch television. This is a much more common response in rural (66%) than urban (18%) areas, where television ownership is much higher (see Table 9.1). Around a quarter (26%) say they watch television everyday or almost everyday.

How many days a week do you watch TV, if any? (Q-4, Base 6406) ALL AND BY RURAL-URBAN




Fig 9.4

Unlike radio usage, television viewing patterns have not changed significantly since 2006.

How many days a week do you watch TV, if any? (Q-4, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009




Fig 9.5

Respondents who say they watch television (42% of all respondents) were then asked how many hours they watch TV on an average day. The survey shows that people watch television for longer periods than they spend listening to the radio. Thirty-seven percent of respondents watch television for less than an hour a day, compared to 59 percent who say the same about listening to the radio. Around a third of respondents (32%) watch television for more than two hours a day, compared to 16 percent who listen to the radio for the same length of time.

How many hours do you watch TV on an average day every time when you watch television? (Q-5, Base 2654)




Fig 9.6

9.4 Sources of information on national and local events

The survey also endeavored to ascertain public preferences regarding sources of information on national and local events. Respondents were first asked to identify their main source of information about what is happening in the country. Just under half (47%) identify radio as their main information source, while one fourth (25%) say TV. Around one-fifth of respondents (18%) say they normally get information on national events from friends, family and neighbors. A small proportion of respondents say they prefer to get information about what is happening in the country from community leaders (6%) or religious leaders (2%).

Although the radio remains the most common source of information for what is happening in the country, 2009 is the first year in which less than half (47%) of respondents identify it as their main source of information. In 2006, the figure was 55 percent and this fell to 54 percent in 2007 and 51 percent in 2008. This is in keeping with the fall in radio ownership and radio listenership measured over this period.

Table 9.4: Which is the main source from where you normally get information about what is happening in the country? (Q-6, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Radio	55	54	51	47
TV	22	26	21	25
Friends, family and neighbors	15	14	18	18
Village chief/community leaders	5	3	5	6
Religious leader	2	1	2	2

However, radio remains the main source of information for the majority of rural residents (53%), while most urban residents identify TV (62%) as their most important information source. Recourse to friends, family, and neighbors as the principle source of information on national and local events is more than twice as high in rural areas (20%) as in urban areas (9%).

Which is the main source from where you normally get information about what is happening in the country? (Q-6, Base 6406) BY RURAL-URBAN SETTLEMENT




Fig 9.7

Women (23%) are nearly twice as likely as men (13%) to identify family, friends and neighbors as their preferred source of information on current national events. Those with lower levels of education also tend to rely more on family, friends and neighbors to get information. Significantly more respondents who never went to school (22%) say they get their information this way, than those who completed primary school (16%), those who attended high school (10%) and those who have completed secondary or higher education (8%).

In order to examine in greater depth who in their communities people turn to in order to find out what is happening locally, the survey asked: “If you wanted to find out about something important happening in your community who, outside your family, would you want to tell you about it?” Results show that, in general, respondents prefer to get such information from personal acquaintances rather than leadership figures within their community. Around a quarter of respondents (23%) say friends and another fifth (21%) mention neighbors or villagers. Around one in six (17%) say they would prefer to get this information from village chiefs or community leaders and around one in eight (13%) from a mullah. More men (19%) than women (15%) prefer to get their information from community leaders, as do more respondents living in villages (18%) than in urban areas (13%). Fewer than one in ten respondents say they prefer to get this kind of information from local radio stations (7%) or international radio stations (9%).

However, the proportion of respondents who say they prefer to receive information on local events from personal acquaintances has been falling steadily in recent years. In 2006, around a third (34%) of respondents said they would like to get such information from neighbors. This figure fell to 30 percent in 2007, a quarter (25%) in 2008 and a fifth (21%) in 2009. On the other hand, 2009 records the highest proportion of respondents who say they prefer to get information from influential people such as village chiefs, community leaders or mullahs. Interestingly, although the popularity of radio as a source of general information is falling (see Table 9.4), the proportion of respondents who say they use local and international radio stations to access local news is increasing.

Table 9.5: If you wanted to find out about something important happening in your community, who, outside your family, would you want to tell you about it? (Q-7) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
Friend	28	30	26	23
Neighbors/ villagers	34	30	25	21
Village chief/ Community leader	15	13	14	17
Mullah	6	11	10	13
International radio stations	0	0	8	9
Local Afghan Radio stations	0	0	5	7
Co-workers	6	5	3	4
Worker at community centers	6	5	3	3
Shopkeepers	4	4	3	3

The survey also attempted to ascertain how often people use different forms of print and electronic media such as newspaper, magazines, internet and SMS text messaging and informal means such as meetings in the community and sermons in mosques as their major source of information about current events. The great majority of Afghans say they never use newspapers (75 %), magazines (78%), SMS text messaging (81%) or the internet (97%) for this purpose. This is likely to be largely due to a combination of low access to communications technologies and relatively low levels of literacy amongst the Afghan population as a whole. However, the use of informal means to get news and information is high. Nearly half of respondent use meetings in the community (53%) or sermons in mosques (47%) for this purpose. This demonstrates that traditional means of information dissemination continue to remain important in Afghanistan.

Table 9.6: How often do you use the following media to get news and information about current events? (Q-8a-f, Base 6406)

	Every day or almost every day (%)	Three or four days a week (%)	One or two days a week (%)	Less than once per week (%)	Never (%)
a) Newspapers	3	5	6	10	75
b) Magazines	1	4	7	10	78
c) The Internet	0	0	0	0	97
d) SMS	2	3	6	8	81
e) Meetings in your community	6	13	16	18	46
f) Meetings or sermons at your mosque	16	12	11	8	53

Despite small fluctuations, there have not been substantial changes since 2007 in the use of different means of communication for accessing information on current events, with the exception of the use of SMS text messaging which has risen dramatically from 9 percent in 2007 and 10 percent in 2008 to 19 percent in 2009. This is consistent with the significant rise in mobile phone ownership in the last year which has meant that for the first time the majority of respondents (52%) now have access to this kind of technology (*See Table 9.1*).

Table 9.7: Proportion of those who use the following means to get news and information about current events (Q-8a-f, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)
a) Newspapers	25	19	24
b) Magazines	22	15	22
c) The Internet	4	2	0
d) SMS	9	10	19
e) Meetings in your community	51	48	53
f) Meetings or sermons at your mosque	56	55	47

10 Appendix 1: Target Demographics

A total of 6406 respondents were surveyed in the study, out of which 5029 (79%) were from rural areas and 1377 (21%) were from urban areas. Of all respondents interviewed, 53% were male and 47% were female. The following tables provide demographic and socio-economic details of the respondents including a rural-urban breakdown. They also provide the employment status, occupation, educational status, income status and marital status of the respondents.

Gender and Region

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6406	5029	1377
Gender	%	%	%
Male	53	54	51
Female	47	46	49
Region	%	%	%
Central/Kabul	23	14	54
South East	11	13	2
East	10	11	4
North East	15	16	10
North West	14	15	13
West	13	15	8
South West	11	12	9
Central/Hazarajat	3	4	1

Employment Status and Age Group

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6406	5029	1377
Employment	%	%	%
Working	36	37	33
Retired	1	1	2
Housewife	43	42	44
Student	6	5	7
Unemployed	14	14	13
Other	1	1	1
Age Group	%	%	%
18 – 24	27	26	28
25 – 34	26	27	25
35 – 44	22	22	22
45 – 54	15	16	14
55 – 64	7	7	7
65 +	3	3	5

Main Occupation

Main Occupation	All	Rural	Urban
Base: Currently working and retired respondents	2389	1912	478
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Farmer (own land / tenant farmer)	30	36	7
Farm labourer (other's land)	14	16	4
Labourer, domestic, or unskilled worker	9	7	14
Informal sales/ business	12	11	18
Skilled worker/artisan	10	9	12
Government office - clerical worker	4	3	6
Private office - clerical worker	1	1	4
Government office – executive/manager	1	1	4
Private office – executive/manager	1	1	2
Self-employed professional	4	3	8
Small business owner	4	4	7
School teacher	6	6	7
University teacher	0	0	0
Military/Police	2	1	5
Other	0	0	0

Farming Land

Farming Land	All	Rural	Urban
Base: Farmers who own land or tenant farmers	722	690	32
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Less than 1 Jerib	12	11	22
1 – 2 Jerib	25	24	32
21 – 3 Jerib	27	27	22
More than 3 Jerib	36	36	25

* Jerib: One Jerib is equal to one-fifth of a hectare

Average Monthly Household Income

Income	All	Rural	Urban
	6406	5029	1377
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Less than 2,000 Afs	16	18	10
2,001 – 3,000 Afs	18	19	16
3,001 – 5,000 Afs	24	24	23
5,001 – 10,000 Afs	23	21	29
10,001 – 15,000 Afs	9	8	10
15,001 – 20,000 Afs	5	5	7
20,001 – 25,000 Afs	2	2	2
25,001 – 40,000 Afs	1	1	2
More then 40,000 Afs	0	0	0

Marital Status

Marital Status	All	Rural	Urban
	6406	5029	1377
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Single	22	21	23
Married	75	76	75
Widower/ Widow	3	3	2

Educational Status

Educational Status	All	Rural	Urban
	6406	5029	1377
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Never went to school	60	63	46
Primary School, incomplete	9	9	9
Primary School, complete	7	7	5
Secondary education, incomplete	5	5	6
Secondary education, complete	4	4	5
High School	12	10	22
University education or above	2	1	6

11 Appendix 2: Methodology

1. Distribution of sampling points by region and urban/rural strata

The survey was conducted among 6406 respondents in a single wave. Fieldwork for the survey was conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR-Surveys), Kabul, between June 17 and July 6, 2009 by a team of 648 trained interviewers (300 women and 348 men). The survey consisted of in-person interviews with a random, representative sample of 6406 Afghan citizens, 18 years of age and over and resident in Afghanistan.

The survey included both urban and rural respondents in all provinces of Afghanistan. The *Shehrawali* (municipal administration in Afghanistan) defines the urban population as those living within municipal boundaries. By default, the rural population comprises those who are living outside the municipal limits. Rural areas are defined neither in terms of population density nor remoteness.

The country is divided into eight geographical regions covering all 34 provinces. The sample was distributed proportional to geographic and residential characteristics of the population in each province. Within each province, districts were selected by first listing them by size of population and then applying a random selection method from this list.

For provinces with low population density, such as Nimroz, Panjshir and Nooristan, five interviews per sampling point were conducted, rather than eight as in other provinces, to offer broader geographic distribution.

The margin of sampling error is calculated at a cumulative of ± 3.7 percent at 95 percent confidence interval. The stochastic error is ± 2.4 percent while the systemic error is ± 1.3 percent. The systemic error appears because of the areas not accessible for surveying this year. The systemic error percentage is based on the retrospective calculation of the contribution of the inaccessible areas in the data for 2008.

2. Selection of sampling points and replacement of sampling points

The interviews were completed using multi-stage random sampling. Due to local cultural traditions, the sample was first divided into male and female sub-samples. Each region, province and further strata was allocated an equal number of male and female respondents per sampling points. Field researchers of the appropriate gender were allocated to conduct the interviews for each sub-sample. However, in 2009, in three southern provinces; Paktika, Uruzghan and Zabul, the deteriorated security situation restricted the freedom of movement, making it unsafe to employ female interviewers. This meant that no women were included in the sample in these provinces.

Moreover, in 2009, there were greater restrictions on the movement of survey researchers than in previous years. A number of districts in the country could not be surveyed because of inaccessibility due to logistical problems, natural disasters and security. Overall 208 of the 882 sampling points had to be replaced. The replacements were made by selecting other sampling points in the same region. The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces caused 102 of the sampling points across the country (12%) to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas affected by active violence. This was a significant change from 2008 when only 17 sampling points (3%) had to be replaced for security reasons. The regions most severely affected by these restrictions are the South East (18 replacements), South West (17 replacements) and West (15 replacements). There were 13 replacements each made in the East, Central/ Kabul, and North East regions. In other regions significant numbers of sampling points had to be changed for security reasons in individual provinces including Faryab (10 replacements) in the North West, Kunduz (8 replacements) in the North East, Logar (5 replacements) and Kabul (4 replacements) in the Central/Kabul region. Helmand was the only province where sampling point replacements did not have to be made.

Replacement of the sampling points and the reason for replacement is described in the following table

Province	SP	Projected District/ Village	Replaced with	Reason
CENTRAL/KABUL				
1. Kabul	94	Dara Mirdad Village	Dara Murghazar Village	No village found with such name
	97	Qala Bakar Village	Wolaswali Bagrami Village	No village found with such name
	99	Kargo Ya Kargo Village	Markaz Tapa Sewom Village	Security problem
	107	Kotakar Wochkaraiz Village	Muhen Khil Village	Security problem
	108	Rahmat Abad Village	Sang Naweshta Village	Security problem
	110	Shamamzaye Village	Khurd Kabul Village	Security problem

2. Kapisa	111	Karaiz Mira Khail Village	Khugi Village	Security problem
	122	Lalma Village	Towachyan Village	The way to the settlement blocked, under reconstruction
	123	Ibrahim Khail Dara Pachaghan Khail Village	Jor Qul Village	Security problem
3. Parwan	126	Shabi Khail Village	Darab Shah Khil Village	No village found with such name
	127	Khosh Dara Village	Tutumdara Village	No village found with such name
	140	Sakandara Sardary Village	Durani Village	Transportation problem
	141	Shemi Village	Ali Khalja Payeen Village	Transportation problem
33. Panjshir	144	Mir Baig Khail Village	Ghanjo Village	Sampled in recent surveys
	150	Khamba Village	Sang Nekhshan Village	No village found with such name
	903	Howdak Village	Dar Nama Village	No village found with such name
	907	Dolana Kona Village	Jangalak Village	No village found with such name
	913	Tond Khoi Village	Qalha Turkha Village	Sampled in recent surveys
4. Wardak	234	Aallah Yar Khail Bala Village	Aman Khil Village	Security problem
	235	Kharani Village	Tangi Village	Security problem

5. Logar	249	Barakat Mohammad Sarwar Village	Joyek Village	No village found with such name
	253	Din Mohammad Village	Deh Yahya Village	Security problem
	255	Zahrab Shah Village	Baboki Village	Security problem
	257	Kunjak Ya Rasool Khail Village	Dara Surkh Ab Village	No village found with such name
	263	Qarya Alif Village	Doshankak Village	Security problem
	265	Spori Kalay Village	Bala Deh Bala Village	No village found with such name
	266	Azra District	Khoshi District	Security problem
	267	Azra District	Khoshi District	Security problem
EAST				
10. Nangarhar	153	Hawza Char Village	Ali Khil Village	No village found with such name
	165	Hazrati Village	Shah Buhran Agha Village	No village found with such name
	169	Meya Gan Village	Sra Qalha Village	Security problem
	181	Dowake Gollaye Village	Do Kalay Village	Security problem
	182	Koz Kalay Sar Kand Village	Atawal Village	The bridge to the village destroyed
	184	Seya Village	Matrani Village	No village found with such name
	187	Atmanzaye Payen Village	Ghazgai Village	No village found with such name
	192	Paitow Ya Lal Kalay Village	Markazi Gushta Village	Transportation problem
	193	Zeyarat Dag Village	Banda Village	Transportation problem
	194	Lalmi Village	Surobi Village	Fight between two tribes
12. Kunar	196	Amori Village	Tarnaw Village	Security problem
	199	Sarki Village	Qalha Banda Village	Security problem
	200	Chapa Dara District	Dar-i- Pech District	Security problem
	201	Chapa Dara District	Dar-i- Pech District	Security problem
	200	Durge Village	Jobi Village	Security problem
	201	Paitow Tentel Village	Sandari Village	Security problem
	202	Narit Village	Barkana Sir Village	Security problem
	204	Babura Village	Adnahi Bila Village	Security problem
	205	Chengay Village	Donahi Village	Security problem
	206	Dacheno Kalay Village	Lahor Dag Village	Security problem
	207	Chehl Gazi Village	Warsak Village	Security problem

11. Laghman	214	Walkank Village	Shangnah Village	No village found with such name
	217	Dak Maly Village	Manko Abo Khil Village	No village found with such name
	219	Nolo Village	Gal Gal Village	No village found with such name
	220	Gumrahi Village	Islam Abad Village	No village found with such name
13. Nooristan	228	Atat So Village	Shir Gul Village	No village found with such name
	918	Awyak Village	Mamo Kalay Village	Transportation problem
CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT				
32. Bamyān	797	Qoul Ali Bala Village	Gunbad Shahidan Village	Transportation problem
	798	Mahajeren Zerbat Village	Dawodi Village	No village found with such name
	801	Kata Khak Village	Dehan Ghar Village	Male residents blocking the interviews
	802	Dahan Palan Village	Surkh Kawak Village	Transportation problem
	803	Dorashtak Village	Sar Asyab Village	Transportation problem
	804	Ghorband Village	Lokitak Village	Transportation problem
	805	Pasheda Balena Village	Gunbadi Village	Transportation problem
	806	Sar Zowlech Jowkari Jowshzako Sheena Village	Deh Now Dara Ali Village	Transportation problem
	808	Ghar Ghara Salih Village	Dew Khana Village	Transportation problem
	810	Char Tak Village	Panja Madad Village	Transportation problem

34. Dehkundi	813	Tamzan Malik Abdul Baqi Village	Wager Tamzan Village	Security problem and presence of Taliban
	814	Seranj Village	Sabz Sang Wager Village	Language problem
	817	Aghil Sang Village	Sozak Charkh Village	Fight between two tribes
	818	Dahana-i-Nur Village	Tay Rah Village	Transportation problem
SOUTH EAST				
6. Ghazni	269	Kala Ghach Sufla Village	Ali Lala Village	Security problem
	281	Madom Wal Village	Qalha Qadam Village	Security problem
	283	Shaliz Village	Haidar Abad Village	Security problem
	284	Zelzela Village	Masjed Eidgah Village	Security problem
	300	Dahi Haji Village	No Burja Village	Security problem
	299	Giro District	Khowja Umary District	Security problem
	300	Giro District	Khowja Umary District	Security problem
	301	Nawa District	Gelan District	Security problem
	302	Nawa District	Gelan District	Security problem
	303	Abband District	Muqur District	Security problem
	304	Abband District	Muqur District	Security problem
7. Paktia	306	Wacha Lagara Village	Lagli Village	Security problem
	316	Waza Zadram District	Ahmad Khil District	Security problem
	317	Waza Zadram District	Ahmad Khil District	Security problem
8. Paktika	331	Waza Khwah District	Jani Khil District	Security problem
	332	Waza Khwah District	Jani Khil District	Security problem
9. Khost	338	Sabari District	Bak District	Security problem
	339	Sabari District	Bak District	Security problem

SOUTH WEST				
28. Kandahar	381	Deh Godarano Kocha Village	Moy Mubarak Village	No village found with such name
	382	Wali Khan Kalay Village	Mirza Mohamamd Khan Qalha Village	Security problem
	383	Daro Mashenan Village	Aji Ahmad Ali Masjed Village	Security problem
	384	De Mula Moh Asan Hamam Makhmakh Sarak Village	Kocha Mir Hazar Village	No village found with such name
	391	Barkiano Village	De Maski Zai Timor Zai Kalay Village	Security problem
	393	Mawla Dad Kalai Village	Shah Usain Hotak Village	No village found with such name
	395	Aji Khaleq Dad Kalai Village	Ghulam Mohammad Village	Security problem
	396	Akhtar Moh Kalai Village	Kabuli Kalay Village	No village found with such name
	397	Ato Kalai Village	Fazl Mohammad Kalay Village	No village found with such name
	398	Burj Kalai Lowal Village	Kadni Pol Village	No village found with such name
	399	Aji Baloch Kalacha Village	Mayubino Kalay Village	Security problem
	406	Char Qalha Alia Village	Sar Deh Safia Village	Security problem
	407	Aji Khunin Village	Lot Baba Kocha Village	Security problem
	408	Akhtar Kariz Village	Qalha Shah Mardan Village	Security problem
	409	Achekzai Yuzni Village	Manan Chawk Village	Security problem
	410	Aji Mohammad Esa Village	Darbazan Village	Security problem
	411	Akhund Zada Khil (Barzayi) Village	Dabroyel Village	Security problem
	413	Anzargi Village	Zarifa Mina Village	No village found with such name
	414	Byaban Kalai Village	Monawar Andam Kalay Village	No village found with such name

29. Zabul	425	Shar Mila Village	Abdullah Khan Village	Security problem and presence of Taliban
30. Urozgan	765	Skech Village	Kotal Village	No village found with such name
	767	Shen Ghola Village	Shin Nahrta Village	No village found with such name
	770	Shaheed-i-Hasas District	Chora District	Security problem
	771	Shaheed-i-Hasas District	Chora District	Security problem
	958	Shaheed-i-Hasas District	Chora District	Security problem
	959	Shaheed-i-Hasas District	Chora District	Security problem
26. Nimroz	445	Mah Wali Village	Alaqa Dar Village	No village found with such name
	452	Mir Ali Village	Malgi Village	This village destroyed due to flood
	940	Shamsudin Village	Nad Ali Village	No village found with such name
	949	Mohammad Osman Village	Khair Abad Village	Presence of Taliban
WEST				
23. Badghis	430	Murghab District	Ab- Kamari District	Security problem
	431	Murghab District	Ab- Kamari District	Security problem
	436	Jawand District	Qadis District	Security problem
	437	Jawand District	Ab-Kamari District	Security problem
	438	Jawand District	Qala-i-Now District	Security problem
	443	Ghormach District	Muqur District	Security problem
	444	Ghormach District	Muqur District	Security problem
24. Herat	467	Akhund Jamshedi Village	Rubat Kabuli Ha Village	Security problem
	472	Asya Buz Bast Village	Buzdang Village	No village found with such name
	473	Momen Abad Village	Sar Tapan Village	Security problem
	474	Qala Safidak Village	Sawa Safid Rawan Village	No village found with such name
	481	Chaka Village	Ardo Bagh Village	Security problem
25. Farah	511	Bala Blook District	Anar Dara District	Security problem
	512	Bala Blook District	Anar Dara District	Security problem
	515	Kariaz Kotak Village	Narmaki Village	Security problem
	516	Kariaz Hakim Village	Barangat Village	Security problem and presence of Taliban
31. Ghor	777	Sopar Man Village	Dara Ghazi Village	No village found with such name

	778	Seya Ab Village	Dara Kasi Village	No village found with such name
	779	Khalawi Village	Family Ha Village	No village found with such name
NORTH EAST				
14. Badakhshan	524	Sholesh Dara Village	Charmaghz Dara Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	527	Towaraq Kalam Ya Madrasa Village	Maida Do Ghalat Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	534	Chehl Kam Shahr Village	Rubat Kalkak Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	535	Kord Bala Village	Dasht Qarinak Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	543	Ghaz Morgh Payen Village	Sar Shar Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	544	Kaida Village	Dand Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	546	Lakeow Village	Zardan Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	547	Gamaow Village	Naw Abad Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	550	Chaka Kha Village	Lagher Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	551	Shaikhan Village	Faqlayee Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	544	Sheghnan District	Zebak District	The way destroyed due to flood
	545	Sheghnan District	Zebak District	The way destroyed due to flood
	546	Shiki District	Arghanj Khwa District	The way destroyed due to flood
	547	Shiki District	Arghanj Khwa District	The way destroyed due to flood
	548	Kofab District	Wardug District	The way destroyed due to flood
	549	Kofab District	Wardug District	The way destroyed due to flood
	550	Khwahan District	Shar-i- Buzurg District	The way destroyed due to flood
	551	Khwahan District	Shar-i- Buzurg District	The way destroyed due to flood
15. Takhar	566	Kata Qeshlaq Village	Zar Mikh Village	No village found with such name
	580	Da Morsalan Village	Taqcha Khana Payeen Village	The way destroyed due to flood

16. Baghlan	583	Haji Nadir Village	Aji Nawab Village	Security problem and presence of Taliban
	587	Haji Gulagha Village	Badozi Village	No village found with such name
	590	Naqelin Haji Abdullah Wa Mohammad Rafiq Village	Panjshiri Ha Village	Security problem and presence of Taliban
	594	Shaikhan Khawja Bai Village	Talab Bay Village	No village found with such name
	595	Showra Zar Village	Chehl Ghuri Village	No village found with such name
	596	Ta Poorak Village	Kaftar Khana Village	Security problem
	598	Naqelin Village	Shahr Kuhna Village	Abandoned settlement
	602	Paghonda Village	Gadi Ha Village	Just a few residents
17. Kunduz	629	Dasht-i-Archi District	Hazrat- Emam District	Security problem
	630	Dasht-i-Archi District	Hazrat- Emam District	Security problem
	631	Dasht-i-Archi District	Hazrat- Emam District	Security problem
	632	Char Darah District	Ali Abad District	Security problem
	633	Char Darah District	Ali Abad District	Security problem
	634	Char Darah District	Ali Abad District	Security problem
	635	Qala-i-Zal District	Kunduz Rural District	Security problem
	636	Qala-i-Zal District	Kunduz Rural District	Security problem
NORTH WEST				
18. Balkh	639	Aji Salah Frosh Village	Karta Bakhtar Village	No village found with such name
	651	Qeshlaq Saye Village	Qaria Qabchaq Village	Transportation problem
	653	Taka Turkman Asfehan Village	Bagh Raq Village	Security problem
	658	Kangori Village	Sar Asyab Village	Transportation problem
	659	Zardyan Mahjer Village	Char Bagh Saidan Village	Security problem
	664	Mazar Qara Village	Arab Nardara Village	Security problem
	670	Now Seli Village	Sukhta Bakhtar Village	No village with such name
	674	Qara Khowal Village	Maghz Zar Village	No village with such name

19. Samangan	682	Qawetash Village	Safed Kotal Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	684	Bariki Village	Naw Azan Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	686	Tewa Tash Village	Char Toot Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	687	Qar Ahmad Village	Khana Sangi Village	The way destroyed due to flood
	953	Pitawak Village	Tajwar Village	The way destroyed due to flood
20. Jawzjan	696	Enol Mal Village	Alti Khwaja Village	No village found with such name
	698	Mir Shakar Sufla Village	Salmandal Uzbekia Village	Abandoned settlement
	706	Fatah Abad Watani Village	Arsanji Village	Transportation problem
	707	Alim Lik Bala Village	Aranji Village	Transportation problem
21. Sar-i-Pul	712	Shah Gul Village	Emam Jahfar Village	No village found with such name
	715	Haji Bacha Village	Achabar Village	No village found with such name
	717	Kohistanat District	Sangcharak District	District governor of Kohistanat didn't allow the interview
	718	Kohistanat District	Sangcharak District	District governor of Kohistanat didn't allow the interview
	719	Kohistanat District	Sangcharak District	District governor of Kohistanat didn't allow the interview
	720	Kohistanat District	Sangcharak District	District governor of Kohistanat didn't allow the interview
	721	Akbar Abad Village	Qatghan Mast Village	No village found with such name
	723	Maimana Qeshlaq Village	Ya Ahoo Village	No village found with such name

22. Faryab	734	Aq Gunbad Ghulam Nabi Village	Chaghanak Village	Security problem
	738	Kamrak Gul Agha Village	Kohi Khana Qaisar Village	Security problem
	739	Jagdelak Village	Naw Wari Qalha Village	Security problem
	740	Ayta Salaq Village	Sofi Qalha Village	Security problem
	741	Ata Salaq Sarbaz Village	Sar Asyab Village	Security problem
	742	Baid Qeshlaq Village	Baloch Village	Security problem
	747	Khowja Zangi Ghalbala Village	Qapich Lik Village	Security problem
	748	Kaftar Khan Gozar Village	Yatim Qeshlaq Village	Security problem
	749	Badshisi Village	Sar Fasl Village	Security problem
	753	Dasht Yaz Village	Pakhal Tughi Village	No village found with such name
	756	Mohmmad Azam Shor Darya Village	Awlia Shay Village	Security problem

3. Selection of starting points within each sampling point

The settlements within districts were selected at random by the field director. Each sampling point was assigned a starting point and given direction. The starting points were recognizable locations like mosques, schools, bazaars etc within each of the selected settlements for the survey.

4. Household Selection

In urban areas, from the given starting point the interviewer headed in the assigned direction and stopped at the 1st street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route. From there on, the 2nd contacted household was the fourth house on the right from the beginning of the street. Further on, the selected household was each 3rd inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer’s route. In apartment buildings the selection method was each 5th apartment.

In rural areas, the interviewer started from the center of the village or the bazaar, mosque, etc. and went to the right selecting each third inhabitable house on his/her route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall were treated as detached houses, counting them counter-clock-wise from the gate to the compound.

5. Respondent Selection

After selecting a household, interviewers used a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and ages in descending order.

6. Respondent Substitution

Using the Kish Grid, under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, the interviewer moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

7. Call-backs (rate, method, and results)

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. Due to security-related fears in previous deployments field researchers had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution. In this survey, while field researchers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt (979%), 19% of the interviews were completed on the second attempt, and 2% of interviews were completed on the third attempt. Due to the high rate of unemployment, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is the norm in Afghanistan.

8. Training of Interviewers

ACSOR first held extended training sessions with supervisors on the Interviewers' Manual which covers all the main aspects of the field researchers' work. This was followed by a briefing for interviewers on the survey questionnaire. At the end of the detailed review of the questionnaire each supervisor conducted a monitored mock interview in the office, and was further assigned to conduct a pilot interview in the field.

On the next day, the completed pilot interviews were reviewed for proper administration. A briefing session was held to discuss any problems discovered during the pilot interviews. Each supervisor repeated the entire process with the interviewers in the respective province. The training typically lasted two to three days.

The briefings with supervisors were held in Kabul. Each supervisor then organized his/her own briefing sessions with the interviewers. The briefing on the main questions was conducted by the Project Managers Mr. Zemarak Mohsini and Mr. Jameel

Rahmany. The Field Managers, Mr. Toryalai Tajmal Zai and Mr. Rahmatullah Faizi reviewed the sampling procedures. Mr. Matthew Warshaw provided guidance and monitored the sessions in Kabul and The Asia Foundation staff and consultants attended briefings as well. Issues emphasized during the briefing were: a) proper household and respondent selection, b) review of the questionnaire content, c) appropriate interviewing techniques, and d) conducting pilot interviews to master logic and concept of questions.

9. Refusals/Non-Contacts/Completed Interviews

Result Category	Number	% of Category
Non-Contact		
No one at home after three visits	437	5.6 %
Respondent long-term absence /for the field work period	467	6.0 %
No adults (18+) after three visits	192	2.5 %
Sub-Total	1096	14.1 %
Refusals		
Not feeling informed to answer the questions	114	1.5 %
Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	81	1.0 %
In a hurry/ No time	111	1.4 %
Aborted in the course of interview		
Sub-Total	306	3.9 %
Completed Interviews	6406	82.0 %
Total Contact Attempts	7808	100%

10. Quality Control Methods

After the return of the questionnaires from the field, most of the completed questionnaires were subject to logical control for proper administration.

Actual interviewing was monitored directly by a supervisor for 7.1% of the sample. Another 19% of the completed interviews were back-checked by a supervisor in person. 3.8 % of the completed interviews were back-checked from ACSOR's central office. The Asia Foundation also contributed to the quality control by back checking 188 (2.9%) of the interviews across 10 provinces. The issues verified during in person back-checks included proper household and respondent selection and correct recording of answers to five randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

In total, 212 interviews were rejected due to the low quality of interviewers' work. These interviews were not kept in the final data set. Three interviewers were dismissed due to poor performance.

11. Weighting

The data set includes a weight to adjust for over-sampling and under-sampling at the provincial level. The data was weighted to be representative of national population distribution according to the population statistics available from the Afghan Central Statistics Office. Below is the entire list of weights assigned to rural and urban areas by province.

Province	Weighting Factor	
	Rural	Urban
Kabul	1.05173871	1.03198431
Kapisa	1.04713488	.
Parwan	1.02202014	1.00282393
Wardak	1.03033593	.
Logar	0.92394254	.
Ghazni	1.05384182	1.03404792
Paktia	0.99759945	0.97886192
Paktika	1.25174745	.
Khost	1.06873138	1.04865782
Nangarhar	1.02539635	1.00613673
Laghman	1.04713488	.
Kunar	0.97233954	.
Nooristan	0.35262394	.
Badakhshan	1.00771821	0.98879063
Takhar	1.07542261	1.05522336
Baghlan	1.05616826	1.03633066
Kunduz	1.03153690	1.01216194
Balkh	1.03922357	1.01970424
Samangan	0.87429206	0.85787058
Jawzjan	1.19106055	1.16868932
Sar-i-Pul	0.99025604	0.97165645
Faryab	1.21380692	1.19100846
Badghis	1.01428359	.
Herat	1.07732556	1.05709058
Farah	1.02410003	1.00486476
Nimroz	0.34971683	0.34314823
Helmand	1.02519695	1.00594108
Kandahar	1.08230925	1.06198066
Zabul	0.72585078	0.71221740
Uruzghan	0.85936827	0.84322709
Ghor	1.05464661	.
Bamyan	0.97364571	0.95535810
Panjshir	0.35588898	.
Dehkondi	1.04968861	1.02997272

12 Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire

Region

	%
Central/Kabul	23
South East	11
Eastern	10
North East	15
North West	14
Western	13
South Western	11
Central/Hazarajat	3

Geographic Code

	%
Villages	79
Towns	5
City	5
Metro (Kabul)	11

Province

	%
Kabul	14
Kapisa	2
Parwan	2
Wardak	2
Logar	1
Ghazni	5
Paktia	2
Paktika	2
Khost	2
Nangarhar	6
Laghman	2
Kunar	2
Nooristan	1
Badakhshan	4
Takhar	4

Baghlan	3
Kunduz	4
Balkh	5
Samangan	1
Jawzjan	2
Sar-i-Pul	2
Faryab	4
Badghis	2
Herat	7
Farah	2
Nimroz	1
Helmand	3
Kandahar	4
Zabul	1
Uruzghan	1
Ghor	3
Bamyan	2
Panjshir	1
Dehkondi	2

NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS:

REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CONVERSATION. MAKE THE RESPONDENT COMFORTABLE. MAKE EYE CONTACT.

DO NOT TRY TO LEAD THE RESPONDENT DURING THE INTERVIEW OR GET THE “DESIRED” ANSWERS FROM THEM. MAKE SURE YOU TELL THEM THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS, YOU JUST WANT THEIR OPINIONS.

DURING THE INTERVIEW, BE POLITE BUT INQUISITIVE. DO NOT ACCEPT ONE-WORD ANSWERS. DRAW OUT RESPONDENTS TO GIVE DETAILED RESPONSES BY FURTHER PROBING - SAY: “WHY DO YOU SAY THAT?” “ANYTHING ELSE?” “TELL ME MORE.”

Asalaam Valeikum, I am from ACSOR-Surveys, an independent research organization. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out what you feel about issues of public interest. ACSOR-Surveys has no relation to the government. I just want to ask you some questions about “matters of interest to Afghans”. I am interested in your opinion. Your answers will be kept confidential and your name will not be given to anyone and your views will be analyzed along with those of thousands of others.

Q-1. Do you own any of the following here in your household in functioning order?

	Yes	No	Refused	Don't Know
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Radio	81	19	0	0
b) TV set	41	59	0	0
c) Fixed phone line	0	100	0	0
d) Mobile phone	52	48	0	0
e) Bicycle	47	53	0	0
f) Motorcycle	29	71	0	0
g) Computer	6	93	0	0
h) Car	14	86	0	0

Q-2. I'll ask you some questions about your listener-ship of the radio. How many days a week do you listen to the radio, if any?

	(%)
Every day or almost every day	44
Three or four days a week	21
One or two days a week	10
Less than once a week	5
Never	20
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-3. (Filtered. Ask all those who listen to radio, answers '1' to '4' in Q-2) You said that you listen to the radio _____ (mention response in Q-2). How many hours do you listen to it on an average day every time when you listen to the radio?

	(%)
Less than 30 minutes	21
31 min to 1 hour	38
1 hour to 2 hrs	25
More than 2 hours a day	16
Refused	0
Don't Know	0

Q-4. (ASK ALL) Now I'll ask you some questions about your viewership of the television.
How many days a week do you watch TV, if any?

	(%)
Every day or almost every day	26
Three or four days a week	10
One or two days a week	4
Less than once a week	2
Never	56
Refused	1
Don't Know	2

Q-5. (Filtered. Ask those who watch TV, answers '1' to '4' in Q-4) You said that you watch television _____ (mention response in Q-4). How many hours do you watch it on an average day every time when you watch television?

	(%)
Less than 30 minutes	10
31 minutes to 1 hour	27
1 hour to 2 hrs	30
More than 2 hours a day	32
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-6. (ASK ALL) Which is the main source from where you normally get information about what is happening in the country? **[Do Not Read Out Answers]**
Write Answer:_____

	(%)
TV	25
Radio	47
Newspapers	1
Village chief /community leaders	6
School teacher	1
Religious leader	2
Friends and family and neighbors	18
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-7. If you wanted to find out about something important happening in your community, who, outside your family, would you want telling you about it? **[Do Not Read Out Answers]**

Write Answer: _____

	(%)
Mullah	13
Village chief/ Community leader	17
Worker at community centers (school, health center, etc.)	3
Friend	23
Co-workers	4
Shopkeepers	3
Neighbors/ villagers	21
Local Afghan Radio stations	7
International radio stations (such as BBC, Azadi, or Ashna)	9
TV stations	0
Other	0
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-8. People get information about news and current events from many different sources. For each one of the sources I mention, please tell me how often you use that source to get news and information about current events: daily /most days a week, 3 or 4 days a week, 1 or 2 days a week, less than once per week, or never?

SHOW CARD. rotate STARTING POINT.	Every day or almost every day	Three or four days a week	One or two days a week	Less than once per week	Never	Refused	Don't Know
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Newspapers	3	5	6	10	75	0	0
b) Magazines	1	4	7	10	78	0	0
c) The Internet	0	0	0	0	97	0	2
d) SMS (text messaging on a mobile phone)	2	3	6	8	81	0	1
e) Meetings in your community	6	13	16	18	46	0	2
f) Meetings or sermons at your mosque	16	12	11	8	53	0	1

Q-9. Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

	(%)
Right direction	42
Wrong direction	29
Some in right, some in wrong direction	21
Refused	1
Don't Know	7

Q-10a. (Filtered. If '1' in Q-9): Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? **(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)**

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-10b. (Filtered. If '1' in Q-9): Why else? **(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)**

Write 2nd Mention:_____

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

	Q-10a 1 st mention	Q-10a&b 1 st & 2 nd mentions
	(%)	(%)
Good security	31	44
Reconstruction / rebuilding	20	36
Schools for girls have opened	9	21
Good government	7	12
Democracy / elections	6	10
Peace / end of the war	5	9
Having active ANA and ANP	3	7
Economic revival	2	6
Freedom / free speech	2	5
International assistance	2	5
Free movement / travel possible	2	4
Disarmament	1	3
Having a legal constitution	2	3
Road reconstruction	1	3
More job opportunities available	1	2
National unity	1	2
Removing the Taliban	1	2

Women can now work	1	1
Women have more freedom	0	1
Refugees return	0	1
Reduction in level of administrative corruption	0	1
Reduction in poppy cultivation	0	1
Removing the terrorism	1	1
More resection to human rights	1	1
Clinics have been built	0	1
Development in agriculture system	0	1
Development in healthcare system in general	0	1
Having Parliament	0	1
More electricity supply now than before	0	1
Don't Know	0	12

Q-11a. (Filtered. If “Wrong direction” in Q-9): Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction?
(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention: _____

Q-11b. (Filtered. If “Wrong direction” in Q-9): Why else? **(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)**

Write 2nd Mention: _____

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

	Q-11a 1st mention	Q-11a&b 1st & 2nd mentions
	(%)	(%)
Insecurity	29	42
Bad government	15	25
Corruption	8	17
There is unemployment	5	15
Bad economy	4	11
Administrative corruption	5	10
Too many foreigners are getting involved	4	7

Presence of Taliban	3	7
No reconstruction has happened	3	6
Suicide attacks	3	6
Innocent people being killed	3	5
Poor education system	2	4
Ethnic problems	2	4
Poor leadership	1	3
Lack of coordination between ISAF/ Coalition forces and ANP/ANA during fights with AGE	1	3
Presence of Warlords	1	3
People disenchanted with the government	1	3
High price	1	3
Lack of aid / no development assistance	1	2
Western influence is too great	1	2
Neighboring countries cause problems	1	2
Increase in level of drug trade	0	2
There is no progress	0	1
Foreign aid causes problems	0	1
There is danger to Islam	1	1
Disarmament didn't take place	0	1
Kidnapping children	0	1
Water and power problems	0	1
Too much luxury	1	1
Unfair elections	1	1
Terrorism	0	1
Don't Know	0	11

Q-12a. (ASK ALL) In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? **(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)**

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-12b. And after that, what is the next biggest problem? **(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)**

Write 2nd Mention:_____

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

	Q-12a Biggest problem	Q-12a&b Biggest & next biggest problem
	(%)	(%)
Insecurity / attacks / violence/ terrorism	24	36
Unemployment	17	35
Poor Economy	9	20
Corruption	8	17
Poverty	6	11
Education / schools / literacy	5	11
Presence of Taliban	5	8
High prices	2	7
Interference of foreign countries	4	7
Government / weak government / central authority	3	6
Drugs smuggling	2	5
Suicide attacks	2	4
Presence of warlords	2	3
Scarcity of electricity	1	3
Reconstruction / rebuilding	1	2
Roads	1	2
Tribe/ Partisanship	1	2
Innocent people being killed	1	2
Discriminations	1	2
Health care / clinics / hospitals	1	1
Drinking water	1	1

Water for irrigation	0	1
Lack of (proper) shelter	0	1
Crime	0	1
Agricultural problems	0	1
Lack foreign assistances	0	1
Lack efficient ANA and ANP	1	1
Kidnapping children	0	1
Too much luxury	0	1
Irresponsible armed people	0	1
Injustice	1	1
Don't Know (volunteered only)	1	5

Q-13a. What is the biggest problem in your local area? **(Do NOT Read codes. Write down answer)**

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-13b. And what is the next biggest problem in your local area? **(Do NOT Read codes. Write down answer and then code in the second column below)**

Write 2nd Mention:_____

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

	Q-13a Biggest problem	Q-13a&b Biggest & next biggest problem
	(%)	(%)
Unemployment	14	26
Electricity	14	26
Roads	14	24
Water	12	22
Health care / clinics / hospitals	9	20
Education / schools / literacy	7	15
Insecurity / attacks / violence	9	13
Poor Economy	3	8

Poverty	3	6
High prices	2	4
Reconstruction / rebuilding	2	3
Government / weak government / central authority	1	3
Water for irrigation	1	3
Presence of warlords	1	2
Taliban	1	2
Corruption	1	2
Ethnic problems	1	2
Lack of (proper) shelter	1	1
Drugs smuggling	0	1
Crime	1	1
Transportation problems	0	1
Lack of agricultural tools /equipment	1	1
No problems	1	1
Presence of foreigners	0	1
Innocent people being killed	0	1
Women rights	0	1
Don't Know	1	7

Q-14. Which one of following issues is more critical or important to your needs at present? Please, rank in order of priority, whereby the most important rank as '1', the next important rank as '2' and so on, up to the least important as '5'. **(Show Card and read responses)**

Average importance of Roads	2.8
Average importance of Power	2.8
Average importance of Water	2.9
Average importance of Health care	3.1
Average importance of Education	3.4
Don't Know	1

Q-15. Turning to another subject, tell me, do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with the following statements?

	SA	AS	DS	SD	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) I don't think that the government cares much about what people like me think	28	46	16	6	0	3
b) It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the Government in public	23	38	25	10	0	4

Q-16. I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. Would you rate (insert item here) as very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad in your area?

Check Starting Item, Rotate Starting Item Between A to G only	VG	QG	QB	VB	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water	22	41	25	12	0	0
b) The availability of water for irrigation	16	37	31	14	0	2
c) The availability of jobs	5	19	40	36	0	0
d) The supply of electricity	13	21	27	38	0	0
e.) The security situation	25	39	22	13	0	0
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	11	38	35	16	0	0
g) The availability of medicine	11	33	39	16	0	0
h) The availability of education for children	25	42	22	10	0	0
i) Your freedom of movement—the ability to move safely in your area or district	25	40	26	9	0	1

- Q-17.** What is your expectation for (insert item here) in your area a year from now? Do you expect it to be much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse, or much worse? **[INTERVIEWER: Start with same item used to start in Q-16]**

	MB	SwB	SwW	MW	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water	48	37	9	4	2
b) The availability of water for irrigation	41	37	14	5	3
c) The availability of jobs	37	27	20	12	3
d) The supply of electricity	41	26	16	14	3
e.) The security situation	46	29	13	8	3
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	41	34	17	6	2
g) The availability of medicine	40	34	17	6	2
h.) The availability of education for children	50	31	12	5	2
i) Your freedom of movement—the ability to move safely in your area or district	46	32	13	6	3

- Q-18.** How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

	(%)
Often	16
Sometimes	35
Rarely	16
Never	32
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

- Q-19.** Have you or has anyone in your family been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in your home or community in the past year?

	(%)
Yes	17
No	81
Refused	1
Don't Know	1

Q-20 (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘1’ in Q-19) What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? **READ LIST (Multiple Response)**

	(%)
Physical attack or beating	30
Racketeering / extortion	15
Burglary/looting	15
Pick-pocketing	7
Motor vehicle theft / Property taken from your vehicle or parts of the vehicle stolen	7
Kidnapping	6
Livestock stolen	10
Militants/Insurgent actions	9
Police actions	4
Army actions	3
Foreign forces actions	9
Murder	1
Suicide attack	0
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-21. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘1’ in Q-19) You said that you’ve been a victim of violence or some criminal act in the past year. Did you report it to any authority?

	(%)
Yes	61
No	33
Refused	0
Don't Know	5

- Q-22. (Filtered. Ask if answered “Yes” in Q-21) To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Multiple Response) [Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions, Specify If Other Mentioned]**
Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code _____

	(%)
Afghan National Army	18
Afghan National Police	41
Shura/ Elders	12
Local militia (police)	4
Tribal leader / Malik	18
Local Commander or Warlord	3
Mullah Saheb	6
Local PRT	1
Office of UN organization(s)	0
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	1
District Governor/ Woleswal	23
Provincial authority	9
Central Government	3
Public prosecutor	3
Courts	0
Press or other media	0
Taliban	1
My family	0
Don't Know	2

- Q-23. (Ask if answered “No” in Q-21) Why didn't you report the crime? (Multiple Response)**
[Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions, Specify If Other Mentioned]
Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code _____

	(%)
It makes no difference	23
Danger or fear of retaliation	22
Lack of evidence	12
It wasn't serious	20
Didn't know where to report it	11
Lack of trust on government officials	14
Lack of legal counsel	4
Other	0
Refused	1
Don't Know	9

Q-24. (ASK ALL) If you were a witness to a crime, to whom would you report it?
(Multiple Response)
**[Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions,
Specify If Other Mentioned]**
Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code _____

	(%)
Afghan National Army	16
Afghan National Police	48
Shura/ Elders	13
Local militia (police)	3
Tribal leader / Malik	23
Local Commander or Warlord	4
Mullah Saheb	10
Local PRT	1
Office of UN organization(s)	1
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	1
District Governor/ Woleswal	15
Provincial authority	5
Central Government	2
Public prosecutor	2
Courts	1
Press or other media	0
Taliban	0
My family	0
No one	1
Refused	0
Don't Know	3

Q-25. If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party? **(Read Out Answers)**

	(%)
A great deal of confidence	16
A fair amount of confidence	41
Not very much confidence	23
No confidence at all	18
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-26a. In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (**Open-ended question. Write down answer**)

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-26b. And after that, what is the next biggest cause of crime? (**Open-ended question. Write down answer**)

Write 2nd Mention:_____

	Q-26a Biggest cause of crime	Q.26a&b Next biggest cause of crime
	(%)	(%)
Unemployment	21	37
Corruption	13	22
Poverty	11	22
Insecurity	12	21
Illiteracy	7	16
Lack of Gov't attention/ weak Gov't	6	12
Drugs	5	10
Taliban	4	8
Lack of law implementation	3	6
Discriminations	3	5
Terrorism	2	4
Existence of irresponsible armed groups	2	4
Pakistan's interference	2	3
Having a weak/low-paid police	1	2
Western countries	1	2
Presence of international forces	1	2
Lack of reconstruction	0	1
Don't Know	6	16

Q-27. Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. **(Circle '8' for Refused or '9' for Don't Know, if volunteered.)**

	Major Problem	Minor Problem	Not a Problem	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) In your daily life	53	31	15	1	1
b) In your neighborhood	50	35	13	0	1
c) In your local authorities	53	34	10	1	2
d) In your provincial government	61	29	6	1	2
e) In Afghanistan as a whole	76	16	5	1	3

Q-28. Compared to a year ago, do you think the amount of corruption overall in ... **(Read out options below one by one)** has increased, stayed the same or decreased?

	Increased	Stayed the same	Decreased	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) In your daily life	23	52	23	1	2
b) In your neighborhood	24	53	22	0	2
c) In your local authorities	32	48	17	1	3
d) In your provincial government	41	41	14	1	3
e) In Afghanistan as a whole	54	30	11	1	4

- Q-29.** Whenever you have contacted government officials, how often in the past year have you had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for an official? If you had contacts with such officials in the past year, was it in all cases, most of the cases, in isolated or in no cases? How about your contacts with.... **(Rotate items on the list)**

	In all cases	Most cases	Isolated cases	No cases	Had no contacts	Ref.	DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Officials in the Municipality	4	7	11	26	50	1	2
b) Customs office	3	5	9	25	55	1	2
c) Afghan National Police	3	8	17	31	38	1	2
d) Afghan National Army	1	4	8	36	47	1	3
e) Judiciary / courts	5	9	15	25	44	1	2
f) State electricity supply	3	7	13	30	44	1	2
g) Public healthcare service	3	10	18	32	33	1	2
h) When applying for a job	5	10	15	25	43	1	2
i) Admissions to schools/ university	4	7	10	31	45	1	2
j) To receive official documents	6	10	12	25	45	1	2

- Q-30.** Now I will read you six different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities with 'no fear', 'some fear' or a 'lot of fear'?

	No fear	Some fear	A lot of fear	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) When participating in resolving problems in your community	57	33	7	1	2
b) Voting in a national election	47	35	16	1	2
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration	32	39	22	2	4
d) To run for a public office	31	37	21	3	7
e) When encountering ANP officers	46	36	14	1	3
f) When traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	28	42	27	1	2

Q-31. Do most people feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live?

	(%)
Yes	40
No	39
Refused	3
Don't Know	18

Q-32. (Filtered. Ask if answered '1' in Q-31) What changes compared with the past, or reasons, do you think have made most people to feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live? **(Pre-coded. Do NOT read out. Write down up to two answers and code to the list)**

- a) _____
- b) _____

	Q-32a	Q-32a&b
	(%)	(%)
The removal of local militias	9	14
Freedom of speech is guaranteed	37	55
The security conditions are good (in our area)	23	37
Having (working) parliament and local shuras	1	2
Peace and democracy	6	14
Presence of ISAF / Coalition forces	1	1
Presence of CDC	0	1
Presence of PC	0	1
(Respect for) Human rights	2	4
Disarmament	0	1
Reconstruction	1	3
Freedom of press is guaranteed	2	4
Having a legal constitution	2	5
Corruption has decreased	0	1
More attention to Women rights	1	3
Good Government	5	11
Better education	2	4
Better Justice system	0	1
Taliban removal	1	2
People's cooperation with the Gov't	0	1
Having ANP and ANA	0	1
Don't Know	3	3

Q-33. (If answered “No” in Q-31) Why don’t people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Pre-coded. Do NOT read out. Write down up to two answers and code to the list)

- a) _____
- b) _____

	Q-33a	Q-33a&b
	(%)	(%)
Fear for their safety	24	34
Security conditions are bad in this area	19	29
Presence of Taliban in the area	14	21
The Government doesn’t allow freedom of political opinions	7	12
Women are under the control of men	5	9
The Government doesn’t care about people’s opinion	5	9
Presence of warlords	4	7
Fear of police	2	5
Lack of awareness of legal rights	2	4
Not interested in/Lack of information about politics	4	4
Lack of education	2	4
No real democracy	2	3
Ethnic discrimination	1	3
Elders / Mullahs don’t allow freedom of opinions	1	3
Fear of Maliks	2	3
Fear of Coalition/foreign forces	1	2
Corruption	1	2
No disarmament	1	1
Don’t Know	4	4

Q-34. (ASK ALL) Various projects and programs have been implemented or are being implemented in some places of our country. Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this area, district, implemented in the following fields?

	(%)
Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges	52
Water supply for drinking	42
Water supply for irrigation	26
Electricity supply	28
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	40
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.)	54
De-mining	33
Demilitarization / disarmament	29
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture	22
Reconstruction/programs in industry	13
Building new mosques	23
Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	26
Other	3

Q-35. (If answered “Yes”, Code 1, in Q-34, ASK) Has the Afghan Government or Foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of the aid for the projects?

Q-34. Aware of project	Yes	No	Ref/DK	Q-35 Who has provided the most aid for the project?	Afghan Gov't	Foreign Sponsor	Bo-th	Ref/DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges	52	47	1	a) Reconstru- ction/building of roads, bridges	34	39	27	1
b) Water supply for drinking	42	57	1	b) Water supply for drinking	46	31	22	1
c) Water supply for irrigation	26	73	2	c) Water supply for irrigation	55	25	19	0

d) Electricity supply	28	71	1	d) Electricity supply	55	22	21	1
e) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	40	59	2	e) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	45	27	27	1
f) Education (reconstruction/ opening of school, more teachers etc.)	54	44	1	f) Education (reconstruction/ opening of school, more teachers etc.)	54	20	26	1
g) De-mining	33	64	2	g) De-mining	33	43	23	1
h) Demilitarization / disarmament	29	68	3	h) Demilitarization / disarmament	47	26	25	1
i) Reconstruction/ programs in agriculture	22	75	3	i) Reconstruction/ programs in agriculture	49	25	25	1
j) Reconstruction/ programs in industry	13	84	3	j) Reconstruction/ programs in industry	47	27	26	1
k) Building new mosques	23	75	2	k) Building new mosques	70	16	12	2
l) Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	26	72	2	l) Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, - shelter, production materials etc.	31	35	33	1
m) Other (specify)	3	95	2	m) Other (specify)	50	31	16	2

(Ask if respondent is aware of foreign sponsors of any project—answered Code 2 or 3 in Q-35; Otherwise skip to Q-38)

Q-36. Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned that have been implemented in this area, district? **(Single response)**
[Do Not Read List]

Write country: _____

DO NOT SHOW CODE LIST IN THE DARI OR PASHTO QQ

	(%)
USA	41
United Kingdom (Britain)	1
Germany	8
Japan	7
India	5
Pakistan	1
China	1
Iran	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Turkey	2
Italy	1
Korea	0
Canada	1
France	3
Sweden	2
Spain	1
Australia	1
Norway	0
Bangladesh	0
Holland	1
Denmark	0
Hungary	0
Uzbekistan	0
Tajikistan	1

Belgium	0
Turkmenistan	0
Russia	0
Switzerland	0
Finland	0
PRT team	3
Lithuania	0
National Solidarity Program	1
France	1
Foreign countries	3
WFP	1
World Bank	0
UN agencies	2
ECHO agency	0
Indonesia	0
Kuwait	0
Ibn-e-Sena Foundation	0
Egypt	0
DAKAR agency	0
Red Cross	0
South Africa	0
Foreign NGOs	1
Poland	0
DAFA organization	0
Kazakhstan	0
Don't Know	5

Q-37. Which other countries have provided aid for the projects in your area, district?
PROBE: Any other?
(Multiple response) [Do Not Read List]

Write down all that apply, then code: _____
DO NOT SHOW CODE LIST IN THE DARI OR PASHTO QQ

	(%)
USA	20
United Kingdom (Britain)	5
Germany	17
Japan	17
India	14
Pakistan	4
China	5
Iran	5
Saudi Arabia	4
Turkey	3
Italy	4
Korea	0
Canada	3
France	7
Sweden	3
Spain	0
Africa	0
Australia	1
Norway	2
Bangladesh	0
Holland	2
Denmark	1
Hungary	0
Uzbekistan	0
Tajikistan	1
Belgium	0

Turkmenistan	0
Russia	2
Switzerland	0
Finland	0
PRT team	2
Lithuania	2
National Solidarity Program	0
Foreign countries	3
WFP	1
World Bank	0
UN agencies	1
Indonesia	0
Kuwait	0
Egypt	0
South Africa	0
Foreign NGOs	1
Poland	1
Greece	0
Kazakhstan	0

ECONOMY

Q-38. (ASK ALL) Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the economy of Afghanistan. If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government?

	(%)
More prosperous	54
Less prosperous	24
About as prosperous	14
Absent during Taliban rule	6
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-39. Now, going even farther back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about your family then and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the *Soviet occupation* government?

	(%)
More prosperous	50
Less prosperous	32
About as prosperous	10
Absent during Soviet rule/ occupation	6
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-40. (*Intentionally left blank*)

Q-41. At this house where you live, do you have the following kinds of electricity supply?
(Read out options)

Q-42. **(Ask for each kind of electricity supply answered with “Yes” at Q-41)** On an average day composed of 24 hours, how many hours a day do you use electricity provided by...? **(Fill in actual hours)**

Q-43. **(Keep asking for each kind of electricity supply answered with “Yes” at Q-41)** And thinking of monthly expenses, how much in Afghanis do you spend on an average month on electricity provided by...?

Q-41. Kinds of electricity supply used at the house					Q-42. Hours a day		Q-43. Amount spent in a month	
	Yes	No	Ref.	DK	Hours	Ref./DK	Amounts	Ref./DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)	(Afs)	(%)
a) Neighbor's generator that provides electricity to your and other households in the area	11	88	0	1	3.64	0	590.55	8
b) Privately, self-owned (non-neighbor) generator	12	87	0	1	3.50	0	1010.23	9
c) Community owned generator, which provides electricity to your household	16	84	0	1	4.41	0	479.63	5
d) Government electricity – direct line dedicated to your house	20	79	0	1	18.77	0	902.89	3
e) Government electricity – other sources, but not directly connected to your home	3	95	0	1	14.66	1	640.03	8
f) Large batteries/ invertors (such as for running TV, lights, etc.)	6	93	0	1	3.22	0	247.67	13
g) Solar panels for producing electricity	4	94	0	1	4.82	0	194.37	72

- Q-44a. (ASK ALL)** What is your main source of energy for cooking? / What do you cook on most? **(Code in the first column below)**
- Q-44b.** And what do you heat your house with most? / What is your main source of energy for heating? **(Code in the second column)**
- Q-44c.** And what do you mostly use for lighting? / What is your main source of energy for lighting? **(Code in the third column below)**

	Q-44a Main source of cooking	Q-44b. Main source of heating	Q-44c. Main source of lighting
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Animal dung/ manure	16	17	0
Bottled gas/LPG	23	4	0
Candles	0	0	3
Charcoal	2	14	0
Coal	2	10	0
Diesel	0	0	7
Electricity	0	8	46
Firewood	52	39	0
Grass or other biomass	6	7	0
Kerosene	0	1	26
Petrol	0	0	2

- Q-45.** Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has got better, remained the same or got worse with respect to the following?

	Better	The same	Worse	Ref.	DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Financial well-being of your household	31	55	14	0	0
b) Employment opportunities	11	40	47	0	1
c) Availability of products in the market	19	48	30	1	2
d) Quality of your food diet	23	53	23	0	1
e) Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	20	55	23	0	1
f) Health well-being of your family members	32	48	19	0	1
g) Electric supply	23	36	37	2	2
h) Access to schools	40	44	15	0	1

Q-46. Now, to change the subject. Sometimes people and communities have problems related to an issue that concerns everybody in their area, that they can't resolve on their own and so they have to ask for the help of a government official or a government agency. In the past 5 years, has your community had such a problem in your area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve it?

	(%)
Yes	23
No	71
Refused	1
Don't Know	5

Q-47. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-46). What kind of problem was/is that? (Open-ended. Write down first mentioned answer)

	(%)
Lack of water and electricity	21
Dispute over land	17
Building mosque	1
Reconstruction of roads and bridges	10
Building clinics	4
Building schools and kindergartens	4
Robbery and burglary	5
Poor transportation system	0
Economic problems	5
Unemployment	2
Tribal problems	6
Presence of Taliban	2
Security problems	10
Agricultural problems	2
Murder	1
Disarmament	0
Lack of shelter	1
Lack of women rights	1
Business problems	1
Foreign forces searching homes	0
Environmental problems	0
Refused	1
Don't Know	6

Q-48. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-46): Who did you approach/ask to solve the problem? **(Multiple response. Code each mentioned) [Do Not Read List, Write Answer Then Code Response]**_____

	(%)
Elders of the local shura/jirga	34
A Member of Parliament	7
Government agency/office	9
Afghan National Army	5
Afghan National Police	12
Malik / Khan	10
Provincial governor/ authorities	17
Community Development Council	9
District authorities	20
PRT	4
NGO	3
Human Rights Commission	1
Foreign forces	1
Mullah	3
Other	0
Don't Know	4

Q-49. (Filtered. Ask if contacted Government agency/office, answer ‘3’ in Q-48). You said you contacted a government agency/office to resolve your problem. Which government agency/office is that? **(Open-ended. Write down first mentioned answer)**

	(%)
District Governor	41
Directors in MRRD	12
Courts	4
Ministry of Public Health	1
Parliament	2
Ministry of Education	2
Municipality	2
Directorate of Water and Power	13
Directorate of Women Affairs	1
Refused	1
Don't Know	21

Q-50. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' to Q-46) Has this problem been resolved or it's still pending resolution?

	(%)
Resolved	47
Pending resolution	44
Refused	0
Don't Know	9

Q-51. (ASK ALL) I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions and organizations in our country. I will read these out to you. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in each of the institutions and organizations and officials to perform their jobs. Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in...

	A great deal of confidence	A fair amount of confidence	Not very much confidence	No confidence at all	Refused (volunteered only)	Don't Know (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Afghan National Army	55	36	5	2	1	1
b) Afghan National Police	46	38	11	4	1	1
c) Political parties	11	36	31	14	1	7
d) The Government Justice system	10	36	32	17	1	4
e) Government Ministers	13	40	28	13	1	5
f) Independent Election commission	23	44	18	9	1	5
g) Public administration	15	42	25	9	1	7
h) The Municipality	12	34	28	17	2	8
i) Local militias	10	27	28	26	2	7
j) Community Development Councils	19	44	21	8	1	6
k) Provincial Councils	20	42	24	9	1	4
l) Community Shuras/Jirgas	24	44	19	7	1	5
m) National NGOs	20	42	22	9	2	6
n) International NGOs	25	41	19	9	1	5
o) Electronic media such as radio, TV	32	38	17	7	1	5
p) Newspapers, print media	24	38	17	9	2	11

- Q-52.** I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree with each. **(Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):** Strongly or somewhat?

	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	57	34	5	2	0	1
b) ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained.	19	33	28	17	0	3
c) ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	30	39	18	9	0	2
d) ANA helps improve the security	54	33	8	3	0	1

- Q-53.** I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). Please tell me if you agree with each. **(Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):** Strongly or somewhat?

	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	47	36	11	5	0	1
b) ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained.	22	36	27	12	0	2
c) ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	32	38	20	8	0	2
d) ANP helps improve the security	43	39	13	5	0	1
e) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	34	37	18	8	0	2

DEMOCRACY

Q-54. What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you personally? **(Probe):** Anything else? **(Open ended. Multiple response. Do Not Read Code List Write down and then code each mentioned)**

	(%)
Freedom	50
Rights and law	24
Government of the people	19
Peace	41
Prosperity	15
Women's rights	21
Communism	2
Islamic democracy	23
Less corruption	17
Better Government services	13
Good security	1
I don't want democracy	0
Access to more schools	0
Good relations with other countries	0
More job opportunities	1
Nothing	2
Others	0
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-55. Do you think that political parties should be allowed to hold meetings in your area?

	(%)
Yes	54
No	37
Refused	1
Don't Know	9

Q-56. Do you think that all political parties, even the ones most people do not like, should be allowed to hold meetings in your area?

	(%)
Yes	34
No	57
Refused	1
Don't Know	8

Q-57. Suppose a friend of yours supported a party you do not like. Would you accept that, or would it end your friendship?

	(%)
Would accept it	48
Would end friendship	40
Refused	3
Don't Know	9

Q-58. I'm going to read some ideas. Please tell me if you agree with each. **(Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):** Strongly or somewhat?

	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition	38	39	12	6	1	4
b) Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion	49	31	13	4	0	2
c) Religious authorities should lead people in obeying the obligations of their faith while political leaders should make decisions about how the government is run	33	38	18	7	0	3
d) A person should vote the way his or her community votes, not how they feel individually.	24	35	21	15	1	3
e) The government should include representatives from all major regions and ethnic groups in the country	48	33	13	3	1	3

Q-59. Thinking of the National Government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities? Is it doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

	(%)
Very good job	19
Somewhat good job	52
Somewhat bad job	20
Very bad job	6
Refused	0
Don't Know	3

Q-60. And speaking of particular aspects of its work, do you think the National Government is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job in the following fields? **(Ask for each on the list)**

	Very good job	Somewhat good job	Somewhat bad job	Very bad job	Refused	Don't Know
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Education	37	46	12	4	0	1
b) Healthcare system	17	46	27	9	0	1
c) Creating job opportunities	6	22	38	33	0	1
d) Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	16	42	26	10	1	5
e) Reviving/ Developing the economy	7	29	36	26	0	3
f) Fighting corruption	7	23	31	37	0	2
g) Security	23	38	22	16	0	1

Q-61. In your opinion, what is the most important **achievement** of the current government in the past few years? And what is the next? (**Open-ended. Write down first two mentions**)

- a) _____
b) _____

	Q.61a 1 st mention	Q.61a&b 1 st & 2 nd mentions
	(%)	(%)
Reconstruction	19	32
Establishing peace and security	18	27
Better education system	14	26
Freedom of speech	4	8
Having ANP and ANA	4	7
Elections	4	6
Having a strong government	3	6
Improving economy	2	5
No achievements	4	4
Having a good relationship with foreign countries	0	4
Improving healthcare system	2	4
Attracting foreign aid	2	3
Creating job opportunities	1	3
Removing poppy cultivation	2	3
Removing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda	2	3
Observing women/human rights	1	3
Establishing Constitution	1	3
Supplying water and power	1	3
Having Parliament	1	2
Disarmament	1	2
Removing administrative corruption	1	2
Building circle roads	1	2
National unity	1	2
Improving communication system	0	1
Improving media	0	1
Creating Development Councils	0	1
Returnees	0	1
Refused	1	1
Don't Know	7	23

Q-62. And what, in your opinion, is the most important **failing** of the current government in the past few years? And what is the next? (**Open-ended. Write down first two mentions**)

- a) _____
- b) _____

	Q.62a 1 st mention	Q.62a&b 1 st & 2 nd mentions
	(%)	(%)
Insecurity	21	31
Administrative corruption	17	29
Lack of job opportunities	9	20
Weak economy	7	15
Weak Government	7	13
Not removing the Taliban	5	9
Not preventing civilian casualties	3	6
Bad education system	2	5
No/ lack of reconstruction/roads/bridges	2	5
Not removing drugs	2	5
Not achieving National unity	2	4
Not removing Terrorism	2	3
Foreign forces in the country (long time)	2	3
Lack of/no relations with foreign countries	1	2
Weak ANA and ANP	1	2
Not fulfilling it's commitments	1	2
Not observing Islamic rules	1	2
Injustice	1	2
Lack of foreign assistance	1	1
Lack of healthcare centers	0	1
Lack of freedom of speech	1	1
Not achieving disarmament	1	1
Not protecting human rights	0	1
Kidnappings	0	1
Poor supply of water and power	1	1
No failures	1	1
Refused	1	1
Don't Know	8	22

Q-63. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

	(%)
A lot	14
Some	42
Very little	17
None at all	21
Refused	0
Don't Know	5

Q-64a. Do you strongly approve, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat or strongly disapprove of the Afghan Government's reconciliation efforts and negotiations with armed Anti-Government elements?

	(%)
Strongly approve	28
Approve somewhat	43
Disapprove somewhat	15
Strongly disapprove	10
Refused (volunteered only)	1
Don't know (volunteered only)	4

Q-64b. Thinking about the reasons anti-government groups used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the **reasons** these anti-government groups choose to use violence?

	(%)
A lot of sympathy	22
A little sympathy	34
No sympathy at all	36
Refused (volunteered only)	3
Don't know (volunteered only)	5

Q-65a. Turning to your Provincial Government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

Q-65b. [URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY] And what do you think about the job done by your municipal authorities, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

Q-65c. [RURAL RESIDENTS ONLY] And what do you think about the job done by your local authorities, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

	Very good job	Somewhat good job	Somewhat bad job	Very bad job	Refused vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Provincial Government	24	51	16	6	0	3
b) Municipal authorities	17	41	25	15	0	1
c) Local authorities	23	46	20	8	0	2

Q-66. Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view?

	(%)
Religious leaders should be consulted	67
Politics and religion should not mix	27
Refused	1
Don't Know	5

Q-67. Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months?

	(%)
Yes	82
No	16
Refused	0
Don't know	2

Q-68. (Filtered. Ask if answered "Yes" in Q-67) What was your main source of information about the elections? **[Do Not Read Out Answers]**

	(%)
Radio	44
TV	25
Friends and family and neighbors	16
Village chief/community leaders	8
Religious leader	3
School teacher	2
Pamphlet	2
Newspapers	1

Q-69. (ASK ALL) Have you registered yourself for the elections?

	(%)
Yes	77
No	21
Refused	1
Don't know	1

Q-70. (Filtered. Ask if answered “No” in Q-69) Do you know where to register to vote?

	(%)
Yes	22
No	73
Refused	1
Don't Know	5

Q-71 (ASK ALL) In the last few days/ weeks, have you received any messages regarding the elections or regarding your participation in the elections?

	(%)
Yes	50
No	48
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-72. How likely are you to vote in the coming elections?

	(%)
Very likely	48
Somewhat likely	25
Somewhat unlikely	6
Very unlikely	14
Refused	1
Don't Know	5

Q-73a. (Filtered. Ask if answered Somewhat Unlikely or Very Unlikely, answers “3 or 4” in Q-72) You said it is somewhat or very unlikely that you would vote in the upcoming elections. Why do you say that? **(Single Response only. Ask for most important reason. Do NOT read options) [RECORD ANSWER: CODE POST FIELDWORK]** _____

	(%)
Not interested	26
Insecurity	18
Will not be permitted to vote / women not allowed to vote	15
Don't support any candidate / party	10
Fear of intimidation	9
Elections wouldn't make difference / disillusioned	8
Do not understand politics	7
Personal reasons: too old, sick, etc.	4
Don't Know	3

Q-73b. (Filtered. Ask if answered “Somewhat Likely” or “Very Likely”, Codes “1” or “2” in Q-72) What is the most important reason why you want to vote? **(Single Response only. Ask for most important reason. Do NOT read options) [RECORD ANSWER: CODE POST FIELDWORK]**

	(%)
It is my right	28
To bring peace	22
To choose my leaders	20
It will help the country	8
To bring prosperity / reconstruction	6
It is my obligation as a citizen to vote	5
New government will be established	4
Strong government	3
I want to express my views	2
Don't know	1

Q-74. (ASK ALL) Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?

	(%)
Yes	83
No	14
Refused	1
Don't Know	2

Q-75. When people talk about elections, they often describe them as free and fair. By “free,” they generally mean that all people had the chance to vote as they wished, and that they were not forced to vote for a particular party or candidate. By “fair”, on the other hand, people generally mean that all candidates/parties were given equal access to public channels of communications, that they were not prevented from getting their message across to voters, and that the cast votes were counted correctly and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair”:

Do you think the upcoming elections will be free and fair, or do you think they will not be free and fair?

	(%)
Will be free and fair	64
Will NOT be free and fair	22
Refused	1
Don't Know	13

Q-76. (Filtered. Ask if answered “will not be free and fair” in Q-75). You said that you think that the elections will not be free and fair. What makes you think so? **(OPEN RESPONSE, Write down response and then code after field)**

WRITE RESPONSE: _____

	(%)
Cheating in the vote count	39
Buying of votes	33
Husbands not letting wives vote	9
Intimidation against voters or party activists	8
Finding out for whom people voted without their knowledge	5
Refused	2
Don't Know	5

Q-77. (ASK ALL) Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change?

	(%)
Voting can change things	70
Things are not going to get better	22
Refused	1
Don't Know	7

Q-80. (ASK ALL) Now I will read a series of statements about democracy. For each statement, tell me if you agree or disagree. **(Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):** Strongly or somewhat?

	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government.	31	47	4	1	5
b) Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don't worry about helping people.	41	34	5	0	4

Q-81. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. Are you ...

	(%)
Very satisfied	20
Somewhat satisfied	48
Somewhat dissatisfied	17
Very dissatisfied	11
Refused	1
Don't Know	4

Q-82. Have you ever contacted your Member of Parliament (MP) for help in solving any of your personal or local problems?

	(%)
Yes	12
No	85
Refused	1
Don't Know	2

Q-83. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-82) For what kind of a problem did you contact the MP? **(Open ended. Write down answer)**

	(%)
Lack of water and electricity	19
Lack of roads and bridges	12
Land dispute	10
Lack of security	8
Lack of teachers at school	8
Tribal problems	6
Economic problems	5
Lack of hospitals	4
Unemployment	4
Problems related to trade	3
Problems in the area	3
Family problems	2
Problems at workplace	1
Lack of women rights	1
Murder	1
Building mosques	1
US airstrikes on civilians	1
Foreign forces searching houses	1
Refused	1
Don't know	10

Q-84. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-82) Did the Member of Parliament (MP) try to help to resolve the problem?

	(%)
Yes, the MP tried to help	53
No, not MP did not try to help	43
Refused	0
Don't Know	3

Q-85. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-82) In the end, regardless of who helped, was the problem resolved or not?

	(%)
Yes, resolved	43
No, not resolved	53
Refused	0
Don't Know	4

Q-86. (ASK ALL) Now let's talk about Provincial Councils. Have you ever contacted a representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems?

	(%)
Yes	15
No	82
Refused	1
Don't Know	2

Q-87. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-86) What kind of problem was it? **(Open ended. Write down answer)**

	(%)
Problems related to electricity and water	23
Roads and bridges	11
Land dispute	10
Tribal problems	7
Building schools	6
Building clinics	5
Security problems	5
Economic problems	5
Lack of assistance to teachers	4
Family problems	3
Lack of reconstruction	2
Unemployment	2
Agricultural problems	2
Bombardment by foreign troops	1
Transportation problems	1
Murder	1
Business problems	1
Taliban	1
Refused	0
Don't Know	9

- Q-88. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-86)** Did the Provincial Council try to help to resolve the problem?

	(%)
Yes, the council tried to help	62
No, council did not try to help	35
Refused	1
Don't Know	3

- Q-89. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-86)** In the end, regardless of who helped, was the problem resolved or not?

	(%)
Yes, resolved	47
No, not resolved	49
Refused	1
Don't Know	4

- Q-90. (ASK ALL)** Now I will read some statements about our elected representatives. For each statement, tell me if you agree or disagree (**Read out statement, wait for response and then ask**): Strongly or somewhat?

	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) The Parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country	24	44	10	1	2
b) My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in Parliament	20	38	14	1	3

- Q-91.** Community Development Councils have been established as part of the National Solidarity Program and members of the Council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, are you aware of such an institution formed in your neighborhood/settlement?

	(%)
Yes, aware of CDC in the neighborhood/ settlement	44
No, not aware of CDC in the neighborhood/ settlement	51
Refused	1
Don't Know	4

Q-92. (Filter. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-91) Which of the following groups are members of the Community Development Council in your neighborhood/ settlement? **Ask for each and code**

	Yes	No	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Local Malik / Khan	71	26	0	3
b) Elders of the local shura/jirga	77	19	0	4
c) Mullah	56	39	0	5
d) Local commanders	32	62	0	6
e) Women	27	67	0	5
f) Local teacher	48	47	0	5
g) Doctor	19	54	0	26
h) Officials from municipal/district administration	23	69	1	7
i) Ordinary farmers	45	49	0	6
j) Landless agricultural workers	36	57	0	7
k) Shopkeepers	40	54	0	6

Q-93. (Filtered. Ask if ‘1’ in Q-91) How satisfied are you with the job this Community Development Council is doing? Are you...

	(%)
Very satisfied	32
Somewhat satisfied	46
Somewhat dissatisfied	11
Very dissatisfied	8
Refused	0
Don’t Know	2

Q-94. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-91) Still speaking of the same Community Development Council, to what extent do you think this Council is capable to represent your interests before the Provincial authorities. Do you think that it is very capable, somewhat capable, not so capable or not capable at all to represent your interests before the Provincial authorities? **(Code in the first row below and ask)** And how capable is this Council to represent your interests before the Government of Afghanistan? **(Code in the second row below)**

	Very Capable	Some-what capable	Not capable at all	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Before Provincial authorities	31	50	5	0	2
b) Before the Government of Afghanistan	23	39	11	0	3

Q-95. (ASK ALL) Tell me, do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with the following statements about State Courts?

	StA	ASw	DSw	StD	REF	DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) State Courts are accessible to me.	20	48	20	9	0	2
b) State Courts are fair and trusted.	11	39	33	13	0	3
c) State Courts are not corrupt compared to other options of settling a dispute (informal systems such as local jirga & shura)	11	36	34	x14	1	4
d) State Courts follow the local norms and values of our people.	12	37	32	14	1	3
e) State Courts are effective at delivering justice.	15	36	30	15	1	4
f) State Courts resolve cases timely and promptly	12	28	32	23	1	4

Q-96. And now let's turn to village/neighborhood based Jirga/ Shura, Tell me do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood based Jirga/ Shura?

	StA	ASw	DSw	StD	REF	DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) Local jirga/ shura are accessible to me.	35	44	13	5	0	2
b) Local jirga/ shura are fair and trusted.	24	48	20	5	0	3
c) Local jirga/ shura follow the local norms and values of our people.	25	45	21	5	1	3
d) Local jirga/ shura are effective at delivering justice.	25	44	21	7	1	3
e) Local jirga/ shura resolve cases timely and promptly	24	40	23	9	1	3

Q-97. In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to a State Court or village/neighborhood based Shura/Jirga to resolve it?

	(%)
Yes	16
No	82
Refused	1
Don't Know	1

Q-98. (Filtered. If answered 'Yes' to Q-97) Where have you taken this case or dispute?

	(%)
State Court	38
Village, neighborhood based Shura/Jirga	47
Both	10
Other	1
Don't Know	4

Q-99. (Filtered. If answered 'State Court', code 1, or 'Both', code '6' in Q-98) When taking a case to a State Court, or being a party in settling case in a State Court, have you used any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or did you plead your case alone or helped by friends/relatives?

	(%)
Professional legal services	39
Alone/ helped by friends, relatives	52
Both	8
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-100. (Filtered. Ask all with case or dispute, answer ‘1’ in Q-97) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (If More Than One Case Or Dispute, Ask For The Most Recent One)

	(%)
Dispute over land	52
Other property dispute, not land	11
Commercial dispute	8
Physical assault	8
Robbery / burglary	6
Murder	5
Don't Know	5
Divorce	3
Pick-pocketing	1

Q-101. (Filtered. Ask all with case or dispute, answer ‘1’ in Q-97) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?

	(%)
Yes	50
No	34
Not finished yet	12
Refused	0
Don't Know	5

WOMEN ISSUES

Q-102a. (ASK ALL) Now let's talk specifically about women-related issues. What is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? (Code in the first column of the table below) [Do Not Read Code List]

(a) Write Answer:_____

Q-102b. And the next biggest? (Code in the second column below) [Do Not Read Code List]

(b) Write Answer:_____

	Q-102a Biggest problems	Q-102b Biggest & next biggest problems
	(%)	(%)
Education / illiteracy	30	49
Lack of job opportunities for women	14	28
Lack of rights / women's rights	11	21
Domestic violence	6	11
Poverty	5	11
General health care	6	10
Can't leave homes	4	8
Pregnancy related health care	5	8
Forced marriages/ dowry	4	7
Security	3	6
Lack of professional courses	2	5
Women have no problems	4	4
Under control of men / men have power	2	3
Government not paying attention to women	1	3
Lack of electricity and water	1	2
Transportation problems	0	1
Lack of shelter	0	1
Freedom and democracy	1	1
Don't Know	2	15

Q-103. Some people say that women should have equal opportunities like men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? **(Wait for response and then ask):** Strongly or somewhat?

	(%)
Strongly agree	55
Agree somewhat	32
Disagree somewhat	8
Strongly disagree	4
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

Q-104. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this?

	(%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	67
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	29
Refused	1
Don't Know	3

Q-105. If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice from men?

	(%)
Women should decide for themselves	57
Men should advise them	23
Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men	19
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-106. In the election, everyone must vote for themselves. Men cannot vote in place of women. Women must vote for themselves. What do you think about this statement? Do you agree or disagree? **(Wait for response and then ask):** Strongly or somewhat?

	(%)
Strongly agree	58
Agree somewhat	28
Disagree somewhat	6
Strongly disagree	5
Refused	0
Don't Know	2

Q-107a. Are you aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women's Affairs?

	(%)
Yes	58
No	39
Refused	0
Don't Know	3

Q-107b. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-104a) Are there any local offices of the Ministry of Women's Affairs in the district or province where you live?

	(%)
Yes	60
No	36
Refused	0
Don't Know	4

Q-108. (ASK ALL) Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?

	(%)
Mostly for men	39
Mostly for women	10
Equal for both men and women	47
Other	0
Refused	0
Don't Know	4

Q-109. Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following organizations?

	Yes	No	Refused	DK
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
a) In National Parliament	48	50	0	2
b) In your Provincial Council	48	49	0	2
c) In your Community Development Councils	45	52	1	2
d) In your District Development Assembly	42	54	1	2
e) In your local Shura or Jirga	43	53	1	3

DEMOGRAPHICS

D-1. Gender

	(%)
Male	53
Female	47

D-2. (Ask All) How old were you on your last birthday? **(Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate)**

	(%)
18-24 y.o.	27
25-34 y.o.	26
35-44 y.o.	22
45-54 y.o.	15
55-64 y.o.	7
Over 65 y.o.	3

- D-3.** Are you now working, a housewife (**ask only women**), retired, a student, or looking for work?

	(%)
Housewife	43
Working	36
Unemployed	14
Student	6
Retired	1
Other	1

- D-4.** (**Filtered. Ask if working or retired**): What is your main occupation? (**Write down and then code. If retired, ask for previous occupation and then code**)

Occupation: _____

	(%)
Farmer (own land / tenant farmer)	30
Farm laborer (other's land)	14
Informal sales/ business	12
Skilled worker/artisan	10
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	9
School Teacher	6
Government Office - Clerical worker	4
Self employed Professional	4
Small business owner	4
Military/ Police	2
Private Office - Clerical worker	1
Government Office – Executive/ Manager	1
Private Office – Executive/ Manager	1
Don't Know	1

- D-5.** (**Filtered. Ask if “Farmer”, code ‘1’ in D-4**) How much land do you farm?

	(%)
Less than 1 Jerib	12
1 - 2 Jerib	25
2.1- 3 Jerib	27
More than 3 Jerib	36
Refused	0
Don't Know	1

D-6. (ASK ALL) What is the highest level of school you completed? **(Write down response and code)**

Education : _____

	(%)
Never went to school	60
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	9
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	7
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	5
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	4
High School (classes 10 to 12)	12
University education or above	2

D-7. Which languages can you read? **(Multiple response. Code each mentioned)**

	(%)
Cannot Read	54
Dari	36
Pashto	30
English	5
Uzbeki	1
Urdu	1

D-9. Are you married or single?

	(%)
Single	22
Married	75
Widower/ Widow	3

D-11. (Ask All) How many people live here at this address? **(Record Number Below)**

	(%)
1-5 pers.	10
6-7 pers.	20
8-9 pers.	25
10-11 pers.	18
Over 12 pers.	28

D-13a. For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly income? **(Show Card and read out)**

	(%)
Less than 2,000 Afs	16
2,001 – 3,000 Afs	18
3,001 – 5,000 Afs	24
5,001 – 10,000 Afs	23
10,001 – 15,000 Afs	9
15,001 – 20,000 Afs	5
20,001 – 25,000 Afs	2
25,001 – 40,000 Afs	1
More than 40,000 Afs	0
Refused	0
Don't Know	2


D-13b. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income?


	(%)
Yes	14
No	85
Refused	0
Don't know	1

D-13c. [ASK IF YES AT D13b] How much of your household’s total income comes from female members of the household?

	(%)
Less than 25 (up to one quarter)	65
Between 26 and 50 (up to one half)	28
Between 51 and 75 (up to three quarters)	4
Between 76 to 100 (more than three quarters)	2
Don't Know	2

13 Appendix 4: Afghanistan Provincial and Regional map





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